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ABSTRACT
The recent Congressional mandate to establish a
"drug czar" has highlighted a growing concern about the
effectiveness of current federal drug enforcement
ef:forts. As the primary federal maritime drug
interd:iction agency, the Coast Guard has been involved
in the c:urrent "drug war" since the late 1960's.
This thesis addresses two issues surrounding the
current federal. dr-.g enforcement effort. First, the
evol uti. on f the c:urrent enforcement structure where
specialized agencies attempt to carry out related and
often conflictino activitie-s. Second, the Coast Guard's
entry into this str.ucture and its impacts.
The research fo:Lused on the dual issues of (1) how
the c::r..rent eriforcemenrt structure evolved and (2) how
the Cast Guard entered that. structur-e and to what
extent the service h--as canged. A literature review was
C01onducted f the -:istory of: drug control policy in the
Un itEd St ates, Coast Guard organizati onal history,
general. organ:izat i onal theory, public admi ni strati on
ttheory, and social. studies of police work. Primary
researc '.h was c:norrduct,:t-ed in Coast Guard arch i ves,
.egis. lati. e h-iistrories, case law, and government
pul:I icat:ions. Interviews were conducted with senior
Coast Guard officers as well as those assigned to
various enforcement agencies as liaison officers.
The research indicates that: (1) the current
federal drug enforcement structure has been preceded by
a cyclical pattern of organizational consolidation,
fragmentation, and reconsolidation; (2) the Coast
Guard's entry into the current drug interdiction mission
was a reflexive, unplanned action in response to
external changes; and (3) the service has made extensive
organizational changes to incorporate drug interdiction
into its mi;ssi. on I:ortfolio .
Thesi s Super visorr: John Varn Maanen
Title: F:rrofessor of Organizati onal Behavior
and Mar -. ement
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a study of the emergence of drug
interdiction as a major mission in the United States
Coast Guard. It is a change that has taken place within
the broader federal drug enforcement structure which
itself has undergone extensive change. My goal is to
understand more clearly the impacts of the drug
interdiction mission on the Coast Guard as an
organization and, at the same time, to understand these
impacts as they relate to the on-going changes in the
larger drug enforcement structure of the federal
government.
Drtugt interdiction has become a major activity of
the Coast Guard in the last twenty years (1969-.1989) and
is worthy of study because it has not developed in a
"traditional" manner. That is to say it was not the
subject of specific organic legislation, executive
order, or other formal mandate. The Coast Guard reacted
to events in its operating environment based on an
organizational structure with standard operating
procedures, utilizing flexible multi-mission resources
capable of immediate response, and pursuant to law and
custom bu:ilt up over centuries of operations in the
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maritime environment. In this fashion the service
exerted itself into the federal drug enforcement
structure from the bottom up when maritime smuggling
materialized. Top level policymakers did not recognize
this at the outset and, in turn, demonstrated early
ambivalence regarding the Coast Guard as an enforcement
agency. Over the last two decades this situation has
changed dramatically.
THEN AND NOW
In 1969 the Coast guard was assisting other
government enforcement agencies, when requested, by
providing cutters or aircraft and a military "back-up"
to other agents enforcing drug,- fish and wildlife,
immigration, customs, and a variety of other laws.
There were few specific Coast Guard law enforcement
operations other than port security pollution
enforcement, and fisheries conservation activities. The
service had recently moved from the Treasury Department
where it had been since its inception in 1790 and was
placed in the new Department of Transportation in 1967.
Maritime safety programs, environmental protection, and
the anticipated expansion of fisheries conservation
dominated the internal policy agenda and were considered
"growth" missions. Traditional services such as search
and rescLu:- (SAR) and maintenance of aids to navigation
10
(AlTON) were delivered routinely. As with every war
since 1790, nearly 10'.0 Coast guard personnel were
fighting in Vietnam. In early October a patrol boat
operating out of San Diego, California was diverted to
investigate a suspicious vessel and made an unusual
seizure of several hundred pounds of mariLjuana.
By 1.989, twenty years later, the Coast Guard had
seize- nearly 27 million pounds of marijuana and over 4:3
thclousand pounds of cocaine- and in cooperative efforts;
with other agencies another 2.6 million pounds of
marijuana and 37 t.-.sand pounds of cocaine were seized.
As smuggle rs changed routes and modes of transportatioln
to avoid sea atrols in the early and mid-1930'ss. The
Coast Guard cshifted its interdiction mission emphafsis to
the ai.r perating airborne early warnin aircraft
(AWACS , mobile ick::et lines formed with radar euioed
balloons tethered t support vessels, jet interceptors
with : sophisticated imaging and detection equipment, and
helicopters to deploy law enforcement strike teams into
tlhe ahamas or clandestine airstrips in the United
States.
The Office of Operations in Coast Guard
Headquarters that directed search and rescue, aids to
navigati on, communi cati ns polar ice brea -k::ing,
i. ntel li.gerce. pollution enforcement, and mari ne sci ences
1t
programs in 1969 is now called the Office of Law
Enforcement and 'Defense Operations. It contains only
intelligence, defense operations, and law enforcement
program management along with facility management of
aircraft and cutters. The traditional core operating
program portfolio has been largely divested to other
Headquarters offices.
Further testimony to this change, the 1988
presidential elections were an unprecedented occassion
in Coast Guard history. For the first time the service
was a focal point in presidential campaign debate. When
the "war on drugs" surfaced as a major campaign theme,
the Coast Guard found itself being championed by both
Jesse Jackson and George Bush. This level of visibility
had not occurred in the past, even in the presence of
equally high visibility operations carried out by the
Coast Guard - most notably the Cuban exodus from Mariel,
Cuba in 1980.
CHARTING A COURSE
The fact that the Coast Guard has drawn high level
attention is, of course, noteworthy. However, the
course sailed by the Coast Guard organization to arrive
at the present location is even more noteworthy and
12
deserves a closer examination than has been conducted to
date.
Precisely when and how the service became involved
in drug interdiction is fuzzy. If one were to travel
around the Coast Guard today and ask its members when
the Coast Guard began its current drug interdiction
effort the response would likely be "sometime in the
early 70"s." If the same question were asked regarding
environmental protection, 20C0-mile fishery zone
enforcement, Coast Guard action in Vietnam, or the Cuban
exodus from Mariel, the reply would include some
legislative mandate or- ex,,ecutive order and a date or set
of dates as chronological bookends. Such is the case
with the current environmental catastrophe involving the
grounding of the Exxon Valdez. The reason for the
ambiguity in the organizational memory regarding drug
interdiction lies in the absence of clear "navigational
aids" such as legislation or eecutive order. Most
mission are clear, chronological bookends exist and
detailed histories can be found on the program or
operation. None has been written to date concerning the
current Coast Guard anti-smuggling campaign. While
professional journals carry articles on drug enforcement
and bureaucratic turf battles with Customs, no one, to
the knowledge of this researcher, has written a detail.ed
history of the current drug interdiction mission.
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The linkage between the general law enforcement
mission and the specific drug interdiction function is
discernible from available data. The drug interdiction
mission is one which has been built up over time and
blended into the overall law enforcement program
evolution in legal concept and operations. Like the
development of case law, drug interdiction by the Coast
Guard is the application of precedents and mandates
accumulated over time in varied situations: boarding
expertise gained in the enforcement of fishing treaties,
interdiction experience gained off the Mekong Delta,
designation of Coast Guard officers as "officers of the
customs" since 790, the operational and cultural
heritage of th e Pro-hibition Rum Wars, and an operating
presence in the Caribbean since Eighteenth Century
encounters with privateers and pirates. Along the way
the Coast Guard gained jurisdiction to deal with the
drug problem on the high seas, a power not held by
Customs or the Drug Enforcement dministration.
The fact that law enforcement activity and anti-
smuggling operations in particular are so ingrained into
the organizational memory and operation has clouded how
the agency has changed to accommodate their growth. In
a si milar manner constant change in the external drug
enforcement structure has diverted attention, until
14
recently, from the expanded role the Coast Guard has
been playing in the overall enforcement structure.
THE FEDERAL CONTEXT
Contrasted to the slow accumulation of expertise,
jurisdiction, authority, and infrastructure within the
Coast Guard, the federal drug enforcement structure has
developed cyclically through the consolidation of
fragmented activities into a single entity, the
breakdown of the entity because of further
fragmentation, and the creation of another entity. This
pattern can be seen in the ascendancy of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) following the institution of
the first domestic controls in the United States, its
eventual dissoliution, and the establishment of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). The
pattern was repeated in the dissolution of the BNDD and
the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA). While the DEA exists today, it is no longer
a true lead agency, as external coordinating structures
have been created to consolidate the efforts of the
various enforcement agencies. In addition, this
cyclical evolution has been accompanied by fluctuating
debate over the the proper roles of control measures and
abuse prevention, commonly referred to today as the
supply and demand sides of drug abuse problem.
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This changing federal enforcement structure is
important to the Coast Guard in that it provides the
macro structure in which drug interdiction is carried
out. While legislation and policy decisions since the
early and mid-1980's have incorporated the role of the
Coast Guard into this broader framework, earlier actions
did not. In major reorganizations of the drug
enforcement structure in 1968 and 1973, the Coast Guard
was not considered. As a result early Coast Guard
interdiction operations were based on existing
procedures and bottom-.p policy generation. More
recently the trend has been to centralize policymaC:king
and focus on top-down programs.
It is a central proposition of this study, then,
that the druQ interdiction operations begun in low
profile twenty years ago have resulted in internal
organizational changes that are more significant than
any formal reorganization or mission acquisition that
has occurred since the formation of the modern Coast
Guard in 1915 with the merger of the Revenue Cutter
Service and the Life Saving Service. The fact that this
change has been accomplished in the absence of the
formal change mechanism normally found in government
bureaucracies makes this case all the more important to
those who lead and manage the Coast Guard as well. as
16
those who interact with the service in the external
environment. The extent of this change can also be
assessed in reviewing and contrasting the evolution of
the larger macro drug enforcement structure.
THESIS SCOPE AND STRUCTURE
RESEARCH STRUCTURE: Research for this study
consisted of 21 interviews with key Coast Guard
personnel. including retired personnel who held
policymaking or program managmement responsibility in
the recent past, officers assigned as liaison officers
to multi-agency coorclinating structures such as the El
Paso Intelligence Center, the National Drug Policy
Board, the National Narcotics Border Intrerdiction
System, and the National Security Council. A literature
search of Coast Guar-d organizational histor-y, public
drug policy, and drug interdiction case law was
conducted and a dual legislative history for both the
Coast Guard and public drug policy was constructed. In
addition, a literature search was carried out in the
areas of legislative management, presidential
leadership, general organizational theory, police work,
the social history of drug abuse, and the history of
commonrlnly abused substances.
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Primary data was obtained from records at Coast
Guard HeadqIuar teis regarding internal reorganizations,
resour-ce allocation operating program plans, and
general directives and correspondence. A number of
government reports were reviewed including those issued
by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the agencies
of the Department of Transportation, Department of
Justice, Treasury Department, Defense Department. A
search f-or profess.ional articl].es was made at the U.S.
Co.ast Guard Academry, U. S. Naval War College, and the
National War College. Finally, discussions were held
with Coast Gard officers assigned to the senior servic e
schools noted abiove, as well. as the Coast Guard:'s
Natirsonal Secu.lrity Fellow at. the John F. Kennedy School
of Govs ernment, H-Harvard Universi ty.
ORGANIZATION OF FINDINGS: Research revealed three
m.aj-or areas where change has occurred in the last twenty
years., The first area is the macro-policy level. of the
federal government. The evolution of federal drug
policy and enforcement structures has been dramatic.
These eternal changes have, in turn, acted on the Coast
Guard top-down.
The seccnd area is the internal organization f the
Coast Guard. FParticularlyV relevant have been the
changes i tt-e structu..ire o: the Off rice of Operati ons,
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the location of the law enforcement program management
function and the development of po:licies and operating
procedures. The third area is the working level in the
Coast Guard where organizational outputs occur. Initial
anti-smuggling operations were carried out at this level
in an ad hoc fashion based on the organization,
training, and procedures which existed at the time.
There were variations in epertise across operating
units and commanding officers exercised a great amount
of discretion.. Ultimately the Coast Guard and, later,
the larger enforcement structure began to develop policy
and exert control.
THESIS STRUCTURE: This study is divided into three
major parts following this introduction (Chapter 1).
Part One examines the evolution of the federal
enforcement structure and includes the following: a
conceptual over-view and analytical framework (Chapter
2); a review of enforcement and control activity prior
to the establishment of domestic drug controls (Chapter
3); an examination of the rise and fall of the the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics as the lead enforcement
agency (Chapter 4); the search for a successor agency
(Chapter 5); and the ultimate establishment of multi-
agency coordinatini structures (Chapter 6 and 7). This
study ends there., but the search for the structure that
19
can centralize conrtrol over the enforcement aencie-s and
place accountability for success in a single point
con rt i iues ,.
Part Two focuses on the Coast Guard and contrasts
the organizational changes brought about by the drug
interdiction mission with the external changes discussed
in Part One. Part Two begins with an brief overview
which ties Part fDre and Two together. The remaining
c hapter n +ude th;e .:.l3o, owing: a brief organizational
history of the Coast Guard (Chapter 8); a description of
the Coast Guard's en, try into the "d-LIrug war" along with
ar- anal-ytical framework from which to understand this
action as a ref lexive one (Chapter 9); an examination of
the irnternal changes made to accommodate the drug
interd:i .:iton mri si. o (Chaptersc 1! and 11) and
signifi.cant working level impacts (Chapter 12).
Part Thr-ee conc lides with a discussion of the
future of the drug enforcement and interdiction mission
in light of the 1988 "drug czar" legislation, the
strategic implications of drug interdiction for the
Coast Guard, and a comment on the strategic orientation
of the Coast Guard (Chapter 13).
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PART ONE
THE FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT AND
POL I CYMKING STRUCTURE
21
CHAPTER TWO
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A STARTING POINT
In a recent lecture at the rookings Institution,
A. Lee Fritschler, Presidenit of Dickinson College
stated that 80( percent of the activity or programs
carried ut in government are "visible and identifiableti.e
decisionm-kiingr systems" which are predictable. At the
core of these programs are a limited number of
indivi. duals which eercise power anric arry out the
plrograms Fi. Flure 2-1 is a representati on of
Fr:itschler's model for a system that directs a simole
program t cnsist.=i..ng of a si.ngle legislative mandate.
Given a legal mandate and the constituency shown ir the
mode, most p-jograms are eecuted with little confl].ict..
In essence, Fritsch-ler states "we are a nation of
incremental:ists" for those 80 percent of programs.
When queri.ed on the remaining 2 percent Fritschler
noted that these are programs r activities in
transition, or involved in conflict. Citing the need of
participa-nts to maintain a stable decisionmaking system
in government.: Fritschler points to the quick and
22
FIGURE 2-1
THE FEDERAL PROGRAMMATIC DECISION MAKING SYSTEM
AGENCY
OR
BUREAU
2
COMM ITT E ES
SENATE
2
COMMITTEES 
EACH ENTITY INTERACTS WITH EVERY OTHER ENTITY IN A
DYNAMIC FASHION THAT DIRECTS THE PROGRAM IN AN
INCREMENTAL FASHION
SOURCE:
LECTURE DELIVERED BY
A. LEE FRITSCHLER
PRESIDENT, DICKINSON COLLEGE
AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTES
27 MARCH 1989
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decisive actions of the Johnson and Johnson Company
during the Tylenol poisonings as an attempt by one group
represented in the model to restore faith and stability
in the program management system. The notion here is
that an ordering system which creates stability and
predictability is a necessary requirement of conducting
business or government. Thus it is in self interest
that each entity seeks stability in the system.
Missing from this model is the role of the legal
system in resolving conflicts among the participants.
One might consider this function to be a maintenance or
bounding feature of the system. It is a feature that
deserves more discussion and the argument could be made
that the jdiciary is an equal player with the others
shown. For the purpose of this study, however, the
simplistic view that the legal system provides for
conflict resolution among participants will be assumed.
The federal drug enforcement program first evolved
as a stable program that Fritschler might place within
his 8 percent category. However, since the mid 1930's
the structure as been continually changing. Yet,
domestic narcotic controls started with a single, simple
revenue statute, thus the Fritschler model offers a good
starting point or benchmark for this discussion.
24
CYCLICAL CHANGE AND NEW ORGANIZATIONS
The federal drug enforcement organizational
structure in the United States has evolved in a cyclical
pattern since statutory controls were introduced in
1914 (the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act). The Federal
Bureau of Narcotics was formed to consolidate fragmented
enforcement and policymaking activities that grew from
the Harrison Act of 1914. Created by legislation in
1930 the FBN was the lead enforcement agency until the
1960's. By that time, enforcement and policymaking
activity had again become fragmented. However,
successive attempts to reconsolidate these activities in
a new agency, first in the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) and then in the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), have failed to restabilize the
federal drug enforcement program.
What has emerged has been a new enforcement
organizational form, the multi-agency coordinating
structure. This new organizational form is a version of
the task force concept. Its purpose is to coordinate
specialized activities of the various enforcement
agencies.
The multi-agency coordinating structure has its
conceptual base in the early task forces and local
25
multi-agency drug operations that were created in the
1970's and early 1980"s in response to changing
smuggling threats. In those instances, as now, a single
agency lacked the resources, skills, hardware, or
political constituency to properly attack the threat.
The latest example of this organizational form is the
Office of National Drug Policy headed by a Director of
National Drug Control Policy, more popularly called the
Drug Czar. An added dimension of recent structures is
the inclusion of both control and abuse (supply and
demand) policymaking in a single body.
GREATER PROGRAM COMPLEXITY
These organizational changes have been brought
about by a breakdown in the existing program model as
dei.scribed by Fritschler. In the case of the FBN it was
a failure to incorporate legal drugs diverted for abuse
(i.e. synthetic drugs such as barbituates and
amphetamines) and new psychotropic drugs into the
agency's control structure. As a result new programs,
enforcement agencies, and other system players were
created. From the view of an overall federal program,
the system was fragmented. Some organizations
participated in only one program and others participated
in multiple programs. This problem persists today.
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FIGURE 2-2
A CLOSER VIEW OF THE FEDERAL DRUG ABUSE PROGRAM
THE FRITSCHLER MODEL
PROGRAM GOAL: "A DRUG FREE NATION"
ENHANCED DRUG ABUSE PROGRAM MODEL
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A cleoser view of the- drug problem in terms of
governmental responsibility (or policy area) reveals
that the drug en-forcement program is but one part of a
complex matrix of activities related to the overal].
problem of drug abuse. Figure 2-2 provides an enhanced
view of the programmatic center of Fritschler's model.
The current federal strategy which seeks a "drug--free
nation" recognizes the problem as both a "supply" and
"demand" probl em. ']he strategy also recognizes that
muc-h of te sEippl y side activity takes place outside the
United St-tates. If the supply-demand relationship is
stated as the- mark-et dimension of the problem and the
domesti c-in-ternat:ional aspect is stated as the geo--
political dimension of the prcblem, the result is a
four-quadrant mati. which represents distinc:t
programmatic and po -,licymaking areas.
As F':igur 2-:3 -hows, a number f organizat:ions and
agencies can occupy the same quadrant. Anthony Downs
[1967: 212] notes, "Bureaus enter into an etremely
comp].licated set of r-e.ations with other bureaus and
social agents. Analyzing these relations is doubly
difficult because there are so many different dimensions
involved andi there are many possibilities for
overlapping and inter-twining relations The concept of
policy space can therefore be useTul" emplha-;sis in
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FIGURE 2-3
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIVITIES OPERATING WITHIN
THE FEDERAL DRUG ABUSE PROGRAM
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
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original]. This policy space is part of a larger
"n-dimensional space" that makes up a given social
program. Downs sees the distance along these dimensions
as "degrees of interdependence." In the case of the
model provided here, each quadrant fixes an area of
interdependence for those who inhabit policy spaces in
the immediate area. Downs is clear in pointing out that
the frame of reference is the social function not the
bureau. Policy space within a social function is not the
same as organizational or bureau space which is the
"whole set of these locations" for a specific
bureau [Downs, 1967: 2123.
Downs [1967:2123 provides an illustrative point
that is directly transferrable to the federal drug
program and the enforcement function in particular:
"a given space can be occupied by several bureaus
simultaneouisly if they all have functions involving that
space. For example, the policy space depicting U.S.
nuclear bombing is occupied by SAC missle squadrons, SAC
bomber squadrons, the Navy's Polaris submarines, and the
Navy's carrier aircraft squadrons. Each of these
bureaus has a different overall location, yet all have
at least one specific location in common."
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Movement in and out of policy spaces or the
simultaneous occupation of a space by more than one
agency may create instability in the overall drug
program. Moreover, if the four congressional committees
included in the Fritschler model are added for each
agency represented, a bureaucratic "multiplier effect"
is created. Added to this mileu are the inevitable
temporary select committees in congress, presidential
commissions, advisory boards, or other ad hoc entities
that are used when the traditional system is questioned.
This quick eerci.se alone could lead to the
conclusion that the drug program is out of control as
many have claimed. Attempts have been made to stabilize
the vaiou-;s programs and a multi-agency coordinating
structure has evolved.
The existence of early multi-agency structures such
as the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and the
coordinated operations of the 1970"s (Operations
Buccaneer, Channel Cat and Stopgap) indicate that the
multi-agency coordinating structure was an result of
constrained enforcement agency resources and increasing
drug threats. The El Paso Intelligence Center is a
multi-agency border intelligence clearinghouse that was
established in 1974 to combine intelligence from border
enforcement agencies in one location for ease of access
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and analysis. All of the agencies shown in the domestic
supply quadrant (and others) provide staffing and
intelligence input to EPIC. These multi-agency
operations were regional efforts in the Southeast United
States and Caribbean designed and executed at the
working level among the enforcement agencies in the
area. Early efforts were locally coordinated. Later
efforts, Operation Stopgap (1979) and Operation Hat
Tri ck : (1985), included interagency intelligence in
support of combined DEA, Customs, Coast Guard, and DOD
operations deep in the Caribbean.
The regional operations and the establishment of
EPIC were largely internal initiatives by field
supervisors or- agencies. In that sense, they were
bottom-up policy innovations contrasted to
congressionally mandated policies and operations which
came about in the 1980s.
In spite of these bottom-up structural innovations
in the enforcement program, the practice was not
instutionalized until the 1980's. During the earlier
period. congressional and presidential attention was
focused on the performance of the lead agency (the Drug
Enforcement dministration) and trying to influence the
demand side of the drug problem. The cure for
enforcement fragmentation was seen by two successive
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presidents as a more conso:idated lead agency. Several
intiatives to reorganize agencies surfaced in both the
execuLtive and legislative branches. There was also
considerable support in the late 1970" s to create a
consolidated border management agency.
THE EFFECTS OF PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL CONFLICT
The movement in and out of policy spaces is
controlJled to a great etent by bureaus themselves as
advocates and participants in the governmental process.
However-, the President, as chief executive, and the
Congress, as author-:izer o programs and appropriator of
funds. play major roles as .gatekeepers or initiators of
th:is activ:ityv.
Early on, Congr-.ess and the President focu.sed on
a lead agency. Bv the 1980's there was considerable
public interest in the drug issue. Hendrick Smith
[1989: 6571 observes:
"After the highly publicized deaths of
two athletes in mid-1986, the public became
panickled over- crack, a new form of cocaine.
Fighting drugs became a hot issue. All sides
genuinely wanted to do something about drug
abuse,, but rather than jointly developing a
s;ensible program, the rival parties manuevered
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for maximum public credit. House Republicans,
eager to divert attention from a sagging
economy, picked the war on drugs as their
campaign issue. The the Democrats, led by
Speaker O"Neill, one--upped the Republicans
with a bigger program. Finally, President and
Mrs. Reagan tried to top the Democrats with a
.joint appearance on nationwide TV. The
poli.tics of fighting drugs made daily
headline: in the campaign homestretch."
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE CONFLICT
The presi dent:L l--congressional interaction noted
above i.s n.rt L.nus1al i ri government and has been a facctor
in the evolution of all social roorams in qgovernment..
Three different v:iews of this relationship by James
Sund .. st Richar d Nat: h. an, and Daniel Patrick Mov y nihan
illustrate how both branches attempt to assert control
over the other.
James Sundquist [1981] in The Decline and
Resurgen c of Congress describes cyclical surges in
power between the branches. Focusing on the role of the
president as a general manager-, economic stabilizer,
foreign policy leader, and chief legislator, Sundquist
[1991: 1 'notes that Congress reached a "nadir" in 1973
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at the height of Nixon's presidential power. The
decli ne of congress had begun with the ascendancy of the
strong presidency in Franklin Roosevelt. Sundquist goes
on to describe the "resurgence" of the congress in the
Vietnam-Watergate period through a series of a case
studies on the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, the War Powers Resolution of 1973.,
and new corngressional ascedancy in foreign policy.
Despite the Reagan first term where the Senate contained
a RepuLlic n majority, the resurgence of the congress
has not been reversed.
No where is this more clear than in recent druc.!
legis].ation whe:re the congress literally imposed a drug
czar structure on the presidency in an election year.
As will. be discussed later, the "drug czar" concept had
been vetoed two years earlier by Fresident Reagan who
was attempting to create a mu.lti-agency coordinating
structture through admiitn:ii.nstrative action (i.e.
reorganizat ion and eeciutive order).
Richard Nathan 19e83, in contrast, has described
the president as having powerful tools to combat the
congress ancl the bureaucracy in The Administrative
Presidencv. Nathan is an advocate for a strong chief
eecLtive who can pursue p lic:y objectives thro-ugh
administrative processes such as the political
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appointment process, internal executive office
organization, arnd the use of special councils to control.
cabirnet officials This approach has been used by
Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Carter and Reagan in an
attempt to retain control in the White House of how drug
policy and multi-agency coordination are to be
formulated and eecuted. The considerable
reorganization powers of the President stem fr-om
legisl.ation passed in the Ne-w Deal era which gave
Riosevelt. e-aFis-i..l-ive powers to reorganize the eecutive
branch. Sundquist, 1981: 51-55]
Senator Daniel Patrick Movynihan [1978] gave a
memorable address entitled "n Imperial Presidency Leads
To n Imperial. Congress Leads to An Imperial Judiciary:
The Ir-ion Law o- Emiulation. " Movnihan's [1978: 71 I r 0 n
Law states that "Whenever any branch of the government
acquires a new techniqcue which enhances its power in
rel.ation to the other branches, that techniq..ue will soon
be adopted by those other branches as well." Thi i idea
fits with James .. Wilson's structural notion that
"organizations come to resemble the oroanizations they
are in conflict with" [Moynihan, 1978: 6].
Movnihan c:ites numerous eamples which bolster his
claim: the creation of a Congressional Budget Office to
coLunter tlhe power of the Bu-eau of the udget (late-
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renamed the Office of Managment and Budget); the
creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
to counter the power of the CIA; and the creation of the
congressional Office of Technology Assessment to counter
the establishment of the Office of Science and
Technology in the White House. The evolution of the
drug enforcement structure can also be seen within this
paradigm. The House has established a Select Committee
on Narcotics. More importantly, the creation of multi-
agency coordinating structures has been a series of
moves and counter moves by the President and Congress to
gain greater control over the drug policy process.
SUMMARY
Efforts by the President and Congress to
consolidate enforcement structures and create an
accountability point in government have increased in
pace in the 980's. While the nature and control of the
structure has been a contentious issue between the two,
the overall thrust has been toward consolidation of the
federal anti-drug abuse functions (activity in all four
quadrants) within a single institutional form.
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CHAPTER THREE
ENFORCEMENT AND CONTROL ACTIVITY PRIOR TO LEGAL CONTROLS
This chapter addresses enforcement or control
efforts which preceded the passage of the Harrison
Narcotic Act of 1914 which was the first domestic drug
control legislation in the United States.
AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE ON "DRUGS"
The earl use and trade patterns involv i ng opi ufr
are significanrt factors in the early development of the
federal druct enforcement structure. Opium trade
irnvolvinn China was the first target for international
control.- SiubseqL.ient i.nternal controls in the United
States were instituted large].y as a result as a resuLlt
of these agreements.
Cocaine was used in a variety of comsumer products
including Coca Cola and wine beverages after its
development in Europe in the mid-Nineteenth Century.
Prior to that, coca leaves had been chewed in South
America as far- back: as circa 1500 B.C. [White, 1989: 10.
A.S the t--rr of the century approached it became
as-sociated with dependence and criminal behavior in the
minds of lawmakers and was included with opium in the
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first domestic drug controls. This linkage has been
challenged by researchers who assert that the
association was based more on racism and the notion that
cocaine use was a black problem [Rachin and Czajkoski,
1975: 4..
Marijuana which is regulated today, did not evolve
as a target of public policy until later in the
Twentieth Century.. Synthetic drugs (i.e. demerol,
amphetamines, barbituates, LSD, etc.) which are also
controlled today are not derived from opium, coca leaf,
or marijuana and were not the object of regulation or
enforcementt ac:t:ion until well into the twentieth
centuriy V.
It is appropriate here to define the terms drug.,
narcotic, and control led substances. These terms have
been and are c:urrently used interchangeably. Narcotics
are opiates, drugs derived from opium such as morhpine
an d heroirn. In a pharmacological sense it is incorrect
to use the term narcotic in reference to other
substances.. However, early control legislation
redefined the term to mean a substance controlled under
narcotics legisai.Z.tion. As a result, cocaine which is
not an opiate was included under the controls of the
Harrison Anti-Narccitic Act of 1914. The term, as will
be discusseed, was epanded to include marijuana and
39
synthetically prot..tced opiates such as demerol.. Legal.
drugs of abuse ere never brought under this control.
regime nor were psyi::hotropic drugs such as LSD.
Separate l gislation provided for their control and
created another enforcement structure. This divergence.
as noted earlier, led to the ultimate reorganization of
the Federal Bureau, of Narcotics in 1968.
In r 197 0f, the Controlled Substances Act created the
new gener: ic term "control ledl substance" for drugs and
substances subiect to federal controls. Under this
1egislation substarnces- are placed on a control schecu!e
suLbject t the reul attor Y process and are classified
accordcino to their add:ic:tive qualities and
susceptibil 1 ity to abuse. Th'us the proper term for what
are enerall y call ed drugs , thou gh rarel used in non--
legal. setti n g s, is "ontrol led substance." For ease of
descr::riptio()n the term-n cdrugt and c ontrolleed sbstance are
used inter:changeably in this thesis unless otherwise
indicated.. N-arctics unless used in connection with the
Harrison Act refer to opiates.
The manner in which particular controlled
substances were originally perceived, identified as
problem substances to society, presented as a publ.:ic::
policy issue, and brought under control regimes is
im.:,,ortant :in r und er stand-g I how r ' a-(J-r en for:cement
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policy developed and ultimately came to bear on Coast
Guard operations. These issues are briefly addressed
below.
EARLY POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT
Throughout the Nineteenth Century there were no
domestic controls on opium or cocaine. However-, by the
end of the century there was enough evidence of the
addicitve properties of pium and morphine to raise
questions as to its uncontrolled use. Opium became the
subject of a tariff fee sometime in the early nineteenth
century. It appears that until the turn of the century
this was the only control on the importation of opium.,
other than the conscience of physicians, pharmacists,
and the manufacturers and sales force of patent or over--
the--counter type of medicines, elixirs, and tonics
EMusto, 1973: 1. The only external control exercised
was through the standcards of professional organizations
or the watchful eye of the growing temperance movement
which abhorred drugs equally with alcohol [Musto, 1.973:
10-213].
Figure 3-1 provides a summary of the pertinent
activity which took: place prior to the insti.tuion of
domestic controls on narcotics and cocaine. The
conrceptua] framework- introduced in Chapter 2 will be
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used occasional y as an organizing device in this and
the following chapters. Used in this particular
context, the model does not represent a specific
instance in time, but rather a grouping of significant
activities with the respective dates provided.
The U.S. Bureau of Customs and Revenue Cutter
Service were the first drug enforcement agencies. An
early history of the Coast Guard written by Rear Admiral
Stephen Evans 1949: 1501 notes two early drug smuggling
operati ons.
"A section of the press was just
beginning a crusade against the evils of
narcotics and the public conscience was
beginning slowly to awaken to the need for
suitable restrictions on the trade. Because
there was a tax on drugs, drug-running
copnrstituted a violation of the customs laws,
and thus.! although fully adequate narcotic
controls were lacking, the cutters were able
to stand with the Customs Bureau between the
country and a flood of relatively inexpensive,
smuggled drugs. West Coast ports were centers
of operations for the dope rings, and cutters
in Pacific waters were a first line of defense
against the gly business."
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Evans goes on to cite the seizure of the George E.
Starr by the Revenue Cutter Wolcott for undeclared opium
in 1890 as an early seizure of the era. Later in 1904,
the Revenue Cutter Grant conducted operations in the
Straits of Juan de Fuca between Washington and British
Columbia, Canada using the first wireless radio in
tactical naval operations to intercept opium bound for
Chinese migrant workers [Evans, 1949: 1823.
THE FIRST DOMESTIC CONTROL OF NARCOTICS
As more information was gained on the effects of
narcotics and cocaine public sentiment, spurred by the
growing temperance movement, grew for domestic controls.
The eventual regulation of narcotics under the Harrison
Act of 1914 was influenced by several factors. Those
most prominently mentioned by social historians of drug
use are (1) international events that were related to
the opium trade; (2) early pharmaceutical and medical
professional association activity, (3) and the impacts
of peripheral legislation such as the Pure Food and Drug
Act of 1906 as shown in Figure 3-1. Actions were
uncoordinated and fragmented because there was no formal
policy structure within the federal government hat
dealt solely with drug policy, nor was there a lead
enforcement agency.
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FIGURE 3-1
ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACTIVITY PRIOR TO LEGAL CONTROLS
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The closest organization to a lead agency would
most likely have been the State Department. In
commenting on the international events surrounding
legislated controls, David Musto 1973: 24) asserts
that, "The State Department's unexpected leadership in
the domestic antinarcotic movement originated with one
of the peaks of American imperialism, the drive for the
China market, and the seizure from Spain of the
Phi l ippine Islandis." Prior to the Spanish-American war
the Spanish had operated a government opium monopoly and
for a while the United States representatives there
considered continuing the practice. However, health
officials and missionaries who "were shocked at the
extent oF opium use in the Philippines when they began
to reform the islands after 1898" succeeded in defeating
this plan and gained passage of the first legislation to
control opium *use LMorgan, 1981: 493. Fassed in 1905,
the legislation applied only to the Philippine Islands
[Morgan, 981: 49].
After pressing for an international conference on
the control of opium trafficking, the United States
found that no law prohibited importation into the United
States. The apparent contradiction of rhetoric and
action prompted a 1907 memorandum from a United States
diplomat in China citing the need for a ederal statute
to put the "AAmerican house in order" [Musto, 1973:
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n. 259) Congress quickly passed the Opium Exclusion Act
of 1909 [35 Stat' 614) to prohibit ncontrolled trade
despite the fact that the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906
contained a provision to ban any imported drug
determined to be dangerous to the health of United
States citizens. A provision of the act also required
the listing of narcotics and cannabis on the labels of
patent (over the counter) medicines shipped in
interstate commerce. A second international conference
was held in 1912 and was in turn followed by the passage
of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act 38 Stat
275) in early 914 which placed a prohibitive tax on
op i ulf...
Until 191.4, governmental action concerned itself
with the international control of narcotics, first at
the 1909 conference in Shanghai that produced a
resolution limit importation and then at the Hague Opium
Convention of 1912 where the same commission agreed to
"enact efficacious laws or regulations" to control opium
production and to "tal.::e measures for the gradual and
efficacious suppression of the manufacture, the internal
traffic in, and the use of prepared opium . ." [Chap
1, Article 1; Chap 2 Article 6 of the Final Protocol]
These international agreements provided the final
impetus for domesti.ce controls.
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Prior to these developments, professional
associations of pharmacists and physicians formulated
national policies regarding habit-forming drugs in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Musto
[1973: 13) notes that these actions were probably more
to strengthen the respective professions and peer
regulating mechanisms than to address the drug problem.
Nonetheless. "Their intense battles for professional
advancement and unification had an effect on the
progress and final. form of antinarcotic legislation"
[ Must o, 1973: 13 .3 
The f(APAs Committee on the Acquirement of
the Drug Habit completed a five-year study in 1902 which
revealed increasing trends in the use of opium and
cocaine that were exceeding general. population growth
[MuIstO, 197.3: 16). The committee also polled phys:icians
and pharmacists in major east coast cities and estimated
the number of addicts in the United States to be about
200,)000 )[Musto, 1973: 17. 3 The committee recommended
federal regulation of opium importation and smoking,
uniform state laws, and refusal or revocation of
membership rights to traffickers Musto, 1973: 17).
In 1903 the committee drafted a model state law
which was submitted with the committee's final report.
The cux of: the report was that the federa-l government
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should "prevent the creation of drug habits, rather to
reform those who are already enslaved. . " [ Musto,
197:;: 17. The AFPA view of the time was that addicts
should be maintained legally while the major effort
should be directed at preventing use in the future. By
1905, the other major- pharmaceutical professional
organizations (National Association of Retail Druggists,
National Wholesale Druggist Association, and the
Proprietary Association of America) adopted the same or
similar positions.
In May 1906 Congress passed the District of
Columbia Pharmacy Act PL 1483 that was very similar to
the model :!egis:ation created by the APA. 'The effect of
the law was to protect under regulation legitimate
pharmacists while controlling "hawkers and door-to-door
peddlers" of patent medicines Musto, 1973: 213.
However, physicians were not regulated and were free to
prepare their own compounds for their own patients.
When it became apparent that some form of legislative
action would be taken after the Shanghai and Hague
conferences, Musto notes the APA became a driving force
behind the establishment of the National Drug Trade
Conference (NDTC) which represented the industry in
later negotiations over the Harrison Act.
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THE HARRISON ACT OF 1914:
The Harrison nti-Narcotic Act was signed into law
by Woodrow Wilson on December 14, 1914, "to provide for
the registration of, with collectors of internal
revenue, and to impose a special tax upon all persons
who produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in,
dispense, sell, distribute, or- give away opium or coca
leaves, their salts, derivatives, or preparations. .. "
[38 Stat 7815]. The law was not as restrictive as
legislation which failed in 1910 which would have: (1)
"eliminated the non-medical use of opiates, cocaine,
chloral, and cannabis" (2) "required careful record
keeping, bonding, and reporting" and (3) "prescribed
harsh penalties for violators" Morgan, 1981: 106].
Morgan [1981: 1.07] describes the bill as "a revenue
measure, and everyone dealing in the specified drugs had
to register- and buy tax stamps. The drug trades won
their battle against total regulation, and the over-the-
counter preparations containing minimal amounts of
opiates remained unaffected. Choral hydrate and
cannabis were not included. Federal authorities
retained records of transactions in regulated drugs. If
the law withstood the test of constitutionality, it laid
the groundworlk for an expandable system of federal.
control of drug use and users, especially through
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bureaucratic enforcement regulations from the Treasury
Department."
The legislation had two broad, but connected basis
in public policy of the era. First, support for the
international treaties signed to control importation of
opium. Second, the strong linkage between the
anti-narcotics reformers and the growing temperance
movement. The literature available concerning early
public attitLldes on drugs use reenforces the latter
notion and, further. gives considerable evidence that
public: perceptions of the time concerning drug use among
blacks and Chinese immigrants caused "general public
fear- of disorder ancl inefficiency" Morgan, 1981: 107. 3 
SUMMARY
The passage of the Harrison Act marked the
beginning of drug control in the United States. The
bill was not as strong as the reformers would have
li ked, yet was stronger than the drug industry would
have preferred. The State Department was, at the same
time, concerned with how international narcotics control
fit in with the larger foreign policy goals of the
country. Competing groups viewed drug control from
their own perspective and these interests shaped the
final form the legislation. 50 What the Harrison ct
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ultimately allowed was the imposition of a narcotics
prohibition on legal addiction. While not specifically
stated to be a goal of the legislation, the end of
addiction maintenance was nonetheless achieved several
years later.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS
This chapter is necessary lengthy because the
history of the FBN is significant in framing the current
enforcement structure. For better or worse, the FBN
exerted the most significant influence on policymaking
and enforcement activities for over thirty years.
The Harrison ct was passed against the backdrop of
a growing temperance movement and World War I. There
was little public interest in the mechanics of the
legislation other than a fragile anti-drug consensus
among voters which was consistent with the temperance
movement and pre-war fears that drugs might "corrupt"
young military people. What did occur was a settling
out period between medicine and law enforcement
concerning the intent and implementation of controls.
This period ended with the establishment of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics in 1930. Under the zealous
leadership of Harry Anslinger (1930-1962) the FBN
assumed lead agency status until its dissolution in
1968.
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ESTABLISHING A GOVERNMENT PROGRAM
Early enforcement of the law and the development of
policy resided exclusively in the Treasury Department.
In the period from 1914 until 1930, administration of
the law and the establishment of a program model similar
to that described by Fritschler tended to drift in the
bureaucracy as relatiornships were established and the
law's intent clarified by the courts. As with other
regulatory :initiatives of the period, there was a
lingering question of whether there was a legitimate
federal role in regulating what had previously been
considered state issues. The law was also not clear as
to its intent concerning the legal maintenance of
addicts. Scessful defenses to challenges on the
constituti onality of the law and later administrative
rules which attempted to cri minalize maintenance
resolved legal but not organizational ambiguity.
Proram administration tended to be fragmented. Early
enforcement units were located relatively low in the
Treasury Department while the State Department continued
to be engaged a higher levels in international control
efforts. The .acl:: of clarity and fragmentation of
players in the program ultimately prompted the creation
of the FN as a ].ead agency.
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The law was generally regarded as a "registration
through taxation" mechanism and "enforcement and rule-
making powers pursuant to this were vested in the Office
of Internal Revenue" Rachin and Czajkoski, 1975: 39).
Until 1920, the enforcement unit was part of the Alcohol
Tax Unit Muston. 1973: 183]. The Treasury Department
was delegated rulemaking authority in the legislation to
handle implementing details. Musto 19733, Dickson
[19753, Morgartn 11981] and others have asserted that the
Treasury Department eercised administrative authority
contained in the Harrison Act to issue a series of
"Treasury Decisions" in 1915 and 1916 which proscribed
the legal maintenance of addicts.
Maintenance of addicts by physicians had been a
legal activity prior to the passage of controls and it
was unclear whether the law intended this practice
continue. The Treasury Decisions were made in an era
which lacked the lega3. constraints on administrative
rulemaking which exist today. These decisions became
the actual governmental policy and defined the role of
physicians, prohibited consumers from registering under
the act, limited the amount prescribed, and required
that addict prescriptions be identified as such Rachin
and Czajkos ki. 1.975: 401. David Musto C [1973: 121 has
described this activity as the "Federal assault on
maintenance. "
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THE MAINTENANCE ISSUE
The first public policy issue that arose following
the legislation was whether the law allowed physicians
to maintain addicts. The Treasury Department,
"accustomed to dealing with smugglers, tax evaders,
moonshiner, and similar law breakers," issued
regulations prohibitin g maintenance [Morgan, 1981: 110] .
After lower courts ruled that the law was a revenue
measure which did not prohibit possession, in much the
same manner that a liquor tax does not prohibit
possession, the Supreme Court agreed in a case where a
physician was maintaining a morphine addict U.S. v.
Jin FUey Moy, 241 US 394 (1916)]. The government had
maintained that, in the absence of an illness to be
cured, the physician was providing a narcotic to an
unregistered dealer. The Court held that it was not
Congressional intent to make possession of small amounts
a crime. This ruling destablized the program. The
Treasury Department with the support of the temperance
lobby had sought to use the law as a means to control
the use of narcotics.
With the Treasury Department urging Congress to
make possession of drugs without a tax stamp illegal,
the combination of the approaching War and temperance
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movement prompted a reversal by the Supreme Court in
1919. The Court held in U.S. v. Doremus and Webb et al.
v. U.S. that (1) the Harrison Act was constitutional,
(2) that physicians could only prescribe drugs in the
course of recognized practice, and (3) that prescribing
drugs for maintenance only was illegal 249 U.S. 86
(1919) and 249 U.S. 96 (1919)]. As a result maintenance
of addiction became illegal and separated addicts from
physicians. Congress responded in 1919 by passing
legislation which forbid possession without a tax stamp
[Morgan, 1981: 118).
This lecgislation was intended to stabilze the
enforcement program and was largely the result of the
efforts of an ad hoc: policy body, the Special Narcotic
Committee of the Treasury Department, that was convened
from 1918 to 1919 MusitO, 197.3: 135 . This action is
noted because it represents the use of an ad hoc body
and presaged the use of a number of other special
committees or presidential commissions as a means to
develop drug enforcement policy in the face of
programmatic instability. In fact, there has been
little stability in the federal drug program since its
inception.
Social historian H. Wayne Morgan 1981: 1173
summarized the social. problem resulting from the end of
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maintenance, despite the apparent solution to the
bureaucratic problem:
"A sense of bewilderment returned to the
discussion of drug policy. Even by 1916 there
was an illicit market in most cities; stronger
enforcement only raised its prices. Cure
seemed impossible, actual prohibition
unlikely. Perhaps the only approach was to
combine everything: institutional care for the
willing addict, ostracism for the willful;
destruction of the sources of supply;
propaganda and education to prevent future
adcliction; and the hope of an as yet
undiscovered panacea through research."
THE PROHIBITION CONNECTION
In 1920 with the implementation of the Eighteenth
Amendment and Prohibition, the enforcement unit was
expanded and assigned as a division of the Prohibition
Unit of the Office of Internal Revenue. From 1915 to
1925 the unit grew considerably from 50 to 300 agents
tRachin and Czajkoski, 1975: 433. The unit was led by
former pharmacist turned Treasury agent, Levi Nutt,
during its entire life until the establishment of the
Federal Bu.lreau of Narcotics in 1930 [Musto, 1973: 183].
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During the same period Congress tightened laws
related to the importation of opium for legitimate use.
The Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act of 1922
established procedures to monitor and inspect imports,
seize drugs and vessels engaged in smuggling, and deport
alien violators. [42 Stat 596-8] In addition, the act
created a Federal Narcotics Board composed of the
Secretaries of the Treasury, State, and Commerce to
promulgate enforcement regulations. 42 Stat 598]. This
board was t!-e first multi-agency structure created in
the federal drug program. It was short lived and
replaced by the FBN in 1930.
In 1924 additional legislation was passed to
prohibit the importation of opium to manufacture heroin.
This legislation was passed at the urging of temperance
and anti-narcotic organizations who sought to strengthen
the international controls on narcotics prior to a 1924-
25 Geneva Conferenc-:e [Musto, 1973: 200-201; Morgan,
1981: 118]. Reformers also supported the Porter
Narcotic Farm Bill Act of 1929 which authorized the
establishment of federal prison-like institutions at
Le'ington, Kentucky and Fort Worth, Texas to "cure"
addicits [Musto, 1973: 206.
In sum, the policy and enforcement strategies that
evolved between 1915 and 1930 phased out a medical
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approach to addiction, ended maintenance, and created a
criminal enforcement (versus revenue collection)
organization to administer the Harrison Act. There was
little public opposition in light of Prohibition and a
number of anti-narcotic organizations maintained
pressure on Congress Musto, 1973: 189-193). However,
while the public later became disenchanted with
Prohibition, narcotic controls "did not reach the
proportions of the national debate over prohibition"
[Musto, 1973;: 188].
In 1930, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was
created. "A separate aency with domestic and
international responsibi lities would mean better
enforcement and better cooperation with other nations in
the prevention of smuggl ing, and the nations could keep
in constant communiication instead of meeting at
occ-assional: conf ereric:es" [Mtusto, 1973: 2071.
ESTABLISHING A LEAD AGENCY
In the late 1920's, support for Prohibition was
waning while anti-narcotic sentiment remained high.
However, a series of scandals involving the family of
the Narcotics Division Chief, Levi Nutt, and his role in
other irregularities at the New York field office
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resulted in his removal from office CMusto, 1973:207-
208]. Harry nslinger was appointed to replace him.
Anslinger was a career public servant with experience in
the diplomatic corps and international programs to stop
illegal liquor traffic. Prior to his selection to lead
the Narcotics Division, he served as Chief of the
Foreign Control Sectiorn of the Prohibition Unit [Morgan,
1981: 1191.
The Federal Narcotics Control Board established in
the 1922 legislation had proven to be cumbersome and
reportedly never met as a group Musto, 1973: 2093.
There was also sentiment that the popular enforcement of
narcotics laws shou..llcl be separated from the unpopular
enforcement of prohibition. As a result legislation was
passed in 1930 which created the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics within the Treasury Department. This bureau
also assumed the clduties of the Federal Narcotics Control
Board. The same legislation moved the enforcement of
Prohibition into the Justice Department. The
legislation was intended to remove the destabilizing
Prohibition enforcement mission and consolidate existing
enforcement and policymak:ing activity in one lead
agency.
The decision to vest the FBN with lead agency
status created enforcement unity in the domestic
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enforcement of the Harrison Act and its amendments.
Figure 4-1 is the 1930 organization chart for the
Treasury Department and shows the Department's major
enforcement agencies (Customs Service, Coast Guard, the
FBN, and Bureau of Industrial Alcohol) reporting to a
single Assistant Secretary. The Coast Guard played a
significant role in anti-smuggling operations during
Prohibition but does not appear to have been a factor in
the early years of the Harrison Act enforcement. This
portion of the enforcement history is included in Part
Two in a discussion of interdiction history. Given the
consolidation of activity within the Treasury
Department, coordination of agency effort which would
become a significant problem in the 1960's was not a
major issue in 19.0!.
While this action unified enforcement within the
United States, the State Department still played a major
role in the negotiation of international agreements.
International affairs were complicated by the fact that
international control efforts were centered in the
League of Nations, an organization not officially
recognized by the United States. What little abuse
prevention activity which took place did so under the
auspices of the Public Health Service which, while
assigned to the Treasu.ry Department, reported to the
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Assistant Secretary in charge of Public Building, Public
Health, and Miscellaneous (See Figure 4-1).
As long as the enforcement and policymaking
activity remained oriented toward domestic narcotic
control, as opposed to international controls and abuse
prevention, this structure proved very stable. Figure
4-2 shows the policy spaces occupied in the four-
qLtadrant framework in 1930.
Since Harry Anslinger had just been appointed as
chief of the Narcotics Division, he became the first
Commisioner of Narcotics, a post he would hold for 32
years. Anslinger was strongly patriotic and an vehement
anti--communist who had the political. support of
the powerful publisher William Randolph Hearst Musto,
1973: 209]. Anslinger was a figure analogous to the
FBI:'s J. Edgar Hoover in narcotics enforcement. His
personal values and beliefs guided drug policy for the
longest period in United States history and provide the
basis for many issues under discussion today.
His longevity and the bureaucratic survival of his
agency can be attributed to his personal experience with
the failure of prohibition and its enforcement
structure. In eneral he focused on high consensus
narcotics issuLes andc avoided what Musto calls "gray
63
FIGURE 4-2
ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACTIVITY CIRCA 1930
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
FEDERAL NARCOTICS
BOARD
(1922-1930)
STATE DEPARTMENT
TREASURY
*PUBLIC
DEPARTMENT
HEALTH SERVICE
DANGEROUS DRUGS
NOT CONTROLLED
EXCEPT UNDER PURE
FOOD AND DRUG ACT
DEMAND
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
*FEDERAL BUREAU OF
NARCOTICS ( 1930)
*COAST GUARD ( 191 5)
eCUSTOMS SERVICE
SUPPLY
MARKET DIMENS ION
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areas" surrounding diversion of legitimate drugs and
marijuana, which evok:ed comparison to the
criminalization of "common citizens" during prohibition
[Musto, 1973: 213],,
Arnslinger attempted to achieve program stability by
excluding controversial low consensus activity wherever
possible. However., in the long run the emergence of new
druLgs and this infle.ibility in policymaking and
enforcement structL.re led to the reorganization of the
agency in 1.968. Anslinger was controversial and
powerful. Fiiure 4-3 rovides a characterization of
rns i.ng-er by Morgan [].9813... The following sections
discuss key policy and organizational changes that
occurred within the FBN from 1930 to 1968.
THE CREATION OF CONTROLS ON MARIJUANA
The first significant policy issue which arose
after the creation of the FBN centered on marijuana. As
noted above, Commissioner Anslinger was personally
opposed to enforcement of laws relating to marijuana.
However, by 1.937 the Marijuana Tax Act was passed and
enforcement was assigned to the FBN. Since
criminalization of marijuana traffic and use is directly
related to the current drug interdiction mission of the
Coast Guard. its genesis is amined in detailed here.
FIGURE 4-3
PROFILE OF FBN COMMISSIONER HARRY J. ANSLINGER
( 1930-1962)
"Born in 1892 in ltoona, Pennsylvania, Anrislinger worked
briefly for the local railroad police as a young man but
came to narcotics control by chance. He was with the
Ordnance Division of the War Department in 1917, then
went to the Netherlands for the State Department. After
the war he was in the consular service there and in
Hamburg, Germa ny. He moved on to similar duties in
Venezuela and in the ahamas, where he secured the the
cooperation of ].oca. authorities against some aspects of
the illegal liquor traff:ic with the United States. He
then joined the fforeign cntrol division of the
Prohibition LUnit and became Commissioner of Narcotics in
1930, a post he held until 1962.
Ansliniger was a figure of both national homage and
controversy during his long tenure as federal narcotics
czar. Supporters saw him as a stalwart opponent of the
insidious drug traffi. c that threatened the nation's
vitality. His belief in strong law enforcemenrt won
their approval as did his opposition to what they saw as
so-ft-minded theor i st; aind humanitarians. Critics saw
Anislinger as a persecutor of hapless addicts, foe of
enJ. i htened medical and psychologic:al reforms, and
bui il.der of a tyrannic::al bureaucratic empire."
H. Wayne Morgan
Drugs in America:
A Social History
1800-1.980
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THE MARIJUANA PROBLEM: The only domestic controls
which existed prior to the 1937 legislation were the
previously noted labeling requirements for cannabis
contained in the 19(06 Pure Food and Drug Act. Efforts
by reformers to include cannabis in the Harrison Act
were not success+fu and the first international controls
did not occur until the 1925 Geneva Convention [Musto,
1973: 218).
A number of writers on the subject have expressed a
view that the onset of public concern over the use of
mar-ijuana stemmed from the association of the substance
with the Mexican ethnic group [Musto, 1973: 219; Morgan,
1981: 138; Schroeder-, 1975: 5-6; and Rachin and
Czajkosi::, S 1975: 4. This siutation was similar to
earlier associations of cocaine and opium abuse to
blacks and Chinese. Legal and illegal immigration into
the United States in the 1920's created a sizable
population of Mexicans who used marijuana Musto, 1973:
2193. The onset of the Depression created an excess
labor market and with it concerns from communities in
the west and southwest over Mexican drug use. Many
claims were made that associated marijuana use with
violent crimes by Mexicans and other minority groups
[Musto, 1973:220-221 and Morgan, 1981:138-140]. In 1931
legislation was passed that athorized the deportation
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of aliens convicted of narcotics violations Conqre.s
and the Nation, Vo:lume I, 1965: 1186.
ANSLINGER'S RESPONSE: s the nation's chief policy
maker on drugs, Anslinger was being pressured by state
and local governments to take action. In addition,
successful appeals were being made to Congress and the
Secretary of Treasury through other channels. Initially
the tactic was to raise the issue of const:itutionality
an issue raised in earlier federal efforts to regulate
drugs and other "interstate" activities. Anslinger felt
that since marijuana was a regional issue there was no
legitimate federal interest with the exception of
legislation that would be required to comply with an
international areement Musto, 1973: 2223.
There are different views as to the motivation of
Anslinger concerning the FBN'cs role in enforcing a
mar i. juana prohibition. Musto 19731 asserts that while
Anslinger was ambivalent on the issue, he ultimately
perceived it to be in the best interest of the agency to
cooperate and control the manner in which the
legislation was created. To that end he first
recommended that an international treaty be negotiated
which would provide a basis for domestic legislation. A
precedent had been established earlier in a Supreme
Court test (Missotri. v. Holland, 2 52 U.S. 416) of the
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Migratory Bird Act between the United States and Canada
and Mexico which provided for an intrusion into state
police powers [Musto, 1973: 224]. However, a subsequent
attempt in Geneva in 1936 to gain an international
agreement for broader internal controls on marijuana
failed. The next tactic was to utilize a transfer tax
on the sale of marijuana similar to an earlier tax
created by the National Firearms Act of 1934 which was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Son zins y v._ U.S. 57
S.Ct. 554 (1937)]. This tax was intended to control
machine gun traffic [Musto, 973: 2223. This tactic was
successful and resulted in the passage of the Marijuana
Tax Act [50) Stat 551).
This Weber ian--type model of the accommodating
public servant is contrasted with other views. Morgan
[1981: 141) presses the case that nslinger, when he
·felt that federal legislation would be passed, used it
as a mechanism to advance his Uniform State Narcotic Law
which had been passed in 1932. Dickson 1975: 423
pursues a bureaucratic behavior model also discussed by
Downs and Morton Halperin which describes the Marijuana
Tax ct as one of the "bureaucratic consequences of
domain expansion" on the part of the federal drug
enforcement system. In Downs' terminology, this would
be described as an attempt to create a larger policy
space for the FBN. Citing a falling conviction rate in
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narcotics and a budget decrease caused by the
Depression, Dickson argues that Anslinger was acting to
insure agency survival and growth. Sociologist Howard
Berker [1963: 145-148, in a work on social deviance,
cites the FBN's actions as a "moral enterprise" and the
role of nslinger as a "moral entrepreneur." This view
is supported by the vast commentary on Anslinger"s
personal style and values.
DANGEROUS DRUGS AND SYNTHETIC OPIATES
While marijuana was brought under the control
regime of the FBN due to regional pressure and the other
reasons put forth above, several. large gaps remained
in the control and management of other substances
viewed as susceptible to abuse. The largest group of
these included legitimate drugs such as barbituates and
amphetamines. A second group, synthetic opiates, began
to evolve during World War II. A third group consisted
of psychotropic drugs such as LSD developed in the late
1940' s. Each of these groups was brought under control
in a different manner and this diversity of control
mechanisms and organizational responsibility laid the
groundwork for the enforcement reorganizations of the
late 1960's and early 1970's.
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REGULATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS: arbitLuates and
amphetamines were first regulated Lnder the Food. I)rugL
and Cosmetic Act of 938.. " Under this law, no new
barbituate or amphetamine could be placed on the market
until the manufacturer had demonstrated to the Food and
Drug Administration that the product was safe for use
under a physician's supervision" [Congress and the
Nation. Volu....e T 1965: 11 88]. The Humphrey-Durham
Amerndme-nts - 195 requLire d the dru _gs be sold nder
pre-sc;riptiron CIH 578. F.. 781. The Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1962 instituted a control system for all.
dr-ugs nct- de .cf:i.ned .. nd-er nar-cot ics statutes and required
FDA cer-tifiat::in -that a drug was effective for it.s
i.ntended pI.irc se [76 Stat 794].
Inr 1965, Cono]ress passed the Drug Abuse Control
Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
t i .ghten-:ing regulatory c ontrols over dangerous drugs and
ins.l7tituted an e-nfor-cemermit agency to address criminal
v :i..lations, the BEurieai..i of Drug- Abuse Control in the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare 79 Stat
226, FPL 89-.741. This agencty was ultimately incorporated
into the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, along
with the F:'BEN, in 1968.
SYNTHETIC OPIATES. If Anslinger was hesitant to
get involveFd i dariger-Ious drugs, the same hesitat:ion waJs
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not present when scientists developed a method to
manufacture synthetic opiates. The first of these drugs
was isonipecaine, know commercially as Demerol. As
Anslinger states in his work on narcotics traffic, "The
new drug bore no chemical relationship to morphine.
When the result of official tests indicated that the new
drug possessed addiciton-liability similar to morphine,
the Bureau of Narcotics proposed and obtained enactment
of a special statute, approved July 1, 1944, making the
Federal narcotic laws applicable to the new drug"
JAnslinger and Tompkins, 1953: 26; CH 377, PL 414].
It became apparent that the scientific community
would continue to produce synthetic drugs with effects
similar to narcotics. Anslinger again backed
legislation to bring these drugs under FBN control and
enforcement. A more general statute was passed in 1946
which established procedures for any drug with narcotic-
like effects Anslin-er and Tompkins, 1953: 27; P'L 79-
3201.
DUAL REGULATORY SYSTEMS: It is not clear why some
drugs were classified narcotic-like while others (with
proven addictive qualities) were not included in the
schedul.e of FBN controlled substances. It is possible
that the increase in dangerous drug use following World
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War II was linked to this dual treatment of substances
within the federal bureaucracy. A discussion of
narcotics, barbituates, and amphetamines in Volume I of
ongrqess and the Nation [1965:11883 includes the
following observation that is not attributed to a
specific aLithor.
"For a number of reasons, there was
a sharp increase in illegal use of barbituates
and amphetamines in the postwar period, so
great an increase that many feared the two
substances were creating a ma.jor new drug-
abuse problem in the country as serious as the
addictive use of narcotics. One reason was
that the narcotics laws imposed close
Government supervision over import, sale,
shipment and manufacture of narcotics, with
e:xtremely severe penalties for violations (the
death sentences for peddling heroin to a
minor, f or eample), whereas the penalties for
illicit sale of barbituates and amphetamines
were relatively light, the offense
constituting only a misdemeanor in most
cases."
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POST WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS
World War II provided an opportunity to, in the
view of enforcement officials, to completely control
illegal narcotic use; a large population was involved in
military service and opiates were needed for wartime use
thus reducing supplies. A window of opportunity eisted
for enforcemen t. acti.on to signi ficantly reduce ill e-ga].
.ise. Mrgan [1.981.: 1.44 notes that the "war years were
bleak: for addicts." Domestic cultivation of poppie
started earlier to ensure supplies was stopped with the
passage of the Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942 [F'L 77-
'7973 -lowever, nslin ger was concerned that a post--
Wor-lc War I tr.end which saw an increase in addiction-
woul.d be repeated af4ter World War II. "On the basis of
Worllf War I e;'perien, e the Bureau of Narcotics feared
and redicted some rise in addiction after World War II.,
and t-tee :forebod:i.ng proved to be well justified"
[Ansl. i ger and Torripki.ns., 1953: 166 ].
Following the war narcotic enforcement policy,
distinct from control of dangerous drugs. became allied
with two higly visible and emotionally charged issues:
communism and organized crime. Anslinger was personally
involved in both issues and gave testimony at hearings
regarding both subjects.
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COMMUNISM AND NARCOTICS: A Senate Committee report
of 1955 stated that "subversion through drug addiction
is an established aim of Communist China" Musto, 1.973:
n...31]. Musto 1973: 231] further stated that this type
of congressional response was prompted by the FBN's
efforts to linl. "Red China's attempt to get hard cash,
as well as to destroy Western society, to the
clandestine sale of large amounts of heroin to drug
pushers in the United States."
ORGANIZED CRIME, PUBLIC FEAR, STIFFER CONTROLS:
PFublicly televised organized crime hearings by Senator-
Estes Kef-auver and narcotic hearings held by
Represetative Hale Eoggs led to public discussion of a
growing heroin pr!:)lem: "narcotics problems recCeived
widespread publicity, partly through Congressional
hearings on addiction and crime, partly throu.gh reports
of gang warfare among juveniles and "blackboard jungle'
condlitions in some large Northern cities. The image of
the pusher,' often an addict himself, lurking near a
school waiting to peddle narcotics to students on their
way home was impressed on the public mind in a series of
sensational newspaper stories, court cases, movies,
television shows, legislative hearings, etc" Congress
and the .Ntion Volume I, .965: 1.87).
75
A series of laws was passed after the war allowing
tightened controls and increased penalties for addicts
and traffickers. 195(0' amendments to a 1939 act
made it "easier for federal agents to seize vessels,
vehicles and aircraft used to transport narcotics
illegally" Conress and the Nation, Volutme I, 1965:
1187; PL 81-678]. The older law, passed in 1939, had
provided for the seizure of vessels and other modes of
transportation if narcotics were found that did not
carry a ta' stamp or were shown to be for transfer. The
1950 amendment allowed seizure without proof of
intention to sell, in other words -simple possession
without a tax, stamp. This legislation, a key part of
Coast Guard interdiction efforts, was eclipsed in 1970
legislation which inadvertantly repealed this law,
creating a loophole for possession of drugs on the high
seas outside United States territorial and customs
waters.
After a series of hearings by the House Ways and
Means Subcommittee under the chairmanship of Boggs and
at the urging of Anslinger, legislation was passed that
provided for stronger penalties and mandatory minimum
sentencing. Suspended sentencing or probation was
allowed only for first offenders [PL 82-255]. 1952
legislation expandecl conditions under which alien
violators could be deported EF'L 82-414]. Public and
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congressional concern peakl:ed in the passage of the
Boggs-Daniel ct of 1956 which substantially increased
earlier penalties and instituted an optional death
penalty for sale of heroin to minors PL 84-7283.
MOVEMENT TOWARD INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL
COORDINATION: With the approach of Harry nsl.inger's
retirement in 1962, a number of initiatives were
underway to develop a more cohesive domestic policy and
a more coordinated international effort to control
illicit drugs. These actions were indicative of the
growing use of synthetic drugs and the di.fficulty of the
dual control systems of the FBN and Drug buse Bureau in
HEW as well as the expanding international markets in
l.egal. and illegal drugs.
DOMESTIC COORDINATION: In 1951 President Truman
entered the policymal.:iing arena with the establishment of
the Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics pursuant to
ExeCLlutive Orcler 10302 of 2 November. The committee was
composed of representatives from the Departments of
Treasury, State, Defense, Justice, and Agriculture., in
addition to the Federal. Security Agency. Under a chair
designated by the President, the committee was
responsible for (1) gathering and maintaining
informationr the sale and use of narcotic drugs and
marijuana, (2) maintaining current information on the
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"character and effects" of narcotic drugs, (3) studying
developments in the administration and enforcement of
domestic: and international laws, (4) examining
prevention and control of addiction, and (5) advising
the President on "problems and developments" and
recommending "measures" to address problems EO 10302,
1951 .
This committee issued reports in 1956 and 1961 at
the request of the President, but lacked the influence
and impact of the public hearings and congressional
action of the time. However, this executive, as opposed
to congressional!y mandatecl, structure presaged later
developments as to how drug policy would be made in the
federal. government. It also marked the beginning of the
current presi.denti.al--congressional struggle over control
of dclrug policy. Real substantive executive involvement
in the drug issue began in the Kennedy administration.
"The election of John F. K:ennedy to the presidency set
in bolder relief the decline of Anslinger's influence
after thirty years of political and popular support. As
Anslinger's retirement grew near, demands for a
reevaluation of the drug policies increased." Musto,
1973: 238 
K::ennedv's establishment of a Presidential Advisory
Commission and the ultimate enactment of its
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recommendations by the congress began a series of moves
and countermoves by the two branches of government that
has extended to the recent congressional mandate for a
"drug czar."
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS: Post-World War II
international developments were focused on the emerging
role of the United Nations and the mechanisms needed to
regulate and control substances that were not previously
included in agreements concerning narcotics. Consistent
with earlier discussion of domestic legislation which
was enacted to comply with international agreements,
post-war legislation was enacted to bring United States
law in line with internationally developed policies.
A Protocol signed in 1946 transferred the various
existing international control functions to the United
Nations. This treaty was ratified without debate in
1947 by the Senate Congress and the Nation, olume I.,
1965: 11871. Later, in 1948, a second Protocol was
signed which created international controls on synthetic
narcotics which were not included in the 1931 Narcotics
Limitation Convention [Congress and the Nation, VYolume
I, 1965: 1187) This protocol established the World
Health Organization (WHO) as the central authority for
the determination of what substances would be placed
under international control. Signatory countries were
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then required to limit or control manufacture consistent
with the agreement. The protocol was "intended to
provide an automatic mechanism by which newly invented
synthetic narcotics could be brought under international
regulation as soon as they were developed" [Congress and
the Nation, Voluj.me I: 11893. While the United States
had strict controls in force, legislators were hesitant
to establish domestic quotas for producers who were
alreacldy regulated. It was not until 1960 that the
United States resolved the issue and passed legislation
to establish quotas on production Cogrqes and the
Nation, Volumene I, 1965: 1193 .
In 195; an attempt was made to ti ghten
inte-rnational controls already in effect under previous
agreements. The Protocol of 1953 extended controls
beyond imports to the limitation of poppy cultivation
within countries. While the United States ratified the
protocol shortly after the agreement, the agreement did
not go into effect until 1963 when the United Nations
was able to get the required 25 nations to ratify it
[Congpress and the Natian, Volume I 1965: 1190 .
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961
placed one internatiornal agreement over- substances that
had been subject to prior agreement Schroeder, 1975:
129. Dangerous drugs and psychotropic su.bstances were
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brought under- international control in the Conventior.an c-f
1971 In 72? an amendment to the 1961 Convention
strengthened the powjers of the previously established
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) to enforce
international controls and, if necessary, declare "an
embargo on drugs going to or from a country that permits
a significant amouint of illicit narcotics produciction
withiin its borders" [Schroeder-, 1975 . 1 
In teri-natiorn controls on drullgs have become a maior
i.ssue in today's dru.g policy In the policy that
evolved followi.ng the reorganirzatiion of drugL enr:for ..eme. .
;roaniis- .t ons i.n th.ie late 1'.sCr and earlv 970's i ssues
F' i n! ::,-orign aid to internal control efforts the
role of tnited States officials in inter-nal dru. control]
mat er, and the l nka1 r:: ge be tween dirug tra-ffic ani
tlerrorism or c C:orrupt government off:icials have become
contentious issues, Th-ese issues h ave als( s;er- ved t 
r e-Ee stab L-ish the S,- : t e Department -n as a. ma ior Iolic. v
player · in the clevel-)mtent of a national strategy. By
1978, a Bureau ot4 International Narcotics Matters (INM'-
was established within the State Deartment.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
Thi d iLscLuss1 i1cn of the evolution of olic:y and
nf:ofrcemernt structure i a ruelude t the - recent
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events. What emerges; in viewing early developimen rrts is a
cyclical pattern of centralization, slow fragmentation,
dissolutio n of e, isting strutctures and, then,
consolidation and centralization to begin the cycle
again. The establishment of the FBN centralized c:(.0ntrol
and consolidated functtions that had evolved
incremental:ly w:i th the events leacing to the Har-rii=son
Act and the ear-ly orFgaizational forlms that administered
the various aspetL s of drL c ontrol. Under the strong
leadersh ' i.p of, Harry -i ns]. inger, FBN s tren gthene d its
po.i cymaking role in both the domes3tic and international
ar. eri as.
The d evel opent of new drug s r est:l te c i n pol i cy
choi . ces the fragmented the central control 1 establ . b,jshed
by the F. New- organizations developed to manage- the
o-ther- prograicms wi. th th-e fedeFral government while
international agreements forced internal contro-ls over
substances not controlled by the FN. 1Fig.ure 4- 4 shows
the anti-drulg ;abuse activities prior to the
reorganization of the FBN.
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FIGURE 4-4
ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACTIVITY CIRCA 1968
UNITED NATIONS
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
STATE DEPARTMENT
, INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON
NARCOTICS
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
*PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
DEMAND
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
* CUSTOMS SERVICE
* FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT
* COAST GUARD
DEPARTMENT OF HEW
* BUREAU OF DRUG ABUSE
CONTROL (1965)
SUPPLY
MARKET DIMENS ION
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISSOLUTION OF THE FBN; HE CREATION OF A NEW STRUCTURE
It was stated in the previous chapter that the
dissolution of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was due
to a fragmentation of policy and enforcement
responsibility between the FBN, the Bureau of Drug Abuse
Control in HEW. In terms of the four--quadranrt framework:
discussed earlier, the FBN operated in the domestic
supply quadrant with occassional forays into the
international supply and demand areas via foreign policy
input and the assignment of FBN agents abroad. LUnder
the assumption that all quadrants of the framework
requitre effective action, the FBN lacked presence and
activity in the domestic demand reduction area and
lacked control of dangerous drug policy and enforcement
effort in all areas.
THE BACKDROP FOR CHANGE
After the initial punitive thrust of the 1950's
narcotics legislation, several factors emerged in the
1960's hastening the development of coordinated policy
and enforcement. First, as noted earlier, abuse of non-
narcotic drugs, increased dramatically GAO, 1979b::L -].
Second, d-.rutg abuse in general, which had been perceived
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as a problem associated with inner cities and minority
groups, surfaced in the middle class [Morgan, 1981 and
Schroeder, 19751. Th:ird, social and cultural norms were
tested in a series of national issues such as the civil
rights movement, the Vietnam War. and Watergate.
Figure 5-1, a National Institute of Drug Abutse
(INIID) chart contained in a 1.979 GAO report, provides an
overview jof the estimated e,pansion in drug use betweenr
1972 a- d :1 97 . T . ere are no earlier comparative f igtres
because NID:A did not exist prior to 1972. Howeve r, tlhe
trend of increased abuse f dangerous drugs noted
earl i.er is appar-ent i.nto the 1970s. Al so noteworthy is
the incr ea se in the use of marijuana and cocaine. Th-ii s
i.s ncri t, teworthy beca tse the traditi ona source co.untries
for narcot -.: hadi tbeen r , at:ions in the M iddl e Eas t or
Southeast Asia. The closest source of marijuana and
cocaine, ot her than domestic cultivation and processin g,
was Latin America and the Caribbean Basirn. C lomment i no
on the perio d, a GAO report stated, "Cocaine and
Mari j.iuana use has moved from the fad stage and has
becomes accepted by an increasing number of the Nation's
population" [GAO, 1979b: 2. This trend had two
signi f i cant impacts.
F i r st, many c:i. tizens whi-o had not previousily-
encountered the drug, problem. found their childrein
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FIGURE 5-1
THE EXPANSION OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES
FROM 1972 TO 1977
(EXCERPTS)
PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE ADMITTING
ANY USE
(percentages rounded)
MARIJUANA
YOUTH
YOUNG ADULT
OLDER ADU..LT
COCAINE
YOUTH
YOUNG ADULT
OLDER ADULT.
HEROIN
YOUTH
YOUNG ADULT
OLDER ADULT
I
T
* LESS THA!' , PER C fENT
S o .. rce. G . C'G-t3C!--4fC O.ct ober =5, 1979: 3
86
1972 1979
14
48
7
28
601
15
9
9W
4
19
1
4
1
involved. The punitive or delinquency approach appeared
less attractive to the majority of citizens when an
increasing number of citizens were involved. In short,
the enforcement policy showed signs of becoming mired in
the same problem that surfaced during Prohibition and
which Commissioner Anslinger attempted to avoid, the
apparent criminalization of the average citizen. While
public perception of the problem was to reverse itself
in the 1980's. it was against this background that
reorganization of the enforcement structure began.
Second, the changes in the drug consumption pattern
noted earlier led to changes in the supply structure.
Where earlier enforcement and interdiction activity had
been focused on transoceanic and transhemispheric
threats.. The involvement of Latin American countries;
produced new threats and required different enforcement
and interdiction policies, ones that necessarily
included agencies operating in policy spaces and
environments not envisioned earlier in the post-war
period. However, the early shifts in trafficking were
not perceived or reflected in policy decisions regarding
a replacement agency for the FBN.
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LEAD AGENCY OR MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATING STRUCTURE?
The evolution of the policy and coordinating
structures can be seen in two overlapping approaches to
the probl.em of coordinating federal action: (1) the lead
agency and (2) external coordinating structure.
The l.ead agency concept began with the creation of
the FBN, pea.ked with the creation of the DruLl
Enforcement Administration in 1973, and has slowly
been eroded since then. Agencies have specialized in
specific areas iof dru-tg enforcement (DEA in intelligence
coordinationt: and investi cations), entered the srtructure
based oni, unique capabi li iies (Coast Guard in maritime
smlggtl. i ng), or becamz.ie involved as a result of
congr-essional. mandate (Department of Defense).
The et. -ternal multi-agency structure had early form.
first i the Fede-al Nar-cotics Board (922-1930) and
later in the Interde-ar tmental Committee on Narcotics
created by President Truman in 1951. However, these
structures had little apparent impact.
The current system draws from both concepts in that
certain org-a=ni zati ons have :t acd agency statucs with:i.n
specific f inctional ar eas of dr ug enf4: orcement (i.e. t he
Co~ast tliGuar-d is th! c:urrent lead agency . in marit:ime
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interdiction) while overall policymaking and interagency
coordination has been centralized. In terms of the
four-quadrant framework, early attempts to create a
single agency to operate across both dimensions
conflicted with specialized agencies who were attempting
to expand their policy space and/or move into adjoining
quadrants when opportunities emerged. Early
coordinating structures tended to focus on either supply
or demand issues until the creation of a unified
structure, the National Drug Policy Board, in 1987.
But, even this; structure did not centralize all drug
control functions. The National Narcotics Border
Interdiction System (NNBIS) remained a separate
organization until the passage of the nti-Drug buse
Act of 1988 created the "drug czar." It remains to be
seen just how centralized and coordinated this structure
will prove to be in practice.
THE IMPACT OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURAL CHANGE ON THE
COAST GUARD
The Coast Guard began to encounter marijuana
smuggling during the period of reorganization (1968-
1973); and while significant law enforcement acitvity
was being carried out by the service, individually and
in joint operations, that f act is not reflected in ear ly
polic:y decisions and legislation. As a result of this
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i n,.st itt.t i oinal ambivalence toward the Coast Guard there
were nintended legislative restrictions on the
service' s ability to carry interdiction operations. The
unintended impacts of this legislation (the 1970
consolidated drug control legislation and the 1976
Mansifel. d mendments to the Foreign Assistance
AcL.) cr ea-Le. prosecutorial and jurisdictional probl.ems.
Tow.ar-d the end of te period (t98C:'s) the pendulu].m
had +shJln:-t t.he .the-r way wi th muL.Ich of the service:'s
operations under eamination and discretion in resource
all ocati r- bei. no cons:,st .ra i ned b- v centrali -zel pol i cymati:: .tl
and manag ,emen i e c-geressio.nall. .y mandated agenc-
f n c:t:i en s an:d r es uj.lr ce allo 1 cation). B e ond s pec i i c:
drug-rela. ate .i::! 1eis.ation, the service was constra:ined by
otherl eter-nal chan.qe s such as the austere fiscal
environmentt created by the federal def:icit and the
nece::,-ss:i ty to co:mpete fori- futnc!in.g in the tlransportation r
pF ir ogam alon wi.th h i. gh c: ost programs such as the
Federal A viat:in dmi .:ni st-.ation and L!rban Mass Transit
[Yost interview, 1891. n . n e amination of the impacts
of Coast Guard participation in multi-agency
or-ganizations follows in later chapters and in art Two.
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PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT: THE SEARCH FOR A SUCCESSOR
AGENCY
After the retirement of Harry Anslinger in 1962,
a search for a new drug control structure too[-: place.
It tool.:: si,' years to replace Anslinger's structure built
up over thirty years.. Musto [973: 238] comments that
"Anslinger:'s replacement Harry Giordano a pharmacist.
was considered much more reasonable. . group li i e the
NI !H made more effective chall.enges to older control,:
styles."
The pl: i :y lead at this pi nt was ta::en by
President t::ennedy using the administrative approach
advocated by Richarcl Nathan 1983]. The dominance of
presidential pol icymakiring and the use of advisorY
commi s;i ons poredomiinated the 1960:' s and were resen-it
into the 1970'.s until the crisis in the Nix-on
administration. TI-hese activities were similar to other-
presidential intiatives noted by Sundquist [19811] and
others during the period in which the president was the
dominant policymaker.
KENNEDY INITIATIVE: Less than two months after
Ansliner's reti.rement, Fresident I:enned convened the
first WhIit.e Hc)iuse Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuise
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(27-28 September 1962). Kennedy established two key
ob.j ectives, "elimination of illicit traffic in drugs and
secondary, the rehabilitation and restoration to society
of the drug addict" [Congress and the Nation, Vol!me I,
1965: 1193. Kennedy personally singled out dangerous
drugs (barbituates and amphetamines) for new controls.
The conference was followed by Executive Order 11076 of
15 January 196 3 which created the President's Advisory
Commission con Narci)tic: and Drug buse. The President
appointed retired federal judge E. Barrett Prettyman as
the chairman. The Prettyman Commission was charged with
recommending new legislation to prevent misuse of all
drugs and improve rehabilitation programs. The
commission represented the first attempt to consolidate
supply and ciemand side issues in a single policymaking
advisory organ.
The Commission' s report was submitted just prior to
Presi.dent ennedy:'s assassination and was not released
by President Johns-on until January 25, 1964. Among its
25 recommendations, the most pertinent for this
discussion were the following:
1. Disestablishment of the FBN with legal
drug activity administration transferred to HEW and
illegal activity enfoi-rcement transferred to the
Department of Justice.
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2. Controls on non-narcotic dangerous drus-t,
·.. Differentiation in sentencing between
small time pushers and addicts and professional
criminals.
4. Better international cooperation
5. Treatment oriented alternatives to
sentencing
6. Generzal increase in enforcment reso..trces
C[Legsi.slative Histor,, PL 91-513: 4581-- 45871.
These recommendations were a departure from the
largely 'punitive measur s legislated earlier and
e,, 1:-)resed th-e need t consrolidate all enforcement effort
in single agency. While the recommendations in
intLernational cont ols were meager and the increase irn
demand reducti on acti vi t considerable, the commi ssi.jon
for the firs-t time epanded policy consideration
concurrently- across all. quadrant of the poli.cy model]..
An effort wa- teir'-..;: made to centralize and coordinate
policy development.
JOHNSON INITIATIVE: While the Prettyman
recommendations were reviewed and circulated through the
bureaucracy, President Johnson enlarged the commission
concet and created the Fresident's Commissi-;i-on Law
EL.forcement and Afdmini.nrst-ati on of Jlustice in March 1 965.
Th :i. c::om:i s i on, c"air-ed by Ni. ch ; tas --t, tf-tl, twas t.he .-
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first ttal review o,f the iustice svctem since the
WJicker sham, CommisE-ion of 1931. [Congress and the Nation
VoIume II, 1.969: A18, A Task Force on Narcotics and
Drug Abuse was; created as a subset of the overall
commission. The final report of the Commission, "The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society," included a
section on narcotics and drug abuse. The Task: Force
R.ep.rt: Nrcotics and DrUg A buse [1967: 1] updated the
work of the F-rettym:an Commission and stated. "There have
been major :inno-vatii.ons in legal procedures and medical.
techniques dring the last few years . . . These laws
and p-ro.rams ignify that the Nation's approach to
narcotic addictir n i has c: hanged fundamental ly. h ey are
a cr:eati- v ef ort to treat the person who is dependent
on drugs. liMajior additions of the tasi.. force. beyoind
the Frettyman recommendations, were:
1. An emphasis on research and record keeping
2. More enfo-ircement sta-ff increases
3. Increase court discretion with violators
4. Model legislation for states
[Legislative History,. F. 91-51.3: 4587-4591.
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE OUTPUTS: The combined
effect of these commissions provided a cohesive
eyxecutive and .egislative agenda that was implemented
over a ve---year per od between 19,5 and 1970.- In 1968.
're:.i dent JTohnscn L t ili zed reorgani. zati onal powers
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(granted by eisting statute and subject to a
congressional veto) to abolish the FBN and created the
Bur-eau of Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) 82 Stat
13693. The BNDD was created from the former FBN
organization and the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control
established in HEW in 1965. The same year Congress
passed the Safe Streets and Crime Control Bill which was
a direct result of the ::azternbach Commission.
A FLAWED REORGANIZATION ?
While the 1968 reorganization plan apparently
consolidated federal enforcement agencies into one
organization, the EBlNDD was burdened from the start with
other aencies in the same policy space. The U.S.
Cus.tom1s Ser vice wh~ cih al ono with the Coas-t .. ~d. had::i
been invol ved i n smuggirg initerdiction and
investigations sincer 1.789 and 1791, retained the:ir
au.thoity. i r i, - ar e jist one form of contraband which
is introduce d into the U nited States by smiuggling.
There was no attempt to separate the drug smuggling
mission from the Customs Service mission.
There are several. possib'le reasons for this which
wi 1 :ll be developed in F:art 'Two However. as Mark Moore
Er978- 229] noted in his analysis of the later DEA1
erganiza tion. io. t is ossible that all apsec:ts of drug
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enfor:ement (i .e. investigations, interdiction,
pro-secution, etc.) are beyond the span of control that
should be epected of any one agency. ENDD would have
been in a difficult position trying to manage the
extensive infrastructure and organization of either
Customs or the Coas;t Guiard. Further, maritime smug)gling
had not yet developed to the point where high level
officials perceived a need to incorporate mariti.me
aenici.es into the str ucture. Final. ly, both agencies
were entrenr:he burea.luca eis w:ith highly developed
cu L tures. r Both would have resisted such a move.. 
later attempt to bing Customs and Immigration
Ins;ectors unr'.der control of a lead agency would fail.
Further, the Coas.-,t Guard which had traditionally
coi)p'erated ith both Customs and the FBN as a Treasury
Depari::tment agency was; moved into the newly created
Department cof 1-Transportation (DOT) in 1967 [PL 89-670:].
Filure 5-2 is, an organizational chart showing the
location of the enforcement agencies within the Treasc.rvy
Department just prior to the 1967 relocation of the
Coast Gluard. The combination of the reorganization of
the FBN and the move of the Coast Guard to the DOT
resul ted in the relocation of all of the former- Treasury
Department drug enf -orcement agenc:es, ecept Cutstoms.
into dC ri. ffernt cabi net dep artment.s. In the case of
Cu .stoms and the Cas t Guard hi ;tor i c al i f not new and
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specific drug enforcement mission mandates were retained
in the organizational policy space and mission
portfolio. While President Johnson could state in his
message accompanying the plan that "The response of the
Federal. Government must be unified," a later General
Accounting Office (GAO) report stated "The formation of
this new agency did not solve the problem. Drug law
enforcement continled to be characterized as
'"-ragmenrted" and having 'serious operational
sholrtcomrins" [5 USC APP :1; GAO, 1979b: 5].
THE NIXON ERA: LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSOLIDATION AND THE PARADOX OF THE DEA
The Nixon era in drug enforcement was marked by the
most dramatic changes in the enforcement and policy
structure since the Harrison Act was passed in 1914.
Many of the changes; were remaining agenda items from the
F'rettyman and k::atzenbach commissions. "Nixon fol3.owed
the pattern of his two immediate predecessors, John F.
Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, each of whom had established
a variety of legislative task forces" Nathan, 1983:
7-8]. In a broader sense, however, Nixon attempted to
consolidate all government activities in each quadrant
of the model under a single coordinating point for
operati onal matters. and created councils or committees
to augment the activities of the ].ead agency in each
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area. This could be considered a micro coordinating
structure within each policy quadrant. In the first
instance he pursued what Nathan [1983: 83 has called a
legislative strategy. In the latter case he pursued
what has been called an administrative strategy,
accomplishing goals through staff assignments and
executive perogatives [Nathan, 1983: 12-143. However-,
the first sionificant consolidation was the replacement
of the Harrison and Drug and Cosmetic: Acts with a new
regulatory regime recommendcled by both earlier
commi ssi ons.
CONSOLIDATION OF CONTROLS: While the BNDD's
existence was short lived (1968-1973), success was
achieved in cleaning up the fragmented legislative
legacy of the dual enforcement scheme. 1970 was a
watershed year in drug control legislation and a major
turning point in public policymaking. The Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control ct of 1970
established the regulatory and enforcement basis for
current drug law enforcement [84 Stat 1236, PL 91-513).
Title II of the legislation, The Controlled Substance
Act, implemented the recommendations of both earlier
commissions to bring narcotics and dangerous drugs under
the same control regime. Musto 1973: 241) notes, "In
it the myriad of regulations advanced during the
Harrison A ct's long evolution were brought into one
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statute, tempered by a desire to have flexible penalties
and to separate marihuana from addicting drugs . . .
jurisdiction was based on the interstate commerce powers
of the Constitution, now greatly extended and
strengthened by sixty years of constitutional
development .. ." Figure 5-3 is a summary of the main
provisions of the act which are pertinent to this
discussion.
CONSOLIDATION OF DEMAND SIDE ACTIVITY: In response
to the growing concern over drug abuse, the Drug Abuse
Office and Treatment Act of 1972 (PL 92-255) created a
number of new functions which specialized certain
aspects of the drug problem. It was passed after
President Ni.on made a national speech which declared
the drug problem a "national emergency" CGAO, 1979b: 6.
In addition to the creation of a temporary action office
in the White House (Special Office of Drug Abuse Policy
-SODAP), the legislation created the National Institute
of Drug buse (IDA) within the National Institute of
Mental Health, ". .. a separate organization within the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare -- to
handle research, prevention efforts, treatment, training
of professional and paraprofessional personnel, and
rehabilitation programs" GA0. 1979b: 63. Also created
was the Strategy Council on Drug buse which was
composed of the SODAP, the Attorney General and other
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FIGURE 5-3
SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL ACT
PUBLIC LAW 91-513
Title I:
Title II:
Rehabilitation
1. Increased rehabilitation, treatment, and
prevention programs with in HEW
Control and Enforcement
1 . Added 30: agents to the BNDD
2. Enpowered Attorney General to controL
dangerous drugs by adding, transfering,
or removing sLubstances from the control
schedule created by the law, subject to
advice and consent of Secretary of HEW.
:3. Gave At ttorney General rulemak.ing
rA Lt C)3 r i t y "
4.. Revised penalty structure and elimi nated
man-datory minimum sentences, except for
prcfessio nal criminals.
5. Distr ibution-i of small of amounts of
mari. it-ana for no renumerat i-on made the
same crime as mere possession.
6. F'rov:ided for "no--knock" entry into
premi:i ses wher-e drugs might be destroyed.
7. Created a Commission on Marijuana and Drug
Abusei to report withi. n one year on
mar-: iuan'ia abuse and within two years on
dru Lig abuse..
Title I: Impr-t and! Export
1. Estab.lished a system of controls and
classification for dangerous substances
based on the nature of the substance from
Schedule I to Schedule IV with Schedule I
being the most harmful and addictive.
Title IV: Advisory Councils Report
1. Required the Secretary of HEW to report to
Coi-ngress annually on the activiti.es of all
advisory councils set up to provide input
on the various local programs provided for
in Title I.
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demand side related agencies (Veteran's Administration.
HEW, etc.) and a 15-member National Advisory Council of
Drug Abuse Prevention which consisted of the Strategy
Council members as well as 12 other members appointed by
the President Congress and the NationL Volume III,
1973: 579]. These different entities with an overall
policy structure above constituted a micro structure as
discussed earlier.
CONSOLIDATION OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS: In 1971,
President Nixon attempt to administratively consolidate
the coordination of international programs in the
establishment of the Cabinet Committee on International
Narcotics Control (CCINC). The GAO 1979b: 7 notes,
"Narcotics control considerations have played a
fluctuating role in foreign policy since the early
19t00s. As the Federal Government moved to a more
comprehensive drug abuse and traffic prevention policy,
curtal ment of drug supplies originating outside outside
the United States received an increasingly higher
priority" GAO, 1979b: 7. Nixon assigned the Secretary
of State as chairman of this committee and the State
Department as the lead agency. However, the committee
met only 5 times in three years and drew criticism for
the lack of policy direction to working groups from the
GAO and Congress GAO, 1.979b: 7-93.
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THE PARADOX OF THE DEA: While President Nixron
established the EA in 19'73 in an attempt to frther
consolidate enforcement activity within a single lead
agency, several uLnusual actions took place prior to 1.973
that appeared contrary to the consolidation trend.
These actions have been regarded as controversial given
the larger political context of the Watergate break-in
and are detailed her e to provide a sense-of what was
transpiring at the national level at a time when the
Coas-t Guard was first beginning to mak-e significant
mar iuana seizures in the Southeast.
In anuary of 1972 th-ie C!ffice ofa Drug Abuse L. aw
En:-orc:emen t t(ODiL..' was created in the Justice
Depar-tment urder e: ecutie order of Ni--xon [E ! 1 64.1
The purpose of th:is agency was to focus oin street level
drluL. deals and make as many buy--bust arrests as
possible. Nixon had c::reated an enforcement agency which
had conflictin jrisdiction with BNDD and Customs. T-he
Director- o)f ODALE was referred to as the "drug czar" of
the administration [Epstein, 1977: 2213. Epstein. an
investigative reporter, asserts that the agency, a
creation largely of Watergate co-conspirator G. Gordon
Liddy, was intended to become the personal police force
of the president t 977 28 ] 
In A tt:)st of 1972. the O)f ice of Nat.i onal. Narc:tci ics
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Intel.ligence (ONNI) was created to address drug
enforcement intellige -nce which was not an assigned
mission of the national secur-ity intelligence agencies
such as the Central. Intelligence Agency (CIA)
EEO 1.1676]. This agency was also placed in the
Department of Justice but, like ODALE, was not placed
under the EBNDD, the lead agency at the time.
Thi:, (re) -ragrerntation of the en-:orcement effort
drew- Conoressionaal and cabinet department. criticismT,.
The programmatic stabil :itty sought in the creation o.r the
BNDD had alre-ady been at ri5sk because of the problems
noted earl :i er and !-ow became even more unstable and
d i sor ,, ai i. Az f te the Watergate break-in became
pLb..il i c a reotani_ at. ii pl. an was submitted by the Nii,-on
admi . stra. :in t:hat csrol i. dated all. of the federal drug
en f r c e Fm- e n t _" c:t :i. ii e s a i clud, i ng t h e dru g i nv e stigative
funrctions of C..ust-oms, irito a single "supert- -agency" --the
Dru.t Enf rc:ement dmi ri str'at i n. It was beyond the
scope of this. study; to eamine the actions o4: the Nixon
adinistration,, They remain controversial and much
information is lacking.
REORGANIZATION PLAN #2 AND THE CREATION OF THE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION: President Ni-on presented
the -dr tg en-f:cremt pl-an to Congress which, again,
held ceto' power oSver the reorganization. Under the p].an
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BNDD, ODALE, ONNI, and 500 investigators from the
Customs Bureau were to be consolidated in the Drug
Enforcement Administration within the Department of
Justice 87 Stat 10913. Additionally, the Nixon plan
sought to consolidate border inspection functions
carried by both Customs Inspectors and Immigration and
Naturalization Service Inspectors. The latter proved to
be too controversial when the American Federation of
Government Employees (FGE) and AFL-CIO opposed the
relocation of immigration inspectors and resulted in
that portion being withdrawn under the threat of
congressional veto [Congress and the Nation, Volume IV,
1977: 567; 88 Stat 51. The remainder of the plan was
approved and became effective in July 1973. Figure 5-4
shows the policy space assignments resulting from the
reorganization and the other actions taken between 1968
and 1973.
Drug enforcement continued to be fragmented with
Customs, Coast Guard and the Border Patrol retaining
interdiction or investigative authority. As noted
above, the border inspection function remained
fragmented. The plan allowed that the "Secretary
[Treasury] shall retain, and continue to perform, those
functions, to the extent that they relate to searches
and seiztcures of illicit narcotics, dangerous drugs, or
marijuana or to the apprehension or detention of persons
105
FIGURE 5-4
ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACTIVITY CIRCA 1973
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in connection therewith, at regular inspection locations
at ports or entry or anywhere along the land or water
borders of the United States" 87 Stat 1091.3 While
later recommendations would be made for further
consolidation of enforcement agencies into a border
control or management agency, DEA was the last attempt
to establish a lead agency. The following chapter
details the rise and institutionalization of the multi-
a-ency coor di.natinq structur- e. This researcher
conc r, ude1   s , i ag reement with Moore 1978: 229 , the DEA
was iven a task "si.mFly too hard to be undertak:en."
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CHAPTER SIX
THE CREATION OF MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATING STRUCTURES
(1973-1979)
"There is a need, of course, to maintain a strong
emphasis on interagency investigations with the
Customs Service, the Coast Guard and the rest cf
the federJa. enfo+ cjrcement comm uni.ty. In these
auLst.ere times, we have all recognized the need for
further enha-ncement of cooperative endeavors. I:
believe we will be seeing an acceleration in the
num .iber of inter-agerecy, h..gh-level invest i gati. i. ons"
Peter B. Bensinger C 98s2: 79
Admi. ni strator,I:1d f,  i cr t r- a t o r
Drug Enforcement Administriatiton
TOUGH EARLY GOING FOR THE DEA
The creation of the DEA consolidated agencies
created by the Nixon administration and added 500
Customs agents. The basic problems noted in Chapter 5
remained after the agency was established. The lack of
overall control of the enforcement program was cited in
a 1.975 G report a-ind the criticism was repeated again
in sitronger terfms ii- 1979. 108
Even after this reorganization problems
continLie to exist. In our report entitled
'Federal Drug Enforcement: Strong Guidance
Needed,' . . . we pointed out that the
problems of fragmented organizations and
interagency conflicts had not been resolved,
and we endorsed the recommendation in the
Domestic Counci].'s September 1975 report
calling for settlement of jurisdictional
disputes between DEA and Customs. Our report
contained a note of caution that it was
questionable whether agreements brought about
by Presidential directive will ever work
without a clear delegation of authority to
someone ac:: tirg n behalf of the President to
monitor adherence to guidelines and tell
agencies what is expected of them"CGAO, 1979:
5:1.
The lead agency concept, problematic in 1968,
remained so in 1973. At the outset the architects of
the agency were swept away in the demise of the Nixon
administration. James . Wilson notes that DEA (li:ke
BNDD) was faced with conflicting requirements to conduct
long term investigations aimed at immobilizing high
level traff:ickers while., at the same time, show
immediate.restults trouLgh day--ti:-day by-bust type oT
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EW:i ; i:!i1 978 I *  - M8t:i ,o- e r
"Di ;: -. i On among DEA s 4 C:) empl]oyees
wa.r :-. deep . a: aim sit i e s bet wieen the age n cies
that m erge to form DE were aggrevated
i-L;tea d f alleviated . . several hundred
former Cstos Servie employees who were
. ....n.-f ried to DEA -:: ied to e returned to
th-eir orgi.gi-nal agency. . A. mid growing
criitici.m of DEA mi smanaegee-nt, the A"Ittorney
Gener-a l forced the agency's first
admiri. 'nistraio-r, rtor John Bartels Jr-., to resign"
C: r.., E., t!-.. he Nt i on L V l, Utme IV. 1977:
James m.. W:,li sn summiar i z ed the si tu at i on as f:oll 1 ow:J
". ..the DEA in the space of ten years
was,- reor.anized twice, shifted from- one
ca:.t:i. et -..n deatrlenrt to aother, and led b a
s u.ccesi s:i. o fI o F ive different admi strators.
Thl-COLh o( .li t i s period, however, what federal
narcotics agents were doing on the street
scarcel changed at all. . ."[Wi 1 son, 19'78: 7]
Meanwhile, thl-e "reslurgent congress" described by
SurdclqOuist [1981 began to assert itself into the
pcI i cvma i~t i ri g s t:rLCtUr E. 75, the Sr.-a.te Government
O)per at :i. one Pe 'maner'. IVest i goa t onie,. Sbcommi t tee beegan
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hearings into the agency s operation [Congress and the
Nation. oli.me IV, 1977: 597]. The GAO began to
scrutinize the agency and produced two reports in 1975
that focused on leadership and ethics [GAO CCG-76-32 and
GAO FPCD-76-27, 1975). More importantly, as the above
excerpt indic:ated, Congress was openly questioning the
President's role and effectiveness in managing the
enforcement bureaucracy through administrative action
alone. There was a growing sense in Congress that
legislative solutions based in statute were required.
NEW DRUG THREATS AND ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
In assessing the drug threat of the period the GAO
rep.ort ed,
"Law enforcement and diplomatic
accomplishments have shown some positive
results in reduc-ing the availability and
adverse impact of some illegal drugs, yet the
drug trade flourishes. Most evidence
indicates that these gains have not
permanently reduced overall drug availability,
but have shifted trafficking and distribution
patterns and users to switch to other drugs
when their preferred drug becomes hard to
get" GAO, 1979: 15)
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THE HEROIN SITUATION: Despite the organizational
dif:ficulties of DEA and the transition period of 1968--
1973, the United States had succeeded in negotiatiin a
restriction on Tutrkish poppy cultivation and had broken
the "French Connection" heroin ring GAO, 1979: 17].
However, these actions may have shifted the heroin
traffic to Mexico. "Production was stepped up to meet
the heroin shortage, and Mexico's share of the U.S.
market is esti mated to have increased from 38 peir cent
in 1972 to 9:! per cenl-t i-i 1976. Correspondingly, the
use of heroini-i in the United States started increasing
again in 1974 after declin:ling in 1972" [GICO, 1979: 171.,
"THE PARADOX OF SUCCESS": After a successful cr-op
red u ction campaign in Mexi co in 1975, GAO reported.,
"succ sse s in eradication campaigns and enforcement
act i ons have reduced overall avai lability of heri !iI in
thie Uni.ted States and contributed to a shift in
marijuana sources from Mexico to Colombia" GAO, 1979:
17, emphasis added]. This patterrn has been
characterized by Coast Guard Admiral Richard Cueroni
[1989], Superintenilant of the U.S. Coast Guard Aademy
and former commander of Coast Guard operations in the
southeast and Caribbean, as the "paradox. of success."
He explains that the more successful law enforcement is
against drug smuggling the harder it becomes to continue
thait success given the abilitv of the drug traffickin
112
trade to respond quickly to market conditions and new
technology to overcome barriers to entry.
THE DRUG "INDUSTRY": The general problem facing
the enforcement community from the early 1970's forward
was the same problem, in a sense, as that faced by
domestic automakers in competing with Japan. Both were
competing with foreign organizations capable of
incorporating new technology faster than U.S.
organizations, entering markets more quickly, and acting
in government sponsored or quasi-monopol i es in cartel
fashion. While it is an area ripe for study and too
rich in concept to fully develop here, the drug
trafficking "industry" learned early on the key elements
of Michael Porter's; Cnompetitive Strategy [1980e and
Competitive dvantage [19853 long before either popular
business strategy book was published. The heroin
situation noted above and subsequent other movements in
the drug trade (i.e. shift from blky marijuana
shipments by vessel to low volume, high value cocaine by
small plane) illustrate an understanding of Porter's
"Elements of Industry Structure" and the "Value Chain"
[Porter, 1985: 6, 47].
Two key points emerge from this notion of the drug
"industry" that are of particular importance to the
overall eforcement structure. First, as long as a
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market exists with the potential for profit there will
be new entrants attempting to enter or old firms
attempting to retain their position and "competitive
advantage." Second, given the ability of the drug trade
to react more quickly than the enforcement structure to
incorporate new technology coupled with the lack of
legal restrictions on their actions, the enforcement
community in general in a reactive mode. When successes
are achieved the industry can react quickly to
reestablish itself.
When these market realities are juxtaposed with the
accelerating rate of change in technological the result
is a faster moving drug threat which has become
increasingly technical and complex. From the time a
Bolivian farmer picks a coca leaf in the foothills of
the Andes until it is ultimately consumed in the form of
cocaine or crack, the raw material will have been
transformed and shipped through a distribution system
that would make Porter's value chain appear simplistic.
The drug trade is "a huge, multinational commodity
business with a fast-moving top management, a widespread
distribution network, and price-insensitive customers"
[Kraar, 1988: 273
This overview of the increasing complexity in the
drug trade is not intended to be exhaustive. The focus
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here is on the evolution of structures. It is
necessary, however, to identify the driving force behind
the structural changes. The bureaucratic context
previously discussed is one dimension of the situation,
the structure of the drug trade is another. While the
demand side of the drug problem is now generally
understood to be the long term solution, this discussion
also assumes an enforcement effort is a desired current
response and national mandate The National DrU
Strategy, 1988: Chapter 3. Organizational change in
the enforcement structure is driven, in large part, by
increasing complexity in the drug trade.
ENFORCEMENT SPEC IALI ZAT ION
A flaw noted in earlier reorganizations of the
enforcement structure was the failure to account for all
agencies that form the drug enforcement structure in the
federal government. Like the generic use of the term
narcotics for all drugs, the term enforcement
encompasses a great deal of diverse activity aimed at
reducing the supply of drugs. In practice there are
many specialized area of drug enforcement.
In his review of the DEA organization Mark Moore
C1978: 235] identifies the major programs in the "supply
reduction strategy" to be (1) "an international program
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that mobilizes foreign governments to assist U.S. drug
control efforts," (2) "a criminal enforcement program
that seeks to immoblize major trafficking organizations
and reduce the capacity of illicit production and
distribution systems," (3) "a regulatory system that
seeks to minimize diversion of legitimate drugs to
illicit markets," and (4) "an intelligence program that
supports the overall supply reduction strategy with
strategic intelligence about the relative importance of
the various drugs and their most important sources of
supply, and gives special support to the criminal
enforcement program by providing operational
i ntel 1 i gence. "
This programmatic breakdown of enforcement elements
is consistent with the with the evolution of the
enforcement structure up to and including the creation
of the DEA. The United States has sought since 1.9309 to
engage foreign governments on supply reduction.
Criminal enforcement is consistent with what Musto
[1973: 242] has called the "quarantine approach" to drug
control created with the Harrison Act. The dual
regulatory system had been consolidated in 1970
legislation. Finally, an intelligence function was
created with Office of National Narcotics Intelligence
(ONNI) in 1972 and relocated in the DEA in 1973.
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The system desc:ribed is consistent with a lead
agency struc:ture where the threat is fairly narrow and
defined as in the early enforcement of the Harrison Act.
When the threat is dispersed and modes of trafficking
vary, each program element in the strategy becomes
varied. In regard to the dispersion of the heroin
problem noted earlier, Moore 1978: 2373 observed the
effort to immobilize traffickers "requires a large and
cotmplex international enforcement program that includes
at l].east the following components: (1) a sophisticated
federal investigative capability supported by a
compr-ehensi e and timely operational intelligence
systemr; (2) strong federal border control agencies, (3)
effective cocoperation from federal prosecutors and the
judicial. system; (4) close liaison with foreign police
organizations; and (5) close cooperation with domestic
state and lcal police.." Presaging later developments
Moore '1978: 237) also stated that the supply reduction
strategy "depends crucially on the capabilities of the
different organizations to take the required actions at
the right time, on a sufficient scale, and with enough
precision and agility."
In fact, as the drug trade shifted to Latin America
in the late 196O0's and early 1970s these activities
were being carried out in different organizations
regardless of the BNDD and DEA mandate. While BNDD/DEA
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focused on investigative work and the development of
informants, other agencies were also making arrests and
seizures. "Customs and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service produced defendants by patrolling
borders, inspecting individuals at ports of entry, and
inspecting cargo. In any given year, these
organizations produce thousands of narcotics
defendants" [Moore, 1.978: 2403 Moreover, "Patrol
operations required heavy investments in technical
equipment for surveillance and pursuit, and agents who
were able to maintain vigilance when nothing was
happening . . . agencies came to specialize in
particular enforcement tactics" [Moore, 1978: 2431
Moores comments support a notion that the agencies
occupied policy spaces in the four-quadrant ramework,
began to encounter various new threats, and had some
means of organizational response or capability not
present in the lead agency. Likewise, DEA retained
investigative resources needed to follow-up on arrests
and seziures made by other agencies, as well as
programmatic responsibility for the national drug
enforcement intelligence system. Constrained by unique
mandates, capabilities, and organizational design,
agencies soon discovered that multi-agency operations
were the most effective way to address the new smuggling
118
trends.
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Meanwhile, at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid
the Congress attac:ed the failure of the DEA to redu.ce
the supply of drugs and attacked the President. During
the period from 1973 to 1980 (the Ford and Carter
administrations) calls continued to create a super
border agency and to identify an accountability point
for drug enforcement in government. This period marked
the trar sition to th-e multi-agency stru.cture approach of
thne 19 80 C-..
EARLY MULTI-AGENCY STRUCTURES, THE FIELD TAKES THE LEAD
As seizures of drugs from Latin American and the
Caribbean increased in the Southeast United States in
the early 1.970 s, local field supervisors from the DEA,
Coast Guard and Customs combined efforts to conduct
m u . t i -a g e cy ci::p er at i on i 
OPERATION BUCCANEER: This operation was conducted
from 1 August to 15 December 1974 under the lead of the
DEA regiona. office in 1Miami. It targeted Jamaican drug
production and traffic. "This; was the first major
international multi-agency anti-narcotics operation.
The Coast Guard seized 7 vessles with over 21,000 lbs.
of marijuana and $40.C00(:' in undelcared currency. T!-e
entire operation nettec! 9 arrests and seizures and
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resulted in the destruction or eradication of 718,171
lbs. marijuana, 83 lbs. marijuana sseds, 20 lbs.
cocaine, 65 lbs. hashish oil, and $143,320 in currency.
Ten aricraft, 17 boats and 11 weapons were also seized"
ECoast Guard (G-000-4), 19763.
OPERATION CHANNELCAT: This operation was; conducted
from 20 November to 20 December 1974 Ltnder the lead of
the U.S. Customs regional office in Mi. ami. It targeted
"smuggl ers and the:ir shoresicle contacts along the Gu:!f
and Florida coasts. This mlti-agency operation
resulted in 60, arrests and the seizure of 2,41.7 lbs.
mar-ijuana 7. 8 oz. .. hashish, 6 aircraft, 9 vessels, and
various other contr-aband" Coast Guard (G--000-4) 1976].n
COORDINATING STRUCTURE: During this same period,
the Coast Guard District Commander in Miam:i, Admiral
Auslti n (R-ed) Wagner became aware of organizational.
T r'. cti n that resultel f rom the 1973 reorganization
[First Coast Guard District, 1.9773. To enhance local
multi-agency operat:ions and resolve jurisdicitional and
coordination issues, Admiral Wagner created a Law
Enforcement Organization (LEO). This informal
organization, to be replaced later with formal
structures, became very successful and was copied
thr'oughout the Coast Guard as a means to integrate the
service irito the lar-tger enfrcement. structure and to
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minimize interagency conflicts [First Coast Guard
District, 19773.
EARLY CENTRALIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION
The first major element of drug enforcement to be
centralized and placed in a multi-agency structure was
intelligence. In the conduct of early multi-agency
operations it became apparent that each agency was a
separate collection source for intelligence. Likewise
each agency had strategic and tactical requirements for
drug smuggling intelligence. DEA had assumed the drug
intelligence function assigned to ONNI in 1973.
THE EL PASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER: In the earliest
consolidation of resources found in this research, the
Department of Justice established the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC) in 1974. EPIC was originally
intended to be a clearing house for border related
intelligence on drug and alien smuggling. Similar to
the situation where the Coast Guard and Customs had
begun to become major interdiction players in the
maritime area, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) and its order Patrol encountered drug
smuggling activities in enforcing of immigration laws.
Since both the Border Patrol and DEA were within the
Justice Department, the closely tied border intelligence
1 1
functions of both were colocated at an operational
intelligence center in El Paso, Texas under the
administration of DEA.
The purpose of EPIC was to combine the personal
expertise of agents from different agencies with the
respective intelligence data bases in one location. In
this case DEA and Border Patrol agents were assigned to
EPIC along with intelligence analysts from both
organizations. The Narcotics and Dangerous Drug
Information Systemr (NADDIS), the automated DEA
intelligence data base., and the INS manual data bases on
alien smuggling and fraudulent documents were also
colocated. Access to national criminal data bases and
state/local systems was also established. The center
staffed a 24-hour watch which was capable f responding
to field reOquests for information via telephone or
teletype. The center was also the central point for the
issua;r:nce of aclv:i.sor-ies and lookouts for vessels,
vehicles. and aircraft believed to be involved in
smuggling. In addition the center contained an analysis
section and established its own data base to consolidate
information developed in-house.
By the late 1970's every federal drug enforcement
and interdiction agency had become a member of EPIC.
Participat:ion inc:luded the Coast Guard, Customs, Federal
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Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobaco and Firearms (BATF). In addition, other
agencies detailed personnel. to the center for special
operations or analysis projects.
THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS
COMMITTEE (NNICC): While EPIC addressed real time,
operational itelligence needs, larger issues of policy
and inter-agency coordination beyond the sharing of
tactical intelligence was necessary.
"In April 1978, the NNICC was established
to coordinate the collection, analysis,
dissemination, and evaluation of strategic
drug-related intelligence, both foreign and
domestic, that is essential to effective
policy development, resource deployment, and
operational planning. Membership consists of
the Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Coast
Gua-rd, U. S. Customs Service, Department of
Defense, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, Internal Revenue
Service, National Institute on Drug Abuse,
Department of State, Department of the
Treasur-y, and the White House Drug Abuse
Policy Office. The Deputy Assistant
Administrator for Intelligence of the Drug
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Enforcement Administration serves as
Chairman." NNICC, 1987: i]
The NNICC produces the annual NNICC ReTort: The
Suely gf Illicit Drugs to the United States. This
report is then used by all federal agencies in planning
and coordinating activities. It is also used in
congressional testimony and other briefings. It
provides a common set of data from which to organize and
operate the federal enforcement structure. It is also
somewhat controversial. in that statistics on drug
smuggling are difficult to obtain and subject to
different interpretations. In a disclaimer included in
its tenth estimate produced in 1987, the NNICC states,
"In recent years, the NNICC has reviewed
and updated various estimation methodologies.
This continuing effort resulted in a number of
revised estimates for previous years. Since
illicit production and distribution of
controlled substances are, by definition,
illegal, there are little reliable data upon
which to base estimates of the quantities of
drugs involved. This document, which is based
on the best data currently available and on
the combined available expertise of NNICC
member agencies, is a comprehensive assessment
.prepared for the Federal Government on the
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worldwide illicit drug situation in 197"
ENNICC, 1987: ii]
Research in this study did not focus on the
intelligence structure or the validity and accuracy of
the NNICC estimates. The issue is noted here to point
out that the development of data within bureaucracies is
inevitably controversial because many resource
allocation decisions are made based on statistics. The
issu.le has r:eeived great attention from RAND Corporation
researcherr Peter- Reuter. He has challenged the NNICC
estimates, going so far as to state, "In fact, they are
without plausible foundation. The data on which they
are based do not support them, and are themselves of
dubious origirn. Again, that is not to say that the
estimates are wrong, but the government's claim to have
even a rough estimate of the level of expenditures on
illicit drugs is simply unreasonable" [Reuter, 19843.
Reuter E1984 futher states, "The agency members o f
NNICC, who might at least seek to give the estimates a
downward trend in order to show success, seem more
satisfied to have a high number to justify their
budgets."
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO PUT IT ALL TOGETHER
Despite congressional pressure to centralize
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control of the enforcement structure, the early emphasis
remained on interagency task force operations such as
Buccaneer and Channel Cat. This approach was expanded
from the regional evel to the national level in the
late 1970's with the inclusion of intelligence
coordination and support from EPIC.
OPERATIONS BULLRING, STOPGAP AND SNOWBIRD:
Operation Bullring was conceived in 1977 by the DEA as
an intelligence operation to identify "motherships"
involved in smuggling from South America. These
vessels, usually small freighters, made transits off the
coast of the United States dropping off quantities of
drugs to contact boats. Operation Bullring successfully
identified a number of vessels engaged in mothership
operations. "The success of this intelligence phase
(BU!LRING) prompted the following combined intelligence-
interdictive operations" [CGLO.-EPIC, 1978).
Two interdiction operations followed Operation
Bullring, Operatin Stopgap and Operation Snowbird.
Carried out simultaneously, these operations created
barriers in Caribbean "choke points" (passages between
islands, the only routes north) and around the coast of
Florida. The cho:e point operations were carried out by
the Coast Guard while the coastal interdiction operation
was coord'inated by Customs. DEA provided intelligence
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support and agents for investigative follow-up. These
operations, condcted in the fall and winter of 1977-78,
resulted in the seizure of 23 vessels, the sinking
(by vessel crews) of 4 vessels, seizure of nearly
900,000 pounds of marijuana and 55 pounds of cocaine,
202 arrests, seizure of 18 vehicles, and the seizure of
6 aircraft [CGLO-EPIC, 19783.
Irn spite of these successful efforts, the flood of
marijuana and cocaine from South America increased. By
sheer numbers, enforcement officials were finding
themselves overwhelmed. Sustained operations such as
Stopgap were difficult due to budgetary limitations and
smugglers soon learned to collect intelligence
themselves, wait for patrols to end, or reroute
shipments. As early as 1977, the DEA Regional Director
in Miami was callir g for significant manpower increases
and a. sustained task force-scale operation to coordinate
interagencly operations CGLO-EFIC, 1979].
THE CALL FOR BORDER CONTROL
As enforcement agencies attempted to consolidate
their specialized activities in local ad hoc
arrangements and, later, in more formal regional or
national task forces, the congress and the public were
becoming concerned by not only the growing drU.g threat
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from Latin America, but the flow of illegal aliens as
well [Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
1988:539-566 .
This notion had grown during the 1970's in the form
of a number of studies throughout government. The
central issue in these studies was whether or not to
create a border management agency to consolidate
enforcement ac:tivity (drugs, aliens, weapons, etc.). In
1974, the Senate looked into dual interdiction problems
between the INS and Customs- on the land border but took
no ac:ti:on on an Offic e of Mlanagement Budget (OMB)
proposal t consolidate patrol (between ports of entry)
and inspectionar (at ports of entry) functions [Senate
Committee onr Governmental Affairs, 1988: 328--3613. In
response, the Department of Justice recommended lead
investigative and patrol agencies be established for the
land and maritime borders [Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 1988: 362-4083. At the same time
a 1975 White Paper prepared by the Domestic Council. Drug
Abuse TaskForce called for an end to jurisdictional
disputes between Customs and DEA Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 1988: 4093. In 1977, the Office
of Drug Abuse Policy in the White House recommmended the
merger of Customs and INS. Inclusion of the Coast Guard
was considered but was only listed as an option in the
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final report [Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
1988: 487]. In spite of these numerous studies and
intiatives, there was never sufficient consensus to
carry out a consolidation of border functions in the
1970's.
THE RESURGENT CONGRESS AND THE "IRON LAW OF EMULATION"
The issue of drugs, aliens, and border control had
other effects. As developed earlier (Chapter 2),
government branches and agencies tend to emulate each
other to offset power. This notion and the ongoing
struggle between the president and congress was
apparent in the late 197C's when the presidency
was weak:ened in the aftermath of the Nixon
admi i stration.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE CONFLICTS: The
growing role of congress and the increasing complexity
of the drug enforcement made it difficult for the
president to carry out an administrative strategy as
described by Richard Nathan 19833. By this time there
were 17 federal agencies with some kind of operating
program in either supply or demand reduction GAO, 1979:
10] The Select Committee, counting entities within
a-encies (i.e. NIDA within HEW) came up with 100
entities GAO, 1979: 1.0 129129
In 1976, Congress amended the Drug Abuse Office and
Treatment Act passed in 1972 and created a permanent
Office of Drug Abuse Prevention (ODAP) in the White
House [GAO, 1979: 11. This was a move to make
permanent the function established temporarily in the
1972 legislation.
"The legislative intent made clear that
the Congress was clissatisfied with
inconsistent and sometimes conflicting Federal.
drug abuse policies with no clear overall
direc:tion. The Congress wanted a central
ac:ountability mechanism to ensure a coherent
Presidential drug abuse policy throughout the
executive branch. ODAP s statutory authority,
responsibility, and objectives were to oversee
all organizational and policy issues for drug
abuse and drug traffic prevention" [GAO, 1979:
President Carter did not activate the ODAP for one
year. Then shortly he submitted a reorganization plan
to abolish the office, preferring to keep policymaking
within the existing White House structure. Congress
reacted with concern "because of their belief in the
continuing need for such a high level. policy and
coordinating office, but also saw the need for
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reorganizattion in the Eecutive Office" and apitulated
[GAO, 1979: 11. The functions were assigned to the
Office of Drug Policy in the Domestic Council.
CONGRESSIONAL EMULATION: The creation of
coordinating structures in the Nixon era (Cabinet
Council on International Narcotics Control. and the
Special Action Office for Drug buse) and the move to
make a per:-manent office in the White House left the
Congress without a corresponding focus struc:ture. I rn
1976, the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and
Conttr l was formed This committee has no authorization
ori appropriation power but is charge with overseeing the
federal drug enforcement effrt and providing
information and advice to the House of Representatives
[GA, 1979: I] The committee +:irst held hearings in
September 1976 ard continues its oversight and advisory
role today.
OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY: It had
been common practice to station drug enforcement agents
at embassies and consulates in source countries to
collect intelligence and provide assistance to local
police agencies. In the early 1970's these activities
camIe under the scrutiny of Congress. In response to
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complaints received by the State Department and reports
by the GAO, Congress moved to restrict the activities
of DEA agents assigned to foreign countries and attached
to United States Embassies.
" . . DEA operations may infringe on
foreign sovereignty, and in some countries DEA
appeared to be reaching a point where its
overseas operational activity may be
substantially replacing the narcotics control
functions of local police . . Embassy
officials believed that sometimes DEA agents
pose a real threat to country relations, and
DEA agents were often not willing to balance
en-forcement efforts with the overall
obiectives of the mission" CGAO, 1979: 573.
In what is commonly called the "Mansfield
Amendment," Public Law 4-329 stated,
no employee of the United States
may engage in any direct police arrest action
in any foreign country with respect to
narcotics control efforts" [22 USC 2291
(c) (1)].
After a storm of protest in the late 1970's over
the use of toxic herbicides in foreign countries, the
Congress intervened again. In 1978 amendments to the
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1961 International Securities Assistance Act, the use of
foreign aid funds for toxic herbicides was prohibited
[92 Stat 730, PL 95-3843.
AGENCY EMULATION: Starting with the designation of
the Secretary of State as chair of the Cabinet Council
on International Narcotics Control in 1971, the State
Department began to assume a larger role in
policymaking, similar to the role played prior to and
just after the passage of the Harrison Act. The
Department pressed for passage of the Mansfield
Amendment :in 1976 and in 197 assumed direct control of
a crop eradication program administered through the
Agency for International Development (AID). In the same
year "Congress approved the creation of the Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters in the State Department
which provides the focus for integrating narcotic
control considerations within the general foreign policy
of the United States" [GAO, 1.979: 83
REFRAGMENTATION OF SMALL COORDINATING STRUCTURES AND
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES
At the end of the decade of the 1970"s it was clear
that a single lead agency was not the answer to the drug
enforcement challenge. Whether in local joint
operations (uccaneer Stopgap), consolidation f
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functions within bureaus5 (State Departments Bureau of
Irternational Narc:stics Matters), or the function of
str.ctiures targeted at specific programs (EPIC and
NNICC), all of the participants were moving into
cooperative structu.res to maximize resources and counter
new threats. In effect, specialized agencies were
grouiped into functional. or joi.nt oper-ations structures.
To complicate matters many agencies belonged to more
than-, one struc.ture and the structures themselves couiild
be ad hcic or permanent. For eample, while the Coast
Guar-d -routinely conducted ad hoc joint operations with
loc:al enfcrcement agencies throughout the country, the
service was also per manenrtl.y involved in EPIC and the
NNICC. Each struct.uire had a lead agency or coordi nating
committee and a different command and control structure
ini- relation to the federa:l government. The ituatt:i t-io
was f .ui i d dynamic. Con-igress was uncomfortabie with
it. In 1979, GAO in t itling their report on the decade
of effort (often qtoted i this chapter) chose "Gains
Made in CI:lntrc lli n Illegal Drugs, Yet the Drulg Trade
Flouri shes. " Figui-re 6-1. summarizes the activities
tal-:ing place at the close of the 1970' s .
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FIGURE 6-1
ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACTIVITY AT THE END OF THE 1970'S
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CENTRALIZAT ION OF COORDINATING STRUCTURES (1980'S)
The trend toward regional and small structures in
the 1971's evolved into a trend toward larger (macro)
structures in the 1980's. Continual pressure by
Congress for centralized control and accountability, the
efforts of F'resident Reag-rn to carry out an
adm inistrative approach, and a substantial increase in
pub lic awareness of drug problems characterized an
en vi ronmientt ripe for cl-hance and new strLcturles. Afs new
forms : -f orcanization emer-ged, agencies participated in
or became aligned with one or more stru.ctures. I 
addition, rnew pla-erst. entered the drug enforcement
p ror ' am . This crt-eated new problems in reporting chains
for organiizati.ons within the government and in
competition or conf: icting policy space assignments for
the new s, truc:ltures.,
The time appeared right to try new approaches. In
The eagan Presidency and the CGoverning of merica a
1984 study conducted by the Urban Institute, Lester
Salamon and Michael Lund note [1984:11], "In the decade
prior- to Ron a1d Reagari's election as president in 198.0,
confiene i the effec tiveness of Amer-ican overnment
rea-:ched a .ow ebb ...... " They note three cris-e-
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present at the time: (1) a crisis of ideas, discontent
with the political agenda; (2) a crisis of political
support, "an errosion in the broad public backing needed
for government initiatives; and (3) a crisis in public
management, "an enlarged scope of activity and the
cumbersomeness of many of the mechanisms through which
government was seel:ing to carry out its
responsibilities" Salamon and Lund, 1984: 1.
Given the failure of the enforcement system alone
to stem the flow of drugs, the proliferation of ad hoc
structures, and the emerging political consensus to do
somethinrg about drugs, the crises identified above might
well have been app:lied to drug enforcement and drug
policy in general. The President and Congress
immecliately sought to mal::e changes. The resulting moves
and countermoves culminated, most recently, in
congressional imposition of a drug czar organization
over the federal enforcement structure.
The Reagan strategy for drug enforcement was
initially one carried out through two entities within
the White House: the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy and
the Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction [Justice
Department, 1984: 181. These offices augmented the
functions carried out in the White House Drug Abuse
Pol.icy Office which was first created in 1972
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legislation and then transformed in the Carter
administration. Working with the various agencies and
responding to inputs from political constituencies, the
Reagan administration began to consolidate policymaking
and enforcement activities in administratively created
focus organizations. This process had begun when
Congress moved to involve the military in drug
enforcement.
CALLING IN THE ARMED FORCES, CHANGING THE 'POSSE
COMITATUS' DOCTRINE
In 1981 there was general consensus that the
military' s capability could significantly enhance the
drug enforcement. Despite some misgivings by senior
Pentagon officials, the Congress enacted legislation in
1981 that allowed a greater role for the military.
This was not. a simple legislative mandate. An
extensive body of law and custom existed which
proscribed use of the military in civil affairs in all
but a few circumstances such as martial law. The latin
term posse comitatus means "to be able to be an
attendant" [Barron's Law Dictionary, 1984: 351 It
refers to the power of a local sherrif to summon
citizens to assist in a specific enforcement action: the
arrest of a :elon [L aturno, 1.975: 22o.
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HISTORY: Such authority has been present in
American law in custom or statute since the birth of the
nation. In 1854 the U.S. Attorney General determined
that the Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed U.S. Marshals to
raise a posse that included military personnel Laturno,
1975: 22]. However, abuses of military rule in the
South after the Civil War prompted the Congress to enact
the Posse Comitatuss Act of 1878. The pertinent portion
of the law states, "whoever, except in cases and
circumstanc es expressly authorized by the Constitution
or Act of Congress. will fully uses any part of the Arimy
or the Ai r Force as a posse comi tatus or other wise to
e.ecuitte the laws shall be fined . . ." 18 USC 1385 as
cited by Laturno, :1975: 22). The Air Force was added
to the statute in 1956 legislation. While the Navy and
Mar:ine Corps were never included in the legislati on.
Laturno argued in a 3.1975 FBI Law Enforcement Bull.etin
that "the Posse Comitatus Act appears to be regarded as
national. policy applicable to all military services of
the United States, except the Coast Guard" CLaturno,
1975: 24]. The Navy stated in policy directives that
intent of the act applied to the Navy as well.
However, as early as 1977, there was a move to more
clearly define the statute and epand the use of the
militarvy. In a 1977 report entitled "If Defense and
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C:ivil Agenc :ies JWor'i.: More Closely Tge ther, ore
Efficient Search/Resc-:e and Coastal Law Enforcement
Could Follo,." the GAOf [1977: 41 stated that the act
only applied to the direct exercise o-f military power
over- citizens and that "indirect roles by mil ]. itarv
personnel, suc - = as, the loan and maintenance otf
equipment, aerial, photooraphic flights, training, and
other e.' :,ert advice ae to- . passive to be viewed asi
vio! at :ins s. the act an p d.. are therefore l awf l. and
proper '' Th -;r t ie re co I:: t: i currence by the Jus t: ce
Depa r- t fmt L ibased on -case law, tLJnite States v. Red,.s
F,.eat .e.-:- [ :Z " .. F, Supp, 9 L ]i.
1981 AMENDMENTS: The D epartmen t of D efense
ii .. bi t . h i i . ' .. .. .Fi i" '
,; ltf~i·":i. zat~i : x i :iJ. j-ri z - .t .. 7 ./-- ,',:.F .r Pi - : ,. i!'f a s i- ':',: t i :::: F',,F,JZ i1  "s ; .iI'L' ..' .nuce sL c.- 
whi. C:h en ai .ed " the E ec et ar- v o- Defen se Ct , 
pr i ; rvi c................ :, t_. lt:i l ian l awi 
_.; ' i ' .* i v et1 i r ,i ri:, ,, :-.I ,: Si ..j. J- Ve.-f:o " t::: f"ma t i on col ]. ected.H-."^.t-@tC~t'-y ^3t^''C--rei-|:-.>t-J t~r H_3i.VE? equr~ipment. .5-' : i.: 1 l:it" '
.r s'e,* any c:i.].:Lt J + o  aya enforcement
o)fc:i.a" [j s 'i' .-. ," ," Adaurys. 19184.- 6, SLb: '~' C L ~"G , 1
picy g uidance i 's-ued to Deparm-ment of Defense a enci .es
I. ' .'- E. i F Ci: : r . 4 i t .r ? i i ary . 1. 1 .3-] t ] . .l: . ac tv i;
"D,::i r.ti, ye; 552.5 f .19.32 c fo 
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Secretary Caspar Weinberger approved the following
activity: (1) air and surface surveillance- (2) towing
or escort of seized vessels, (3) logistics support to
Coast Guard units, (4) transportation of prisoners, and
(5) embarkation of Coast Guard personnel to conduct
boardings of non-foreign vessels [Adams., 1984: 36. In
fact. dams [1984] notes, the Navy had been providing
survei. llance information in the course of normal.
operations prior to the legislation. The impact of this
policy change on Coast Guard operations is discussed in
Part Two.
IMPACTS ON THE ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE: This
landmiark legislation had two major impacts in regard to
the enforcement structure. First, it established a
precedent for further involvement at a later date.
Second, it presented another dimension and level of
complexaity in the coordination of interagency operatiorns
and the structure needed to coordinate those efforts.
After a transition period, the structure which emerged
to fill the role was the National Narcotics Border
Interdiction System (NNBIS), discussed later in this
chapter.
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FURTHER CONSOLIDATI ON AND COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
A GAO report [1983] cited the successful operations
conducted in the late 1970's (i.e. Stopgap) and the
value of EPIC to the drug enforcement effort. The
report strongly endorsed further centralization and
coordination of intelligence at EPIC, including the
transfer of in-house intelligence functions from the
Coast Guartd and Customs.. While this consolidation never
occurred for a variety of reasons discussed in Part Two,
strong support for increased effectiveness of the
intelligence portion of the drug enforcement structure
had been present since the establishment of EPIC in
1974..
In 19131, however, a significant change occurred in
the inte1ligence p-ogram. President Reagan signed
Ex ecutive Order 12333 which allowed the national
security Intelligence Community (IC) to prepare national
intelligence estimates concerning drug trafficking.
This action provided a linkage between the national
se.Lcurity intelligence system (National Security Agency -
NSA, CIA, and the Defense Intelligence Agency - DIA) and
the system created with NNICC and EPIC.
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THE SOUTH FLORIDA TASK FORCE, THE FIRST STEP TOWARD A
DRUG CZAR
In the winter of 1981 and 1982 a group of concerned
citizens and business people in Miami, including Frank
Borman (CEO Eastern irlines) and other community
leaders requested and received an audience at the White
Ho..use to cliscuss the situation in Miami caused by the
drug problem, violence, and the influx of refugees from
the Mariel boat e.odus in 1981 D. Thompson intervi.ew,
19893. The group, know as the Miami Citizens gainst
Crime, were successful in gaining local enforcement
attention. President Reagan assigned Vice President
George Bush as the adlministrationns lead official to
look into the problems.
On January 1982, Vice President Bush announced the
formation of the "South Florida Task Force, a multi-
agency effort that emphasizedc interdiction of drug
shipments and the arrest and prosecution of smugglers"
[Shannon, 1988: 841. A career Coast Guard law
enforcement specialist termed it the "marriage of
interdiction, investigations, and intelligence" [Hart
interview, 19893.
In contrast to earlier multi--agency operations
which were generally conceived. p]anned, and executed at
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the regional level with coordination at higher levels
done only as necessary to obtain resources or authority.
the South Florida Task Force (SFTF) represented an
operation directed from the top-down. It was the first
direct linkage between the White House and field
enforcement efforts since the Nixon era.
The SFTF was intended to be a coordinating
structure to focus enforcement efforts. No additional
funding was provided to participating agencies, bt the
GAO has estimated the first year cost to the
participating agencies to be, approximately, $66
milli.on [Shannon, 1988: 84; GAO, 1983: 251. The task
force was staffed with temporary personnel detailed from
the participating agencies. The first director was a
career law enforcement officer who had been placed in
charge of the Atlanta child murders investigation ED.
Thompson interview, 1989). A short while later Admiral
D.C. "Deece" ThomFpson, the Commander of the Seventh
Coast Guard District in Miami assumed the coordinator"s
duties. From that point on, the District Commander was
the local coordinator of the SFTF.
This structure introduced new relationships into
the regional drug enforcement structure. In Desperados:
Latin Dru.,,: Lr:ds., U.S.L,_. Lawmen.. and the War- America. Can't
Win, Elaine Shannonr [1988: 84--85 describes her view of
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the agency reactions:
"'CLsitoms I and Coast Guard officials were
generally pleased with the idea because the
project emphasized their mission of
interdicting drug traffickers. BATF officials
were grateful for the opportunity to have a
job that the White House considered top
priority . . "
"Bi-u-t DEA officials obiected that the tas.::
for-ce was no m r-e than a campaign platform fo :r-
the Republicans and that it solved a pol itical
problem in i Flor-ida at the e--pense of
r-egl ectirig c::ses in Houston: Los Angeles, and
t he North--east. They did not believe the tatsk.-
f-orce c ncept would advance DEtA's miJ ssi on: to
make coL: pirac:y cas, es against kingpins a -nd to
ta ::e away their i 3.. --got ten gai ns. Th e tas::,
for ce plan cal led for DEA ag en ts to h an dle
fol o.w--up i nvesti i ati ons a f ter Customs or the
Coast Guar d made a s ei ure. IDEA officia ls
wanted their agents to penetrate the rings at
ever- higher levels, not react li k:e firemen to
the busts f other agencies."
The, DElA ijante d more resources in South Flo!-rida but
Cbjected to the external control and pri oritiz. zati on
I t C., 1 Ut.t cne year- e-ar:ir the DE had coc rdinated
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Operation Grouper- which was a regional effort similar to
St opgap in 1978. The operation was carried out in
cooperation with the Coast Guard and Customs and
resulted in 155 indictments of which 81 were high level
violators (DEA classification I or II); the seizure of
1.2 million pounds of marijuana, 831 pounds of cocaine,
and three million methaqualone tablets; and the seizure
of $20 million in cash and other assets GAO, 1983: 241.
Nonetheless the SFTF was placed into operation.
Vice President Bu..sh was able to put the SFTF in
place due, in large part, to his chief-of-staff retired
Navy AdmirDal Dan Mur..phFv who had been Bush's deputy
director at the CIA. Shannon 1988: 853 notes the "plan
hal a dis.:tinctlv m:i l itary s:Lant, which was; not
surprising.'" Rudolph Guiliani C1985: 714 has stated
that "Under prcdding from the Vice President and his
chief of staff, retired Admiral Dan Murphy, the mili.tary
was peirsuade to participate. .. " The combination of
the interdiction orientation and the top-down style of
Murphy caused some friction between DEA dministrator
Francis Mullen and Murphy according to Shannon.
In a their 1983 report the GAO evaluated the first
year of the SFTF operation. A summary of that report is
provided! in Fi u!re 7-1. 'The effort was generally
regarded as successful.! e.cept that DEA reporteci data
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FIGURE 7-1
SUMMARY OF 1983 GAO REPORT ON SOUTH FLORIDA TASK FORCE
"Although designed to be a braod, multifaceted anticrime
program for South Florida, the bulk of the Task Force,
both in terms of activities and resources, focuses on
drug interdiction."
"Reports of the results achieved from the Task Force
efforts have been mixed. The Departments of Justice and
Treasury have reported some very positive achievements.
They note that:
-- The crime rate in South Florida hs dropped
si gnf:i cantl]. y.
-- Drug arr-ests and se:iziures in Florida have
i. ncreased.
F-- llowup drug interdiction investigations have
been carries ou.it i almost every case withpositive results.
O-- verall drug enforcement cohesiveness has been
st rengthen ed.
Treasury Department seizures statistics between the
first year of operation and the year before (1.982 and
!981):
-- Manr ilana seizures increaised from 1 ,94, (000 to
, 245, 0 -r - pou r'i d..
---- Ccaine sei. zures went up from 1,617 pounds to
2 83. pounds.
Arrest rose from 74-2 to 95.
"The Tr-asury Department also noted that the Tas:: Force
appears to have shifted drug smuggling activity to other
parts of the cuntry. For example, even though
mar-iju.ana seizures in the S.outheastern United States
showed little change in 1961 and 1982, marijuana
seizures increased imore than 400 percent in the
Northeast during tis period."
"On the other hand, DEA data shows that most of the
arrests associated with the Task Force are low level
violators . . only 5 percent of the Task Force arrests
are mare drug violators . Several DEA and other-
officials said that . it is doubtful whether the
Task Force can have any ubstantial long-term impact on
the drug availability."
drug price and purity data in 1982 indicates
increased availability of most drugs."
Scource: GAO eportL. Federal Drugc interdiction Efforts
Need St Con Centr-l versi ght, 19"8, pp. 24-26..
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that indicated most of the arrests were of low level
violators [GAO, 1983: 261.
The experience with the SFTF showed that a top-down
managed, multi-agency effort could be successful
locally. On a national level the drug trade shifted to
less patrolled areas. However, as Guiliani 1985: 714]
noted, "The South Florida Task Force provided a working
model which proved that a concentration of resources in
one geographic area, using a task force arrangement,
could result in a substantial reduction in drug
traffick1ing." It also demonstrated that agencies would
work together- when the directing authority was eternal
and higher in the government than any participating
agency.. However, problems still existed in the larger'
enforcement structure.
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
BORDER MANAGEMENT: Froposals continued to surface
regardino the consolidation of the Customs and
Immigration patrol functions. In 1981, two confl.icting
reports were subitted on the consolidation. The Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, chaired by
the Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, the President of Notre
Dame Univ. ersi ty, recommended no change in the
enforc:ement stlrciCture [Senate Committee on Governmental
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Affairs, 1988: 5:39-566]. Meanwhile, the ttorney
General's Task Force on Violent Crime, co-chaired by
former Attorney General Griffin Bell, recommended the
consolidation of patrol functions within the Treasury
Department [Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.,
1988: 567-5743.
In 1983., three different reports called for
resolution of the border- management situation: (1) a
Cat:inet Council on Management and Administration
Proposal; (2) the President's Private Sector Survey on
Cost Control (commonly known as the Grace Commission) 
and (3) the lHouse Committee on Government Operations
Report, "Inter-i Report n the War Against Drug
Smuggling: The Soft Underbelly of the United States"
[Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 1988: 575--
718). As before, in the 1970'"s, no action was tal.en on
any of the proposals.
OTHER OPEN ISSUES: side from border control,
other issues remained. First, no structure had been
developed to incorporate the military into the
enforcement effort. While a special staff was created
in the Pentagon to address the issue and coordinate the
DOD role, each agency tended to work its own deal for
militar-y support as the Coast Guard had done with tie
Navy prior to the PFosse Comitatus Amendments. Second.
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efforts in South Florida diverted drug traffic to other
areas and soon other regions and states began to request
directed operations in their areas Guiliani, 1985:
7143. As a result, a group of governors approached the
President to request a nation-wide effort [Hart
interview, 1989]. Third, the DEA, dissatisfied with the
structure and operation of the SFTF still sought a
better structure to immobilize major trafficker
[Shannon 1988: 84...87 .
The rising public awareness of the drug problem and
its growing support for more effective action on the
part of the government (as described earlier in the
chapter) created a climate for bureaucratic
entrepr eneurship. Despite tight budgets, the public and
the conagress were will. i ng to buy better enforcement.
The SFTF had been the first manifestation of this
not i on .
The SFTF was also the first of a series of actions
by President Reagan to consolidate enforcement policy
and multi-agency coordination through an administrative
strategy to forestall congressional action. Richard
Nathan [1983: 11-13] has stated that the administrative
president reemerged with the Reagan presidency after
lying dor-mant since the Nixron administration. However
in his second term President Reagan lost control of the
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Senate and then had to contend with a resurgent congress
with an enforcement agenda of its own and a drug czar
champion in Senator Joseph Biden.
THE ORGANIZED CRIME DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCES
The first bureaucratic coalition to bring a new
organizational "product" to the drug enforcement
"marketplace" were the enforcement agencies within the
Department of Justice. The Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) concept was developed by
then Associate Attorney General Rudolph Guiliani and
announced by President Reagan on 14 October 1982
[Shannon, j1988: 83; Giuliani, 1985: 7121. The official.
rationale for a muLlti-location strike force organization
was based on (1) the success of the strike forces
established by Attorney General Robert Kennedy in the
late 1960's and early 1970's which targeted organized
cri.me. () te success of this form of organization in
South Florida, and (3) the need to be flexible and "move
with the traffickers and to attack the problem in its
different forms all over the country" Guiliani, 1985:
714-717; Shannon, 1988: 873.
The major agencies involved in the OCDETF's were
DEA, the LU.S. Attorney organization, and the FBI which
had been given concur-rent jurisdiction with the DEA over
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drug investigation in 1981 as a result of a previotus
Giuliani initiative [Shannon, 1988: 83). The
interdiction agencies and the military were also given
roles and assigned personnel to facilitate the flow of
information. The OCDETFs were staffed, like the SFTF
with 1. 800 personnel detailed from the various agencies
to the organization EGuiliani, 1985: 716). In contrast
to the SFTF, the OCDETFs concentrated on long term
conspiracy cases and high-level traffickers. While
information ex'change and general coordination took place
the OCDETFs tended to operate autonomously within their
particular regi.ons. A ar ticL:lar concern to the Justice
Dep.artment had been the day--to-day decision process
concerni ng which governmental level would prosecu.lte a
given case. "While federal and state law mandates joint
jurisdiction and responsib:ility for prosecuting druLt
traffickers, it provides no formal basis for allocating
these massive joi nt responsibilities" [Guiliari, 1985:
715 .
Local U.S. ttorneys were placed in charge of the
tastk forces to "remove most of the jurisdictional
disputes within partic:ular districts and eliminate the
inherent unwieldiness of absentee management" EGuiliani,
1985: 7161.. This role was largely administrative in
nature as there was a specific decision made not to
estab:iish leald aenc-:ies that would create frictior or
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rivalry. In fact. this structure was modeled somewhat
on the Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees (LECC)
established in the 94 federal judicial districts under
the chair of the local U.S. Attorney in 1981. The LECC
structure was very similar itself to the Law Enforcement
Organizations (LEOs) established a decade earlier by
Coast Guard commands to enhance interagency cooperation.
The OCDETFs were a marriage of investigation and
prosecution with interdiction providing one part of the
actionable inputs. They were an eample of the
President's administrative strategy regarding drug
enforcement. The Reagan administration was aware of a
growing movement in Congress to establish a drug czar
and wished to avoid this imposition of congressional
will if possible. Opportunities to centralize and
cordinate federal! efforts forestalIled those efforts.
Elaine Shannon observed that "Joe Biden"s drug czar bill
became the centerpiece of an anti-crime legislative
package which passed in the closing days of 1982.
Objecting to the drug czar concept on bureaucratic and
constitutional grouands, Reagan vetoed the entire crime
package in January 1983" Shannon, 1988: n.4601.
The interdiction portion of the enforcement
structure was coordinated in South Florida but nowle re
elsee, so a void eisted even in the creation of the
153
OCDETFs. That issue was addressed in the creation of
the National Narcotics Border Interdiciton System
(NNEIS) establ ished six months after the OCDETFs were
announced.
THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS BORDER INTERDICTION SYSTEM
(NNBIS)
Pres:ildert Reaan announcred the format ion of NNBIS
on 23 March .98 3, and named Vice Presi.dent Eltsh to head
the o rganizat ion. "The President said that mission rT
NNBIS was to coordinate the work of those federal.
agencies that .have existingr responsibilities and
capabiii. tie s fJor the interdiction of seaborne, airborne.
and other- cross-borde i mportat ion of illegTal diruogs . He
directed NNBIS to monitor suspected s;muglin. actit.vity
origi ating o utsid e and des tined for the U.Jnited States
and to coordi.nate agencies' seizures of contraband and
arrest;s i personsl i nvo.ved in illegal di.rug
i mp-ortation" [ CPOD , .98: 21.
The NNBIS organization was comprised of a
headquarters staff and six regional centers located in
Miami, New Orleans, El Paso, Long Beach, Chicago, and
New York. In concept NNBIS was intended to be an
informatl coor-F-inat:ing body that wo uld recommmend actions
to agencies bu t not direct operati ons. "NNB'IS is not a
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separate and distinct agency -- it does not have a
legislative charter or a budget" [GAO, 1985: 23. Using
the office of the Vice President, intelligence and
interdiction resources would be identified and routed to
the right agency for action. Subsumed within this
concept was the intended solution to two problems noted
earlier: the coordination of border interdiciton effort
and the structured use of the military in support of
interdiction. To that end each regional center
contained an Intelligence Information Coordination
Center and an Operations Information Center.
For ease of comparison, Figure 7-2 provides a
compar'ative listing of multi-agency coordinating
structures (EPIC, SFTF, OCDETFs, and NNBIS offices) and
their locations. Of the six centers established by
NNBIS, Miami., New Orleans, and Long Beach were assigned
to local Coast Guard District Commanders who titled
Regional Coordinators. The remaining centers in
Chicago, New York, and El Paso were assigned to local
Customs Commissioners. Deputies in each center were
assigned from the agency that did not hold the Regional
Coordinator position. The total staff of the centers
was approximately 150 full time personnel with temporary
resources assigned from agencies as required
[Schowengerdt and Hart, 1984: 26. The agencies
represented were Customs, the Coast Guard, DEA, FBI, the
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FIGURE 7-2
COMPARITIVE LISTING OF MULTI-AGENCY STRUCTURES 
ORGANIZED CRIME
DRUG ENFORCEMENT
TASK FORCE
NATIONAL NARCOTICS
BORDER INTERDICTION
SYSTEM REGIONAL CENTER
LOCATION South Florida
Task Force
Miami, Florida
New York: New York
Atlanta
St. L. oui 
Houston El Paso 
Denver
San Diego
Los Angel es Long Beach
San Francisco
Detroit
Bal ti more
Bost on
Ch i c ago
New Orleans
* The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is a separate
multi-agency facilities operated under the
administration of the Department of Justice and DEA.
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Chicago
Air- Force, the Navy, the Army, the INS, the Marine
Corps, the U.S. Marshall. Service, BTF, members of: the
national security Intelligence Community (IC), and state
and local enforcement personnel Schowengerdt and Hart,
1984: 26 1.
Pursuant to a 1984 congressional request, GAO
conducted a review of NNBIS operations and concluded
that "the concept upc0n wh ich NNBIS was founded -- a need
for improved crosis--agencv coordination of drug
interdict:iori efforts --- was sound. GAO found that there
has been some imp-rovement in interagency coordi nat i. on
and: tthat NNE.IS efforts did result in some gain in dru.lg
inte- d i. ctions. However, these improvements still fel1.
far- shoi:.rt ,of what is needed to substantially reduce the
·. low o.f d rugs irnto the c:untry" CGAO, 1.985: cover] 
Soime of the probems that GfAO found inc::ded rap i:il
tur-nover and the assi.gnment of lower rank personnel. tan
requested, d:uplica-tion of the intelligence functionr in
other agencies and a hesitancy to provide all
informat:ion, and the actual involvement of NNBIS
personnel in some operations, contrary to the
organization's precept GAO, 1985]. Still GAO found
nume.rous cases of "NN IS:' par-ticipat ion in an
inter-liction that we be: ieve w ould not have ccurred
without NIE-:' involvement" GAO, 1985: 14].
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Respondents to a GAO questionaire also stated that NNBIS
had increased cooperation with DOD and that "getting
military assistance through NNBIS is quicker, easier,
and less costly to them than before" [GAO, 1985: 183.
DEA Administrator Francis Mullen maintained the
view that NNBIS was an unnecessary layer in the
structure and was an attempt (like the SFTF) to claim
interdiction success for the Reagan administration. In
a highly publ.icized report to the Attorney General
Mullen severely criticized both NNBIS and Bush's chief
of staff, Dan Murphy; actuall.y charging that the
resources c:com,mjitted by the agencies were reducing
effectiveness elsewhere Shannon, 1988: n.4613.
MANAGING THE PROLIFERATION OF COORDINATING STRUCTURES,
THE NATIONAL DRUG POLICY BOARD
The creation of structures such as EPIC/NNICC, the
SFTF, the OCDETFs, and NNBIS succeeded in focusing
multi-agency effort and provided some measure of
coordination within a geographical region or functional
specialty of drug enforcement. Each could claim at
least modest success. However, each structure was
incapable of capturing the entire drug enforcement
effort across the federal bureaucracy. No matter how
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effective . a oiortion of the effort was, the entire
fedteral p.rooram remained subiect to criticism due to
fragmented responnsibility and lack of overall
coordinatio-n and management. Moreover, public patience
was being tested and the administrative approach of the
Regan first term was tbeing criticized in Congress
THE NATIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY BOARD: On 1.2
October 1934, President Reagan signed into law the
c:omprehensive Crime Control Act of 1.984.. Thi s
leg islat:ion was the most etensive revision of the
criminal codes since President Johnson signed the 1968
OmnibusL, Crime Control and Safe Streets Act [CQ. _Al.fiT!anac.
1.94: 21.]. The H-a-,ndbook- on the Comorehensive Crime
Control A :-t of 1984 anId Other Criminal Statutes Enacted
kby the 98th C.ng--:- pl ublished by the Justice
Departmenr-t reCuiredl over 2:: pages to suLmmarize the
changes i.n the :fede.r-al. code [Ju sti.ce Department 1984].
Thi.s legislation was a reformulation of the 193 bill
that President Reagan had vetoed because of the drug
czar provision.. The bill was the "culmination of an 11-
year effort to make major changes in the federal
cr:iina code" [CO lmarac, 1984: 215 ] RemaininQ
legislative agenda items from the Prettyman, F::atzenbach,
and following commiss ions were addressed, includin a 65
point planr developed by the Attorney Gener-al.'s Task
Fo-rce on V:i olent C:i rrme conv -,ened in 198:1 by Wi. lliam
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French Smith [ISchowengerdt and Hart, 1984: 24 CQ
Almanac, 1984 215-224 .
Chapter XIII of the Act was titled the National
Narcotics Act H.J. Res.  648 and created the National
Drug Enforcement Policy Board which replaced the Cabinet
Council on Legal Pol icy and the Working Group on Dr-ug
Supply Recduction. but not the White House Drug Abuse
F'olicy Of fic. T his cabinet level board was a
legislati e mandate by the Congress and superceded the
e'xi sting admi. ni strati vel y created pol i cy structure.
Elaine S1. hannon ['--1988: n. 460)! comments that after the
198..: drug czar bill was vet ed1 "At s iden and his adl.lie
regrouped., the White Hiouse proposed a compromise, a
National Dru.g F'olicy Board. which wou]. d be chaired by
the Attorn-- GEneraly G ideni did not lilke the idea biut
did not wan-t to ap:peFar unreasonable, so he went along on
the condition that the Congress get regular- progress
reports."
To correct Ms. Shanrnon's note, the board was
established as the National Drug Enfor cement Policy
Board (NDEF') and was later reorganized into the
National Drug Polic Board (NDPFB) under eecutive order
when Reagan attempted to reassume the lead with
ad m inistratie action. The NDFB broadened the NDEFPB
memberTshi.:, and, for the fi rst time in the hi.ist-or of
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*drug control, consolidated supply and demand reduction
policymaking and agency coordination in a single
organization.
The NDEPB consisted of the Secretaries of State,
Treasury, Defense, Transportation, and Health and Humans
Services. In addition, the Directors of OMB and the CIA
were included. Later Presidential additions to the
board were the White House Deputy Assistant to the
President for Drug buse Policy and the Vice President's
Chief of Staff ENDEF!B, 1986: 2.
"The Board was] given authority to develop federal
drug strategy, eva:luate eisting programs, coordinate
the activities of the departments and agencies
responsible for drug enforcement and gather information
about illegal drug use. The mandate to the Board was]
thus quite broad and allowEed] a range of possible roles
--from essentially passive research and analysis to
active implementation of drug policies" [Justice
Department, 1984: 181). After an interim report on
initial activities in July 1985, the Board submitted its
first full report in March 1986 for 1984-85 and
incorporated a previous reporting requirement on the
OCDE'TF program NDEPB. 1986: 1.]. The report was a
summation of federal activity in the areas of
i.nvestigation and prosecution, interdi ction
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i nternat i onal dru-Lg coi-ntrol domestic canni bi s
eradication, lici t drul.g diversion, intelligence
programs, legislative intiatives, and drug abuse
prevention and education [NDEPB, 1986: ii].
NNBIS AND THE NDEPB: The legislative mandate made
it clear that the Eoard could review and recommend
changes in e.'isting agencies or tructures such as EPIC
or NICC where the leadership or- ch:air eisted w:ithin a
cabinet departmentu NNBIS and the SF7TF were ex-cepti oncs
in that they reported to the ice President who wais
senior to the EBoard chairan, the Attornev General. T'he
fact caused GA t comiment in the 985 NNIS evaluati-on
c ited earlie . .r . the relationship o-f NNIS,
located in the O-fice of the .ice President, to the
newly. created National Drug Enforcement Policy BEoard is
unclt ear in lig h t -of te fBoard ' s tatutory objective :.
ove;rseeing and coorclinating all feder-al drug law
enr C). l:efn.t. effort.- including drug interdiction" [GAif,
1985: 1]. The itua-tion also caused Senator Dennis
DeConcini to recommiend in a 1.985 letter to the President
that NNFIS be relocated in a cabinet department
DeConc i n i, 1985. Ir- creating an alternative to the
dr-uj czar organization desired by Congress, the
Pre:icent's was nab-le to c:apture all of the enforcement
functiors wi, tii. hin the structure. The .alternati ve
r-ec r anizat.i. on or re ocation of NNBIS from the Off.i. ce o. f
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the Vice President, carried huge political liabilities.
With NNBIS technically autonomous in the federal
structure it was possible for the Commandant of the
Coast Guard to be working for three bosses: the Vice
President, the Secretary of Transportation, and the
Attorney General (chair of the NDEPB). The fuzziness of
the structure did not end there.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) ROLE EXPANDS:
The NNBIS role and questions regarding its interface
with the ND:F'B were highly visible within the
enforcement structure and the subject of much
discussion. However, an additional organization,
external to the NDEPB, entered the scene on April 11,
1986, when President Reagan signed National Security
Directive 221. The directive "stated that international.
drug trade is a threat to our national security because
of its destabilizing effect on allies. The drug trade
is also a possible source of funds for Soviet
intelligence services, and insurgent and terrorist
groups. The strategy is . . . to reduce the ability to
use drug trafficking to support terrorist activities"
[Trainor, 1987: 85-861.
The organizat:ional implications of this decision
were similar to that of the creation of NNBIS in that
another organization, the National Security Council.
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staff in the White House, had become a policymaking
entity in the drug enforcement structure. Earlier in
1985, Howard Gehring, in a research report prepared at
the National Defense University's Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, concluded that drug trafficking was a
growing threat to national security and policymaking
regarding the drug threat was best located in the NSC
where "strategy guidance from the highest levels of both
the e.'ecuti ve and egislative branch" could be obtained
[Geh-ring, 1 985: ia. In essence, Gehring's approach
would have placed the focus on drug enforcement policy
in the NSC sub ect. to Presidential. .in+fluence and
ianagement and obviated the need for a policy board.
CONSOLIDATION OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND SIDE ACTIVITIES
IN THE NATIONAL DRUG POLICY BOARD: On 26 March 1987
President Reagan signed Executive Order 12590 which
created the National Drug olicy Btoard (NDPF'. "The
Policy E;oard centralizes over-sight for all aspects of
the Federal anti-drug effort, which etends from
diplomatic initiatives to achieve increased
international cooperation against the global narcotics
threat to domestic law enforcement activities and the
broad r-ange of activities aimed at prevent ing ill egal
dru..t tuse. and treating and rehabi litatinog users" [.Cuoted
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from the stated of purpose of the N DFPB, 1988, ins ide
cover . E: 1259t: e:.panded the membership of the c.d
NDEPB as shown in Fi .Lure 7-.3. The new board included
neither fNNIUS or the NSC activity in i.t sphere of
coord i nat i on.
At the request of Senator EBiden, the GAOC cond.ucted
a review , of the NDPBF acitvities in 1.987 and issued the
rit , Na. " i onal iD-ruo Po licy Boar d Leader ;h i p
Ev. ,i .r. Greater R-ol].e in Develo ping Bdgets Fossi. bl e"
Ei GPi. i 988 (- . The .e.o..r. , ::concluded that the B o a d '.
": f: -r t: r i tt: .:itt er i oordi nati on hav e b een wti w hi . e
andi resp..-, nsive t .'-- t requi iements of the aw
L,.sta . 1,ishi te . j. cv:'.i y B strd " GA .I 1988 2-- 3 . The 
r eo -:; rt c:i t ei:l the b: a . 's -: i u a n c e o f t wo p ol i c y
d-.r etives an t i 4:aci .itating decisi on s made regard i ng
et -o.e: * -- e-' ati .CiiL t. i- , The board also published the
N a t i on a. a,  I n e r na t i d n d D r u o E n f o r c emi e t t Fr t v v
r1. 98,-7]. The i-repor-t di. state that the boar d needed to
as-s,-!Ie a, :-. a ,e,- ro'l  ii the- review o)f agency
e:'ipenditures and the development of budgets. The Board
prcdluced the first combi ned national drug strategy in
1988 which addressed both the supply and demand side of
the issue :in one c:cC:Lment.
-h cawn ir Fig !.r'e 7-4, the enfrcement str-ategy i 
the s',-pl y reducti on p]ort io an of veral nat i onal
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FIGURE 7-3
MEMBERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL DRUG POLICY BOARD
NATIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY BOARD (NDEPB)
ORIGINAL MEMBERS DESIGNATED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME
CONTROL ACT OF 1984 TO FORM THE NATIONAL DRUG
ENFORCEMENT POLICY BOARD (NEDPB)
Attorney General, Chair
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Vice Chair
Secretary of State
Secretar of Treasury
Secretary of Transportation
Secretary of Defense
D:irtec:tor- ,Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Director. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
NATIONAL RUG POLICY BOARD
ADDITIONAL MIvEMBERS ADDED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 1259 TO
CREATE THE NATIONAL DRUG POLICY BOARD (NDPB)
Secretary of Interior
Sec:retary of: Agri. CLtu tt.re
Secretary of Housi - and Urban Development
Secretary of Energy
Se cretary of EducationAssistant to the President for National Security A-ffairs(also known as the National Security Advisor)
Chi-ef- of Staff to the Vice President
Direc:tor- of Whi.te House Drug buse Policy Office
andc, other members as, the FPresident may designate
The intent of the chanes made under- EO 12590 was to
combine supply and demand reduction within the same
policy makina body.
Source: National Drug PFolicy Board, 1989
166
strategy. The enforcement strategy contains 5 strategic
sections developed by the Drug Enforcement Coordinating
Groutp of the Policy Board which consisted of the
enforcement agency heads. These strategic sections are
further subdivided into strategic subdiviorions with
responsibility for strategy development. For eamp e,
the interdic-tion section is brok:en down into air, sea
and land subdi vi si onst with a lead agency assigned to
c:tordirnate a::t tivities.. The Coast Guard is the lead::
agency within.r the s:iea interdiction subgroup. This
relationshi is also shown in Figure 7-4. Prior to the
establ. ishent of the board, the national strategy had
beenr prep red by th e ru g l bLise Policy Of fice in tie
Office of Policy Development in the White House with t-he
participatioin f the varicius cabinet department pursuant
to the T"he Dru-i.g Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 972
discussed earlier in FPart One [Drug Abuse Policy Off ice,
1.9843 
THE IMPACT OF THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986
Juist prior to the 198t elections Congress passed
the Anti-Drug Abuse ct of 1986. Despite the creation
of the NDEPB, Congress continued to be actively involved
in setting policy. The legislation was passed in the
wake cf two hig hliy publi- i.ie c deaths caused by "crack"
anrid has beei-i ci. ted by Hecirick Smithl- as an examrple of the
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FIGURE 7-4
.1.
THE NATIONAL DRUG POLICY BOARD ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
CHAIR
(ATTORNEY GENERAL)
VICE CHAIR
(SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES)
DRUG ENFORCEMENT DRUG ABUSE, PREVENTION
COORDINATING GROUP AND HEALTH COORDINATING
GROUP
(SUPPLY) (DEMAND)
STRFA-TEGIC L SECT IIONS STRATEGIC SECTIONS
. INTELLIGENCE * PREVENTION EDUCATION
* I NTERN ATI :)NA ' ...L. CONTRO TC!. t MAINSTREAM ADJI TS....T
* INTERDICTION * HIGH RISK YOUTH
. INVEST I iAT I NS
T'F;REATME:NT
,* FR'1-o SECU,lT ICONS
EACH STR.TE IC SECT I ON HAS FURTHER SUBDIVISIONS.
THE I NTERDICTION COMMITTEE (TIC) OVERSEES STRATEGIC
SUBDJIVISIONS IN:
* AIR
* LAND
t SEA.
1. ]The ational Strategy developed by the NDFPB is based
on si: goaals that will reduce supp:l y and demandl . The
Pr-esident has termed these goals the "Foundation o0f the
national stratev."
a. A drug-free workplace
b. Drug free schools
c:. E;panded tr-eatment for- users
d. Improved international cooperation to reduce
supp3.y and use
e. Strengthen drug law enforcement
f. Improve pub].ic awar-eness and prevention
2. Each strategic gLro-p and sub-group is coordinated by
a "lead agency." For example, the lead agency in
international narcotics control group is the State
Department. The lead agency for the sea interdiction
subl-grou.l is the Coast Guar-d.
Source: "A Repor-t Fr-omr the National Drug Policy Bo ard:
Toward a Druo--Free m.er-i .ca. The National Druc, Strate-vy
and Im I leme ntatilon F.ans.a." Wasfshi. n gt on : GiC. 1999..
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political tactic of "positioning" in an election year
[Smith, 1988: 6573. It represented, in large part, a
return to the punitive legislation of the 1950's.
Numerous house and senate committees were involved as
well as numerous proposals. The legislation had twenty-
two major provisions many of which were riders on
unrelated subjects such as infant formula regulations
[CQ Almanac, 1986: 92-1063.
The provisions pertinent to this study include the
fol owing:
1. Increased penalties under amendments to the
Controlled Substance Act.
2. Significant funding for increases in drug
interdiction including WACS aircraft for
the Coast Guard and Customs, aerostat radar
balloons, and 8 blackhawk helicopters.
3. Authorization additional funds and personnel
for- the Coast Guard.
4. Expanded the circumstances under which DOD
agencies could be utilized.
5. Strengthened anti-smuggling laws related to
reporting arrivals and penalties associated
with smuggling controlled substances.
6. Established a United States-Bahamas drug
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interdiction task force with authorization
to construct facilities in the Bahamas
[CO Almanac, 1986: 92-106.
These provisions did not change the enforcement
structure under study here. However, the struggle over
the acquisition of new equipment, personnel, and
missions by the interdiction agencies was intense and
took place to a great extent within the Policy Board as
will be discussed in Fart Two.
THE TRIUMPH OF THE RESURGENT CONGRESS AND THE NATIONAL
NARCOTICS LEADERSHIP ACT
The administr<tive strategy of the Reagan
administration came to an end in the fall of 1988 with
the passage of the National Narcotics Leadership Act of
1988, the "Drug Czar" bill. The act was part of a
larger legislative package called the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988. It was the third successive piece of anti-
drug legislation passed just prior to an election: 1984-
National Narcotics Act; 1986- Anti-Drug Abuse Act; 1988-
Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the included National Narcotics
Leadership Act. Figure 7-5 provides the major
provisions of the legislation. The pertinet provision
to this tudy is the National Narcotics Leadership Act
(NNLA) 170170
FIGURE 7-5
SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE
ACT OF 1988 OF WHICH THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS LEADERSHIP
ACT IS INCLUDED
Title I: Coordination of National Policy
"National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988"
- Established for 5 years the Office of
National Drug Control Policy with a
Director and Staff. Two Deputies for
supply and and demand.
- Director is to promulgate a national drug
control strategy, make organizational
recommendations, direct reassignment of
personnel subject to agency concurrence
review agency budget reprogramming
reqtest s.
- Terminates NDPEB NNBIS, and White House
Drug buse Policy Office.
Title II: Treatment and Prevention: Grant programs
Title I I I: Drug EduLcati on Programs: Grant programs
Title IV: International Narcotics Control
"International Narcotics Act of 1988"
- Amends 1961 Foregin Assistance ct
- Calls for international drug force in UN
- Amends previous legislation regarding
mi ilitary assistance and human rights
certi f i cat ion.
Title V: User Accoun..7tabilitv: Certification program that
recipients of federal funds are attempting to
maintain drulg-free workplaces.
Title VI: Anti-Drg Abuse Amendments Act of 1988
-Amends Zero Tolerance Policy
Title VII: Death Penalty Provision
Titles not related to study not shown.
Source: HR 5210 and "Notes on the Final Drug Bill, HR
5210," prepared by the Legal Staff at Coast
Guard Headquarters. 171
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The NNLA was a similar versi on to the drug czar
legislation vetoed by President Reagan in 1983. Despite
a lukewarm approva:L by the GAO in their 1988 report, the
National Drug Policy EBoard system of coordination drew
e<,treme congressional criticism in the 1987 House
Committee on Government Operations report, "The National
Drug Folicy IBoard: A Failure in the War on Drugs" [HouIse
Committee on Government Operations, HR 100-184. 1987].
Onei- Coast Guard sat .- attorney des.;cribed it as
"blisteri-nl" [Coast Guard (G-LLX), 1988). Senator
Joseph idern, who had attempted since the early 1980's
to establish a dru9 czarr position. stated, "For the
first time, there will be one person in charge of )Lur
national. effFort to c ntrol il. legal druLgs. No such
posit.ion exists today and never has" [C( .Cur. ren t
n3eric can Governmient, 1989: 763.
The N!l,, .._ establishes the position of Directori of
National. Drug Control Policy (the drug czar) for a
period of five years to head the Office of National
Drug Control Policyv i. the E:x.ecutive Office of the
President (EOP). Two Deputy Directors are established
for supply and demand reduction programs. The Director
is authorized to si;:t on the National Security Council
when-i dir-ected bvy -he President The Director is charged
with promut.gatino the Nat:i onal Drug Control Strateyr
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coordinating and overseeing the implementation of drug
policies by agencies, making recommendations for changes
in Federal organization, forumlating and overseeing the
National Drug Control Program budget, and reassigning
personnel with the concurrence of department or agency
head.
The NNLA called for the termination of the National
Drug Policy Board (NDPB), the National Narcotics Border
Interdiction System NNBIS), and the White House Dr-ug
iAbuse Policy Office 30 days after the confirmation of
the first director-. That confirmation occurred in
mid-March 1989 and the terminations have occurred. The
new Director, William Bennett is now engaged in a very
public transition period.
An interesting aspect of the transition was the
manner in which the NNBIS and NDPB staffs were
dissolved. Upon his innauguration, President Bush
relocated the NNBIS headquarters and staff structure
into the Executive Office of the President. The NDPB
staff remained located in the Justice Department until
dissolution. Although the research for this study had
been completed at this point, it could be assumed that
the staff members of NNBIS stood a much better chance of
retaining employment in the change of administrations
than did the NDFPB staff.
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Since this legislation was passed during the
research for this study and with the transition process
still underway it has been difficult to move past this
point in describing the changes in the drug enforcement
structure. Part Three of this study contains an
update on the establishment of the Office of National
Drug Control Policy up to mid-April 1989.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COAST GUARD: The Coast Guard
was an integral player in both NNBIS and the NDPB.
Coast Guard personnel were assigned to both staffs and
were interviewed as part of this research. Coast Guard
personnel are also assigned to The Interdiction
Committee (TIC), the working group of the NDPB for
interdiction strategy. The coordination issues of the
NDPB/NNBIS relatieonship, the allocation of the resources
provided in the recent flurry of legislation, and the
nature of Coast Guard interaction within these
structures will be e.'amined in Parts Two and Three of
th:is study.
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FIGURE 7-6
ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACTIVITY BY MACRO-STUCTURE
CIRCA 1988
INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGIC
SECTION
DEMAND SUPPLY
MARKET DIMENS ION
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PART TWO
THE COAST GUARD AND THE DRUG INTERDICTION MISSION
"Come gather round people wherever you roam
And admit that the waters around you have
grown..."
- Bob Dyl an
"The Times They Are A Changin"
Aside from my brief introductory comments, the
discussion to this point has concerned the macro
structure in which drug law enforcement takes place.
The long standing control and stability brought about by
Harry Anslinger and the FBN broke down in the .960's to
be replaced, first, by a lead agency, then, by a multi-
agency coordinating structure. This new structure has
been attributed to (1) a change in the drug threat that
required agency specialization, (2) a need to create
policy and coordinate the activities of many agencies,
and (3) a struggle within the federal government over
who should set the drug policy agenda and who shou ld
coordinate enforcement activity. The programmatic model
described by Fritschler has shown to be but a starting
point in the cyclical changes of the federal drug
enforc:ement program. The programmatic matrix 
represented by the four-quadrant framework:: and the lead
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agency concept have beer replaced by the mlti-agencv:y
coordinating structur.e.
The question that remains in this study is how and
when this process impacted on the Coast Guard as it
became involved in interdiction operations in the late
1960b's and early 1970"7's. It is contended here that the
early e-facrt t relace FBN with a lead agency and the
problems attendant to that effort tended to cloud the
to--down view of the Coast Guard and its emerging role
The absence c f the Customs Service and other
interdi ction agencies (Coast Guard and Border F'ar tr 
fr-rom F:-residei-nt Johnson:'s reorganization lan of. 1968
slpForts th:l-is notiion. By the time the DEA was formed in
1973 these agencies were deeply involved in dru!
en forcement and firmly rooted in policy spaces.. The
early organiati. onal problems of the DEA, cuplled with
the crisis in the Ni<orn presidency, allowed this
fragrmientation t become institutional ized at a point
when sea borne smuggl ing was in its early, rapid gr'owth
stage. The result was a policy and coordinati on vacuum
that eisted until: new organizational forms were created
to cross agency boundaries and capture the drug
enforcement funct:ion at the macro level as has been
de c ri b ed . 178
The self-imaoe of the Coast Guard was also clouded.
Having just relocated into the Department of
Transportation, the service viewed future growth
potential in new policy spaces such as environmental
protection, maritime safety systems, and expanded
fisheries conservation. Maritime law enforcement was
generally considered to revolve around the enforcement
of conservation laws and treaties regarding fisheries
but was havirng troubled finding an organizational niche.
The difficulty of the macro structure and the
service itself to accurately see what was happening in
drug interdiction had significant implications in the
first 10 years of modern post-Prohibition interdiction
operations (1970s). Unit commanding officers who
encountered increasing numbers of smuggling vessels
operated with great discretion and were forced to
exercise a great amount of judgement. As a result
enforcement policy tended to be de facto, set in the
course of operations. Multi-agency operations tended to
be the result of local negotiations and personal
interactions between agency supervisors. The cultural
impact of police work on an agency that had slowly
drifted away from direct, non-conservation type police
activity in the post-Prohibition era was also
si gnf i cant. 1
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It is a second and related contention that the
second decade (1980's) of the interdiction era brought
significant changes as macro structures were created and
the political importance of drug policy issues
increased. Within the service, programmatic structures
were created to provide policy guidance to the field,
control discretion, and manage resources gained as a
result of mission growth. Agents of cultural change
were introduced in the form of a Maritime Law
Enforcement School and management seminars in law
enforcement. Liasion officers were routinely assigned
to other agencies and macro structures to represent the
Coast Guard, carry out joint staff operations,
coordinate activities, and collect organizational
information. Of great signficance, the Office of
Operations in Coast Guard Headquarters, the pblic
sector analog to the corporate operating division or
wholy owned subsidiary underwent a series of major
reorganizations cui..lminating in the divestment of most of
its pre-interdiction operating program (product line)
portfolio. Finally, resource allocation in the Coast
Guard changed dramatically.
In 1979 the drug interdiction mission accounted for
7.6 percent o:f operating funds allocated in the Coast
Guard! Coa-st Garc! (--CBU), 189] . The FPre si dlent:'s . 990
bu.dget request for the Coast Guard inc].udes 24.8 perrcent
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of operating fuLnds for drug interdiction [Coast Guard
(G-CBU), 1989. Search and Rescue (SAR), traditionally
the largest operating program in the Coast Guard,
received 26.9 percent of operating funds in 1979 CCoast
Guard (G-CBU), 19891. The 1990 request includes 24.6
percent of operating funds for SAR [Coast Guard
(G--CBLU), 19893. Since 1985 drug interdiction has
received more operating funds than SAiR.
The mac::co tr ucture took notice of the Coast Guard
in the second decade. Unintended constraints on Coast
Guard operations introduced in earlier legislation were
refnoved. Greater use was made of the Coast Guard's;
infrastructure of coastal and deployable facilities.
The Commandant, Coast Guard policymakers, and senior
field commanders became players in the macro strL.cture
and had impacts in policy decisions, the execution of
multi--agency operations, and macro resource allocation.
This new role in turn created other problems: conflicts
with Customs over new and old policy spaces and renewed
threats to agency survival in various reorganization
proposals.
The examination of the interdiction era begins with
the nature Coast Guard entre in to anti-smuggling
operations. While anti-smuggling operations were the
first true operating program of the Coast Guard in 1.790,
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focus on specific types of smuggling and specific
geographical regions has varied over the life of the
organization. From early Nineteenth Century operations
to protect strategic shipbuilding materials (liveoak
forests in the southeast), to interdiction of undeclared
opium in the northwest in the 1890's, to Prohibition.
operations, the Coast Guard's anti-smuggling efforts
have varied considerably. Two significant points can be
derived fromr this history.
First, anti-smuggling operations tended to be
"campaign" oriented. That is to say they have targeted
a specific material, in a specific region, for a
specific timeframe. This approach is contrasted to that
of the Customs Service which is a day-in and day-out
anti-smuggling enforcement agency dealing with all types
of contraband. The Coast Guard, however, seems to
become involved in periodic smuggling "wars" which are
separated by periods of low involvement and general
logistical support to other agencies.
Second, the diversity of anti-smuggling operations
has created an extensive organizational memory. This
memory includes legal, legislative, and organizational].
precedents which have been built up over the years. As
as result the Coast Guard has tended to have natural
entre whenever new threats appear. For example, until a
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legislative remedy could be obtained to close a legal
loophole which allowed possession of drugs by United
States citizens on the high seas (inter-national waters),
the Coast Guard relied on a prohibition era statute
concerning hovering vessels outside customs waters.
A distinctive organizational competence for
engaging in ant:i-smluggling campaigns and a legitimatized
dom.ai rn over su..ch ativity, has been complimented by an
inventory of 4fi,,ed coastal and mobile, deployable assets
that are multi-missioned as noted earlier. When this
triad of factor-s, competence, domain, and. capital
assets, is supported by an etensive organizational
history together with military-style operating
procedures.. the Coast Guard is capable of responding to
immecdiate changes i-n the smuggling threat without
external mandate. It did so in the ].ate 1960's and
early 1970:'s. Almost oblivious to the major structural
changes occurring in the macro enforcement structure and
diverted from the maritime smuggling threat by new
missions and programs, the Coast Gard nonetheless began
anti -sm uggling operations in what could be termed a
reflexive response.
The following c hapters in Part Two examine the
Coast Guard and its dr-ug interdiction role. Chapter 8
pro-::),icles a br:i.ef aency hi-sto. .-y and organirzati. onal
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description. Chapter 9 constructs an analytical
framework by which to describe the service's reflexive
entry into the current anti-smuggling campaign based on
the triad noted above. Chapters 10 and 11 discuss the
organizational changes that have been made in the last
twenty years to accommodate the drug interdiction
mission. Chapter 12 discusses working level issues in
drug interdiction.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
COAST GUARD ORGANIZATION AND HISTORY
"The history of the Coast Guard may be approached
through many avenues, none of which is easily traveled
because the service has had many missions. The best
approach is to study the service through the evolution
of its organization."
- Robert L. Scheina
Government. Agen i es (1983)
There are two k::ey concepts to be derived from a
review of the Coast Gluard's organization and history.
The first is the u. 1 character- concept that the Coast
Guard is both an armed force and civil law enforcement
authority. The sec::ond concept is that the Coast Guard
:1 s a Mlti -L m ti . s i osn organ zati on Each attribute se-ts ;
the Coast Guard apart from other federal agencies and
together they create a anomolous organizational form in
any government. Each concept is developed in the brief
history and organizational description that follows.
Figure 8-1 is a graphical presentation of the
development cof the Coast Guard in ter-ms of major
or gani zat :ional acqui si. t :i 's. The or ani za t:i onal.
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FIGURE 8-1
THE ROOTS OF THE COAST GUARD
elnr~~fPr e - -
Run by local states from 1 716 until 1789 when it joined the
Treasury Department. Merged with Steamboat inspection
Service under the Department of Commerce in 1903.
Came into Coast Guard in 1939. I
-- E - -
Run by Treasury Department from 1790 to 1915. Merged
with Life-Saving Service in 1915 to form Coast Guard.
Illb-o -
Run by Treasury Department from 1848 to 1915. MergedI with Revenue Cutter Service in 1915 to form Coast Guard. I
Run by Justice Department from 1838 until 1852. then
Treasury Department until 1932 when it merged with
Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection
in Department of Commerce.
' _Se - --
Formed under Department of Commerce in 1932. Joined
Coast Guard in 1942. Served under Navy during
World War It. I
Formed under Treasury
Department from Life-SavingService and Revenue Cutter
Service in 1915. Served under
Navy from 1917 to 1919 and
1941 to 1945. Became part
of Department of Transporta-
tion when it was formed in
1967.
~~~~~~~~~~~~i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A,
I
· 11AS~rl~I
Formed in 1848 by the Treasury Department. Joined
Steamboat Inspection Service in Department of Commerce
in 1932. I
SOURCE: U.S. COAST GUARD, 1989
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antecedent of the Coast Guard was the Revenue Cutter
Service. This organization was established initia:Lly as
the Revenue Marine in 1790 to enforce new tariff and
customs laws within the Treasury Department. The
combination of the Revenue Cutter Service and the Life-
Saving Service in 1915 created the modern Coast Guard.
By pure coincidence that was the same year the Harrison
Act controls on narcotics took effect. Other major
oranization,al acqcusitions are shown in Figure 8-1..
In 1967, the Coast Guard was relocated from the Treasi..ry
Department to the new.ly created Department of
Tran spor t at i on.Cr Th e organizational acquisitions and
functional relocations have been in addition to a number
of statt-tory and regulatory functions which have been
assigned since 1790.
DUAL-CHARACTER
When the Revenlue Malrine was established in 1790 :Lt
was given a military character Evans, 1949: 5. A rank
and pay structure existed that was comparable with the
Army. This role was further enhanced between 1790 and
1798 when the Revenue Marine was the only coastal naval
force for the United States [Evans, 1949: 143. Cutters
fought in the Quasi-War with France (1797-1801) and were
the only naval combatants pending the establishment of a
Navy :i.n 1798. The practtice rof assigning cut:ters to the
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Navy at the President's discretion was formalized in
legislation and later Congress provided for the transfer
of the entire service to the Department of the Navy in
time of war or national emergency [Evans, 1949: 14-151.
Cutters have fought in every war since 1790 and, because
of the dual-character of the service, have participated
in some unique operations that have been both military
and civil in nature. Some of these were the engagement
of French privateers in the Caribbean in the late
eighteenth century. attacks on pirate land bases in the
Gu:Lf of Mex:ico in the early nineteenth century, defense
of settlers against Seminole Indian attac ks in Florida,
early law and order functions following the purchase of
Alaska, and blioc.::ade duty in the Mexican and Civil Wars
[Evans, 19491. Coast Guard cutters currently undergo
thle same training for combat as naval ships and most
recently ser'ved in Vietnam, providing gunfire siLpprt
and conductting arms interdiction and anti-insAurgency
operations T:!ich. 1986: 1. 
As a law enforcement agency originally charged with
the enforcement of customs laws, the Coast Guard has
acquired sweeping authority and jurisdiction over the
years. Figure 8-2 provides a summary of major
legislation that has expanded the Coast Guard's law
enforcement authori. ty over the years;.
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FIGURE 8-2
SELECTED LEGISLATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AND TREATIES PROGRAM
LEGISLATION TITLE OR DATE CONTENT
The Revenue Collection Acts Established tariffs, of
1789 collection system, port
of entry, and Customs
Act of August 4, 1790 1 Stat 145 Revenue cutters
authorized
Act Providirin a Naval 1 Stat 621 Coastal defense
Armament, July 1I 1797
Act of February 2, 17' 1 Stat 619 Quarantine enforcement
Act of March 2, 1799 1 Stat 627 Disabling fire athorized
Act of May !:, !1800 2 tat 70 Slave trade prohibition
Act of April 2, 1818 3 Stat 447 Neutrality enforcement
Act of March 3. 1819 3 Stat 510 Firacv enforcement
Act of February 23. 1822 3 Stat 651 Timber (shipbuilding)
conservation
Act of Dec:ember 22. 1837 5 Stat 208 Winter cruising, began
regular patrols
Act of February 19, 1862 12 Stat 340 First immigration
restriction
Act of March 2, 1889 25 Stat 1009 Salmon fisheries
regul ation
Modu.is V:i .end i. w ithi Br itai.n Fur seal protection
1891
Act of May 19, 1896 29 Stat 122 First regatta patrol
Act of May 11 190) 35 Stat L 102 Wi'dlife/furred
animal protection
Act of February 9, 1909 35 Stat L 614 Prohibited importing
Opium Eclusion Act opium, except as reg
Act of August 15, 1914 38 Stat L 692 Sponge fisheries
Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act 38 Stat 785 Narcotics controls
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FIGURE 8-2
(CONTINUED)
SELECTED LEGISLATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AND TREATIES PROGRAM
LEGISLATION TITLE OR DATE CONTENT
Act of Januarv 28, 1915 38 Stat 800 Created modern
Coast Guard
Act of 22 June 1936 Maritime Law
Enforcement Authority
Continental Shelf 78 Stat 194 Creatures of the
Fishery Resources FL 88-308 shelf (lobster,etc)
Act May 20, 1964 protected from
foreign fishing
Department of Created DOT, Coast
Transportation Act PL 89-670 Guard moved from
HR 15963 Treasury
Bartlett Act 80 Stat 908 Contiguous fisheries
zone established
Marine Mammal Protection 80 Stat 178 Protection within
Act October 2. 1972 PL 89-435 12 miles
Fisheries Conse vation PL 94-265 200-mile limit
and Management Act 1976
Biaggi-Gilman Bill (1980) 94 Stat 1159 Closed high seas
PL 96-350 possession loophole
__._______________________.______________________________________________
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MULTI-MISSION
The Coast Guard has accumulated a diverse number of
missions in its history and is best characterized
through analogy as a holding company of diversified
maritime services. These services, which roughly equate
to product or service lines in the private sector, are
delivered through a hierarchical military field
organization which is geographically based. The
headquarters organization provides policy guidance,
obtains resources through interaction with the federal
oovernmenta]. structure in Washington, D.C., administers
operating progr ams, and allocates resources.
The .multi.-miss ion concept applies at all level.s of
Coast Guard activity. The agency itself is multi-
mission in that it engages in service delivery (search
ancr rescue, aids to navigation, emTergency
commun i cations, ic ebreaking), law enforcement
(fisheries, drugs, illegal aliens, environment),
regul atory functions (rulemaking, licensing,
adjudication) and national defense. Coast Guard
hardware, oper-ating units, and even its people are
mul ti -mission. A patroling cutter is also a standby
search and rescue resource. coastal station engages
in search anl resc..ue, law enforcement and environmental
pr otection. A crew member of l1lcutter has a career
FIGURE 8-3
ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 1989.
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specialty (i.e. electronic:s technician), may be a
member of a boarding team, stands certain watches on the
cutter-, and has a responsibility in the event of fire or
comb at.
A workable private sector analogy is the economic
and accounting term "joint production." More than one
product is produced with the same resources or
personnel. In discussing the multiple missions assined
to the ser-vice, the portfolio concept used in strategic
management t heory is a s.iefUl analogy.  I gy.The current
Coiimmandant, Adm7iral Paul Yost, speaks of a strategic:
triad whi.ch cassifies specific functions or missions
into either mariti. me safety, defense operations, or
mariltime law enforcemflent strategic groups in much the
same manner that General Electric's diversified busine.ss
units are clas-sif i-ed into three strategic groups.
ORGANIZATION
The Coast Guard operates in a matrix fashion to
deliver services and conduct operations within the
Department of Transportation (see Figure 8-3). Public
services and other operations are classified into
"operating programs" and assigned to "program managers"
at Coast Guar-d Headqarters. Required internal support
services are c:lass:i. f ied into "support programs" and are
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FIGURE 8-4
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
SOURCE: U. S COAST GUARD, 1 98.
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assigned to "support managers." These operating and
support program managers have no d:irect line authority
over fiel.d units. Figure 8-4 is the Coast Guard
organizatioin. Figure 8-5 is a listing of current
operating and support programs shown with the
responsible program manager at Coast Guard Headquarters.
The Office of the Chief of Staff coordinates the actions
of various offices with management responsibility,
provides the interface with the eternal resource
structure (DOT., Congress);, and makes the macro resource
allocation decisions. The Coast Guard's senior
execLutive is the Commandant, a four-star admirals who is
assisted by a Vice Commandant, a three-star admiral.
The Co;mmandai-nt is the senior offic:ial in both the
HeadI-Iq.-uarters and field organization.
The program and support managers provide internal
support and progr--am oversight for a pyramidal. military
field organization that is geographically based. The
field structture is divided into Pacific and Atlantic
Area commands. Each!-: area is the responsibility of an
Area Commander, a three-star admiral. Within each area
the commander exercises control. over a regional
Maintenance and Logisitics Command (MLC) and
geographical districts, both of which are commanded by a
one or' two-star admiral. Figure 8-6 is a graphical
representation of the current field structure.
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FIGURE 8-5
COAST GUARD OPERATING AND SUPPORT PLANS
OPERATING F'ROGRAM OPERATING PROGRAM PROGRAM
AREA PLAN DIRECTOR
Aids to Navigation Short Range Aids Office of
to Navigation Navigation
Radionavigation and Waterway
Bridges Bridge Administration Services
(G-N)
Domest i c/Pol ar
Ice COperations
Ice Operations
Marine Safety,
Security, and
Envr i onment a
PFrotection
Recr-eati onal
Boating Safety
Waterway Management
Defense Operations
Marine Envri onmental
Respone
Marine Inspect:ion
Marine Licensing
Port Safety/Secur i ty
Recreat i onal
Boating Safety
Waterways Management
Defense Operations
Office of
Marine Safety
Security and
Envri onmental
Protection
(G-M)
G-N
G-N
Office of Law
Enforcement
and Defense
Operat i ons
(G-O)
Law Enforcement Enforcement of Laws
and Treaties
Reserve Forces Reserve Forces Office of
Readiness and
Reserve (G-R)
Search and Rescue Search and Rescue
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G-N
G-0
G-N
FIGURE 8-5
COAST GUARD OPERATING AND SUPPORT PLANS
(CONTINUED)
Support Program Support Plan Program
Director
General Support Acquistion Office of
Acquisition
(G-A)
Civil Rights
Command, Control
and Communications
Engineering,
Research and
Development
Resource Management
General
Admi ni stration
Health Services,
Safety, Occupational
Health
Legal Support
Intelligence and
Security
Personnel
Public Affairs
Office of
Civil Rights
(G-H)
Office of
Command,
Control and
Commun i c at i on
(G-T)
Office of
Engineering
(G-E)
Office of the
Chief of
Staff (G-CCS)
G-CCS
Office of
Heal th
Services
(G-KF)
Office of
Chief Counsel
(G-L)
G-0
Office of
Personnel
(G-P)
Office of the
Commandant
(G-C)
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FIGURE 8-6
COAST GUARD FIELD STRUCTURE
1 _~~~~~~~ in>,ininii ^A
9
2 high endurnce cter
10 medium endurance cutters
15 tugs and tenders
- 13 patrol boats
9 heos
.... '** .1 6 hxLed wing arcaft
::.[CT/NY rJ
o.,it m
I
\ ......... _ >7 medium sndurnce cutters
I icbreaker
17 'tugs and tenders
Xii tgs adtndrs IPA 10 patrol boats
axm Jxd wing aircraft
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3 meium ndurance cuae
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12 patrol boats
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SOURCE: U.S. COAST GUARD,
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FIGURE 8-6
' COAST GUARD FIELD STRUCTURE
(CONTINUED)
g ..
1 high endurance Cutmer
3 mredium endurance cutters
2 Celbakers
4 tugs and lenders
5 patrol boats'2 nmetum endurance rstters
7 tugs and tenders
4 patrol boats j
11 helos
6 fixed wing aircraft
helos
xed wng aircraft
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SOURCE: . S. COAST GUARD, 1989.
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Districts, in turn, are subdivided into smaller military
commands. District staffs provide operational oversight
in their areas as well as intermediate program
management. Figure 8-7 is an example of the subdivision
of the First Coast Guard District which is headquartered
in Boston. Large cutters and long range aircraft which
are highly mobile and routinely cross district
boundaries are controlled by the area commanders who can
task those unrits or shift control to district
commanders. District commanders exercise autonomy
subiect to resource constraints ancl higher level policy
guide.ines within their district boundaries. The result
is a matrix type operation where services are delivered
thr u gh a field organization while program and support
management interac:ts horizo -tally at a variety of
1. eve. s .
The regic-nal maintenance and logistics commands-r are
a recent aor-ganizational development, having been
established in 1987. These regional commands
centralized engineering and support functions previously
carried out in a decentralized fashion at district
offices. This action, a major reorganization in the
service's history, was carried out to free personnel
resources for operational field units and is directly
attributable to "recent mission expansion in the area of
drug enfor-cement [Belz., 1988: 10]. The theme of
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FIGURE 8-7
FIRST COAST GUARD DISTRICT SUBDIVISION
Coast Guard Group Southwest Harbor
Station Eastport
Station Jonesport
Base Southwest Harbor
Station Rockland
Coast Guard Group Portland
Station Boothbay Harbor
Base South Portland
Station Portsmouth Harbor
Coast Guard Group Boston
Station Merrimac River
Station Gloucester
Station Boston
Station Point Allerton
Station Scituate
Coast Guard Group Woods Hole
Station Provinctaown
Station Chatham
Station Woods Hole
Station Cape Cod Canal
Station Castle Hill
Station Point Judith
Station Brant Point
Station Menensha
Station Block Island
Coast Guard Group Long Island Sound
Station hnw Haven
Station nw London
Station Eaton's Heck
Coast Guard Group Moriches
Station Montauk
Station Shinnecock
SARDET Nor iches
Station Fire Island
Station Short Beach
Coast Guard Group Nw York
Station Burlington
Station Fort Totten
Station Nw York
Coast Guard Group Sandy Hook
Station Rockway
Station Sandy Hook
Station Manasquan Inlet
Station Shark River
SOURCE: U.S. COAST GUARD, 1989.
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organizational change to adjust to the drug interdiction
mission is discussed in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE ENTRY OF THE COAST GUARD IN DRUG INTERDICTION
CONCEPTUAL MODEL
The ro-gramatic model used in Fart One focused on
the collection of what Downs termed policy spaces for
the cdro u- e or ce - rn t pro ram in the federal g overnment 
Downs stated that these policy spaces within programs
w.re d.-istinct from the organizational olicy space. T , e
latter being the cor. ect ion7 of all ass i. ned spaces in
wh:ic:h an an.i . .Azii carLirr:ies oLt a ,c: .iVity It '.
not ion - ,f or ni:Z t i on vers us policy space that f or,
the bas:is for ithe model developed here, The mdel is
intended to ex,, .ai.- the re-fe -xive ery of the Coat
Guard i nr:t th e currient dru interdiction campa ig n in t.
early 1.97:, 's and - ill ! be used in art Three in a
d:i. ;sc:us i o.f: tt he t. rat i e g: c i: mpli c iti ons f Cd LUt.g
interdi. cti on
DEFINING ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY SPACE: It is
possible to list all legislative mandates. eecLtivC-e
orders, administrative actions, and customary activity
carried out by an agency. In the case of the Coast
Guard, with- its ilong and diverse oroanizational hisB-tor-v.
the i. st wo ,_,lcl e : - f :ide rab: l e. It would approx :i mate
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the aggregate of policy spaces assigned over the years..
However, such a isting would not be exhaustive because
it would not contain certain activities carried on
without a precept in an informal or undocumented manner.
For example, one of the largest and most complex
operations carried out by the Coast Guard in recent
years will not be found in statute, case law, or
executive order-. Nor was it carried out due to cistom.
When it became apparent that an aircraft carrier would
be an tnsLuitable platform for the ceremony and
festivities surrounding the relighting of the Statue of
Liberty during Liberty Weekend on 4 July 1986, the venue
was changed to the Coast Guard base on Governors Island
in New York:: Harbor. The resulting operation to control
both land and harbor traffic while supporting a massive
inlflu' of meclia andl government personnel was one of the
most complex in Coast Guard history. Much of this
operation was based on verbal agreements by senior
managers in the Coast Guard, White House, other
agencies, New York City, the television networks, and
independent production entities. Many standard forms of
organization and procedure were simply not feasible
given the time frame and complexity. New and novel
approaches to organizing and conflict resolution were
need ed.
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In the 4: oregoing e , ample the C toast G tuar l n ever
considered the operation as unwork.abl e or beyond the
service mandate (Ioutside the organizational policy
space). The service simply assessed the situation
estimated the requirements to carry out the funct:ion,
organized a response, and eecuted the ad hoc plan
developFed.. In the same manner, the Coast Guard and many
other organizations carry out activities not subject to
advance des crip tion cr classi fi cati on into a partic ultar
p olI si et c 
CAPABILITY AND CONVERTIBLE CAPACITY: This notionir
of activity not sus ceptible to advance planning or
descr iption gives r ise to a question o+ aenc
ca_ .ab. i . t a more a pr opriat. e descr ion iht i be
re ser-E. U L.l ,Lt;Ed. or convert ib. e cao-acity -- its
pi tent i al That EUc:h capab i lity, capacity or pot ent.ia.
e;ist.s ha s been tIchEr c i. z ed by a number of observers f
t i· he b u-r e a& . . .r c:: .
Chester arnard [1968: 16] r ecognized the power
and ambi.uity of the informal group in organizations
noting its power to "establish institutions" and bring
about "conditions u.nder which formal organizations may
ai- . ; " ,eS1 n ick [1'957:7 5 differentiates rational
org.ani..zations which he co:nsiders "ePpendable tools" from-
:i ,t i ttl Fi hi-l, w ch are a rinat-ura product o f s ocia:l
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needs a nd pr essiures -- a responsive and adaptive
or ga r ism. Selznick [1957: - 6]L further states such
institutions demonstrate responsive versus designed
be-havi or To the extent that informal organizationsr, and
other subtle forces operate within organizations.
institutionalization processes take place. This
process, in trn, can expand or decrease the potential
of an agency to act in a manner separate from rational
organiztions and e].gal mandates.
ORGANIZATIONAL ESSENCE: Viewing the organization
or agency as a group within the larger governm, ent
bur eaucracy., the irnstitutional3. ization process can
man:iffest tse-. f in what Mort.ron Hal:perirn 19'74: 28] has
called "or-anizational essence." He notes tat
"Org-ani zati on s have considerable freedom in def :i ni n-
thei ir. missions and the capab i .i ties they need to p.ursue
t hele m:i s:i oli. Th! e or- :. rh .anation ' s essence is the view
held by the dominr-ant group in the orgarizati on orf: wha.t
the missions and capabilities should be. Related to
this are convictions about what kinds of people with
what expertise, experience, and knowledge should be
members of the organization" [1974: 283. In other
words, some discretion ex ists in mission definition and
how that discretion is eercised is based on
orani. zati onal essene. Within the bureaucratic
f. ewr orgaiza t:it i l essence in agenc i is. 
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developed in imuch the same manner that culture is
developed in smaller informal. groups within agencies
themsel yes.
Edgar Schein 1985: 6 states that the term clture
"should be reserved for the deeper ].evel of basic
assiumIp tions and b. :iefs that are shared by members of an
organ izati .. .. These assumptions and beliefs are
l earneci r·esp nses t.:: a group s p ro le m of sur vi va i n
i.ts ex ter- na . envi ronment and its problems of internal.
i -ntegr at is F ;' *-, J q! ..ic:: to note that sp eaking o,'
c:uture t F ii t!ms th e "or;g nization" versus the
"group" can!- become probl].ematic Schein 19,8: 7]3 states
that "cult tur houti be viewed as a property of an
in'derendentl d ef:ii-.ned stab]. e soci.al nt. "t
L..oui) B aga :198: 2481 in a case tudy of the
JCoast Guard c::nccl dedi that "threats to survi. val of the
Coas t Guard as., a federal .--- enc are the hidden timl u sL
fTor better- performance . . the hidden stimulus is a
forml- of the s, urvival l instinct." EBragaw 1980: 247]
further den ti i f es te strategy used t meet e . terna].
threats: the "dual -role," "mul t i t mision" s trat egy. .
If survival. oif an agency is an adaptatio n t the
e:tera.,ia. 'ea i envi.ronment. in Sch-ei n i meani nC, and if the
s.rategy or pattern cf res-por that has evolved over
the years has been the preservation of the dual
character, multi-mission nature of the service, then
these two concepts must be elements of the
organizational culture and essence.
The organizational essence of the Coast Guard, it
is contended here, is its dual character and multi-
mission heritage. These two elements of organizational
essence give the Coast Guard an eclectic nature, an
anomalous position in the bureaucracy, and a
survivabilitly whic:h is based in the difficulty of
outsiders in disaggr-egating missions and resource
appl:ication. At an indiv:idual level, Coast Guard
personnel feel they belong to a unique organization and
feel they are un:iqLue. If there is no agency quite lik:e
the Coast Guard. then there are no people quite like
"Coasti es."
Kent W:ill i ams .1984: 95J in a 1984. study of Coast
Guard culture identified five beliefs which "form the
core of the Coast Guard's culture." Three of the five
relate to the uniqueness or mission variety of the
service: humanitarian service, individual worth and fun.
It is when this organizational essence acts upon
the apparent (nom:inal or rational) organizational policy
space (collection of mandates. etc.) that the potential
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mission universe of the Coast Guard is defined. The
dual character- an(:' multi-mission orientations act as
multipliers on the set of rational mission assignments
to create the true capability of the service. They
create an attitude that is reflected in a common saying
about the service'i_ budget: "We have been doing without
anything for so long, that now we can do anything with
nothing!" It is also relfected more elegantly in the
Coast Guard motto: Semper Paratus, "Always Ready." The
service has to be convinced it can't do something which
appear-s ir-i :its tr.adirtional domain. What is eft is to
def ine the set oJ f missions on which these mul t i. p i e
STRATEGIC TRIAD: That collection of missions; is
defiired by the tri:lad descr:ibed in the introduct :i.cn t o
Fart Two- competence, domain, and capital assets.
Capital a.s.i ..s are the hardware and infras tructure of
the G-Coas-t tard! its shi ps, pl anes, stations,
communications network::su and so forth. Domain is the
ownership rationale for the mission in terms of st-atute.
case 1.aw, custom, geographical location, eecutive-
ord-er, or service initiative. Competence is what the
organization brings to its activities in terms of human
capit::i al, ski 1 l, internal cultures, and organizational
sitru.cture (formal and informal.)
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MISSION UNIVERSE: This triad is shown in Fig ure 9 -
1 as a model where capital assets, domain: and
competence are dimensions which describe the
organizational policy space in Downs meaning. Here it
is referred to as the mission universe. For any mission
to be carr-ied out by the Coast. Gard there must be t
rationale (domain), a mechanical system (assets), arid
expertise (competence) . Mission acqulisition may involve
the acqui.sition o-f a ll three e lements at once (the
reloc-at:i i oif the folar i cebreaki ng- progtram -:ra io tl he
Navy to the Coast Gulard) or the epa-nsion o one or- more
o f the element (increased legal athor i ty iover
-i sherie i s ervat i on) 
Ai-s -'at.. .. eari= the ail.it o the Coa st. Gt..arl to
i. t rand i ts -i. Son un r -. iverse ws:i.h t o;ut noti.c i s baed .n
:its oroan r i:i aon- .L ei ssene: dual character and muLt.i -
r i. ss.in. Whe-i t heie : . ,.ti ].i p rs operati-t on the missi.on
L.uni ver..r ._,e- -, the C, st Gu ard' s potential mission
universe. Fi..a.re 9 -2 is a conceptual representation of
th:is notion. The three-dimens:ional space is expanded by
th1e o lrganizational . essence to cee cre onvertible
capaci:t y (mu lti.- mi ssion ia s-.et i  and reserve c:apa c:i t- 
(ability to use the other character).
Models oly s:i miu].a1te environments and sita tion s
f:or the prp .s.i.)-.e ., c r-eatir L. .rderstandi n and insi.ght.
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FIGURE 9-1
THREE-DIMENSION MISSION UNIVERSE
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FIGURE 9-2
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This model :is; not perfect. For example, one could mal:e
the argument that organizational competence is really a
rationale (domain) for mission acquisition. Current
strategic thought would assert that technology is a
multiplier whereas it is seen as a factor in competence
or the asset base by the author. As with many
conceptual representations, this model is fuzzy at the
edges. Since the Coast Guard like other organizations
is a dynamic system,. the bounclaries of the actual
mission .niverse and potential mission universe i ke.ly
1 fl..tLctuate or Fl,.1 se
APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT: The main purpose of
the model in this situdy is to provide a means to
understand why the Coast Guard began drug interdiction
operation-..s, then sustainecd a regional mission
realignment to suppor-t these operations, and, final. ly.
involved the entire agency absent an internal or
external mandate. The contention being that drug
interdiction was a mission which eisted in the fuzzy
margin between mission and potential mission. The
agency first reacted as if it was a normal activity
within the general maritime law enforcement mandate
created since 1790. The reflex.Sive response was
driven by the organizational essence and culture which
ex tendl ed theiss m :i n Lr:i verse.213" We did this ::ind of ..iob
before, why shouldn't we do it now?" Since that first
period, the drug interdiction mission has been
incorporated into the rational mission universe as the
domain expanded, assets were acquired, and competence
gained.
FIXING THE POSITION OF DRUG INTERDICTION IN THE COAST
GUARD MISSION UNIVERSE CIRCA 1969-73
"I had just come from Vietnam - where 
had been in combat for a year -and I came t:ack
here as chief of the Bridge Division, and that
4 years I: was chief of the Bridge Division I
was not particulairly, acutely aware of this
growing mission for drug interdiction."
Aidmiral Paul A. Yost
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
The set of+ missions which ccupied the operating
program managers at Coast Guard headquarters in the
1969-1973 period did not include drug interdiction.
Against the backdrop of a relocation to a new cabinet
department, the Coast Guard was preoccupied with other
mission-related issues such as marine environmental.
protection, fisheries conservation, and the war in
V i et nam.
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A PERIOD OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSITION: There were
other pressing issues of the day. FPresident Johnson
consolidated all transportation related activities in
the new Department of Transportation in 1967. fter
hearing vehement opposition to relocating the Coast
Guard in the new department by the service and the
Treasury Department, President Johnson told Treasury
Secretary Fowler, "I'lil tell you that I don' t even need
l3.oiislation to t-rnsfer anv functions of the Coast
Guard that are re-laiteed to transpor'tation safety to the
new department:, i. it is tuformed" Johnson, 1987: 34-11.
Faced wit.h the pr--ospect that the service would be.
"st-ripp ed of its most important roles and remain with.
the Treasury Department as sort of a latter day Revenue--
Cutter Service' the Coast Guard reacted in a manner
consi stent wit te organ :izat i onal e;sene and ctui.re
described above [Joh nson :: 1.987: 34.!]. The head of the
trarnsit:iorn task force. Admiral Mark:: Whalen, recommended,
"I feel our approach should be that we have epertise,
loyalty, a:ility, and military professionalism which a
DOT must have to operate effectively, and that with the
above we can perform certain functions of other agenciesc
forming the DOT better than they now do and should
acquire such fLunctions.,. All levels of Coast Guard
per-sonnel shorulrd b e dir.ected to at all times ref l ect
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this attitude" [Johnson, 1987: 341]. The transition
into the new department and the attendant redefinition
and e.pansion of the service's strategic triad (domain,
competence, assets) dominated program planning and
external relations in the late 1960's. The three most
important are discussed below.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SURGE: A subset and
compliment of the general transportation safety program
concept, the environmental protecti on mission, emerged
shortly after the relocation of the Coast Guard into the
DOT. Environmental disasters caused by tanker
groundings in England (Torrey Canyon, 1967) and Puerto
Rico (Ocean Eagle, 1968) and the o:il well blowout in
Santa Barbara Channel (1969) focused national attention
on the pollution threat [Bragaw, 1980: 159-160.
Following in successi on were: the 1969 National
Environmental Folicy Act (NEFA); the establishment of
the CoJuncil of Environmental Quality CEQ) in the White
House in 1969; the creation of the Environmental
Protection Agency by executive order in 1970; the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendment of 1972;
and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 EBragaw,
1980: 1603. This flurry of legislation and the external
demands generated by the environmental movement causied
the creation of the Office of Marine Environment Systems
in the Coast Guard :i t 1971. Bragaw, 1980: 160). Ti 
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mission acquisition is an example of a "top-down"
legislative form of program creation. The mandate and
mission were clear in statute.
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF OCEAN RESOURCES:
Another issue which was tangentially linked to both
maritime transportation and the environmental movement
was the conservation of ocean and continental shelf
resources. in 1966, Congress created a 12-mile
"contioguoLs fisheries zone" to protect United States
resources f rom a growing foreign fishing fleet [Allen,
1985: 9 Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington
proclaimed that "Fisheries are one of the major
battlefields of the cold war" and called foreign nations
"rustlers of the sea" [Allen, 1985: 7. While the
United States had attempted to manage fisheries nder- a
1949 international agreement, that structure had come
under- f i re [Allen. 1985: 10-113. The 1.966 legislation
was the precu:rsor to the imposition of a 200.',-mile
fisheries conservation zone in 1976 legislation in PL
94-265. It was clear in the late 1960's that some sort
of legislation would be passed and that a role in
fisheries management was likely [Melsheimer, 1989).
Headquarters planners were involved in studies as to how
such a limit or "iron fence" could be enforced given the
current Coast Guard cutter and aircraft resources [Lynn,
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19839].3 Fisheries conservation enforcement was another
top-down form of. program creation.
OPERATION MARKET TIME, WARTIME INTERD I CTION
OPERATIONS: In the 196C0's, the Coast Guard was called
upon to do three things in the war in Southeast Asia.
First, Coast Guard epertise in supervising the loading
and nloading of hazardous cargo, bilt itP through World
War I and I::crea, was utilized to upervise untrained
Vietnamese stevedores "whose methods of handling
explosives weire an invitation to disaster" [Johnson,
!.987: 337] Second, reliable marine (buoys, etc. ) and
avi at i ri I(e.ectronic- positionirg) aids to naviatio n
were needed for United States forces.. The Coast Guard
put in place anr: mairntained both systems C[Johnson, 1987::
3371. Th:ird, and most important to this study. t he
Coast Gt.ar1l was irnvolved in Operation Market Time.
Oper-at.ion Mari-::et Time was conceived by the Navy toC
interdict arms and insurgents entering South Vietnam by
iunks and small craft in 1965 [CJohnson, 1'17: 3311. A
shortage of shallow draft vessels led the Navy to
request assistance from the Treasury Department. From
1965 until 1971, the Coast Guard dispatched cutters to
Vietnam and participated in interdiction operations that
were intended to force the Viet Cong to "rel.y on the
t:-trt, Is Ho Ch:i Mi nh trail for most o)f their sLpp :ies"
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[Johnson, 1.987: 3363. During that period Coast Guard
forces boarded thousands of vessels and was involved in
combat [Johnison, 1.987: 336. These operations renewed
armed boarding skills not used since the anti-narcotics
smuggling operations of the 93)'s and the prior
Prohibition operati ons.
Coast Guard participation in Vietnam did not result
fr-om a new congressional mandate. It was the
discretionary application of resources based on the
customary practice of using the Coast Guard during
conflict. In fact, failure to use Coast Guard forces in
southeast sia woul.ld have reversed a 200-year old
pol i cy. Johnson [197: .331 clearly supports this
notion in regard to the combat operations in Market
T:i me: "A dmfi ral Roland Comffimandant of the Coast Guard],
had been try ing to devise a way to get the Coast Guard
involved in Vietnam, fearing that if his service were
limited entirely to a support role as it had been during
the Korean War, its prized status as one of the nation's
armed forces might be .jeopardized."
THE DIRECTED RESPONSE CONCEPT: In each of the
missions noted above, the Coast Guard responded to a
direct mandate. The relocation to DOT, environmental
protection, and fisheries conservation were all mandatec
in legisla.tion. The invol].vement in Vietnam was based on
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e :L.'s tin statutory authority and the customary practic.
to assist the Navy as directed by the President in time
of confli c:t. The cmmon themes in each were (1) an
official mandate calling for a directed response and (2)
the immediate response by the service in reallocating
multi-mission resources and gaining competence needed to
carry out the mandate. In most cases competence eisted
within the service (i.e. maintenance of aids to
nav- at :i on, e ir!. ,tosive loading epertise) or was
ge1ner-ated as part of the new mission implementation
(on11 thIe j bl t. rai ing in f :isheri es boardings) Whi I e so.I-me
mission acqui. si ti onr were sh or t-notice (op eratons in
Vi etnam), r ther e is till a s-ens e o-f rati onal ity inv lved
in cldef i n. in a need, e val uating r equi r ement s, fo rm ing a
resp.onse, an-r:d implementing a plan which was present in
all of tse activities.,
ENTER THE NEW MARITIME DRUG SMUGGLING THREAT: The
Coast Guard was heavi ly focu::tsed on the missions noted
above in eptember- 1969.. "At 2:3C]) p.m., PFacific
Daylight Time, on Sunday, Sept. 21, U.S. Customs
officials, reinforced by agents and inspectors from
around the c:ountry, suddenly tightened their- inspection
procedures at every entry point al].ong the U.S. Mei can
border. Each car crossing the bor-der was subjected to
an intensive search . . . the object of the campaiign wa s
to cut o--f the flow f ma ijuana into this countrnt in
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one massive, abrupt action" [Schroeder, 1975: 127].
Operation Intercept was a highly visible border
interdiction operation that was conceived of by Justice
and Treasury Department officials John Mitchell, Richard
Kleindienst, and Gordon Liddy [Epstein, 1977:Chapter 7.
Intended to demonstrate the administration"s get tough
stand on crime and drugs, the operation caused a si-
mile line at the San Ysidro, California port of entry
from Tiajuana, Mexico on the first day Schroeder, 1975:
127). While there were few seizures, impacts were felt
in the border- economies in reduced tourism and the
cutoff of both :legal and illegal Mexican workers.
Schroeder- 1975: 1283 has contended that the temporary
cut-o+ff in the flow of Mexican drugs caused the
consumers to shift to other drugs, establish new sources
of supply (for marijuana and cocaine - Latin America).
or domestic cultivation.
Elaine Shannon [1988: 70-72) points out that shifts
in the source of supply may have been facilitated by
supply fluctuations in Mexico, but Colombia already had
a "superior product" and access to East Coast markets
where the "Mexican networks were weak. "Colombia's
Caribbean ports had teemed with smugglers ever since the
clays of the Spanish Mairn. Smuggling was a primary
source of 'cash f-or tens of thousands of coastal people,
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'costenos,' who moved Colombian cattle into Venezuela,
coffee and emeralds to the United States, and
cigarettes, whiskey, and electrical appliances to South
America" Shannon, 1988: 713. Coast Guard Captain John
Trainor has also attributed some of the shift to
internal controls and crop eradication programs in
Jamaica and Mexico that forced the marijuana trade to
Colombia Trailnor. 1987: 77].
THE REFLEXIVE RESPONSE BY THE COAST GUARD: On 3
October 1969 (two weeks after the border was closed),
the 95-foot patrol boat, the Cape Jellison, intercepted
a small boat headed inbound near San Diego, California
and pursued it [Scheina, 1989t . The boat was seized
with an unrecorded amount of marijuana and other
contraband. Two days later 200 pounds of marijuana were
found floating by the Cape Jellison 20 miles soLith of
San Diego [Scheina, 1989. While it is unclear whether
or not Coast Guard personnel carried out the enforcement
action, this is the earliest recorded seizure of the
modern interdiction era found by this researcher.
Although the operation ceased in mid-October after
relations with Mexico were put at risk. the trend in the
shift to other methods and of transportation and sources
continued [Epstein, 1977: 84; Schroeder, 1975: 1273.
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Later, patrols in south Florida (Severnth Coast
Guard District shown Figure 8-6) began to encounter
marijuana smugglers. The earliest action on the east
coast found by this researcher was the seizure of the
Mont Boron by the cutter Cape Knox on 10 September 1972.
In 1973 five seizures were reported [Melsheimer, 19893.
Seizures doubled in 1974 and 1975 [Melsheimer, 1989]. By
the time the lecade (:1.970's) ended,, over 7.5 million
pounds of mari.:iuana had been seized by the Coast Gu- ard
with iother 1. 1:i:io n p ounds seized i.n ijo:int oper-at:ionls
with other genc:ies. Figu.re 9--3 provides yearly seizure
data since 1973 when the Coast Guard started to ma:i. ntai.n
sta tij stics ri s L J. ei
EXPANDING THE MISSION UNIVERSE TO INTERDICT DRUGS
THE EXCEPTION, NOT THE RULE: The cutters that made
early s .eizures were not on directed clrug patrols. Thse.e
j.zUeses were seen a s the e..cerpti on. r at her t h an the
ru:Le. to thl-e m:ission of the clay. For example, the
seizure of the Gilma I by the Cutter Courageous with
6,200 pounds of marijuana in September 1.973 (miniscule
by current standards) was cited at the time as the
"largest high seas narcotics haul in the history of the
Coast Guar-d" and prompted congratulatory letters from
thle President and the new Drug Enforcement
Administration Larzel ere, 1975: 59). In an account. of
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the incident f.or a pr f essiona. jiourna . the cutter's
co.mmand:ir 'g of:-f :i.- er described the patrol as a "cont. i-t.n..tous
law enforcerment patrol. i.n the busy Caribbean waters
north of Cuba" to "enforce the variOus U.S. aws and
agreements i n the area" [Larzelere, 197!5- 53. Included
in that general description were: prevention of the
entry of illegal aliens, enforcement of the "anti--
hi. : k::ino " a-eement with CuLtba, deterance of raids oi
Cuba by esile . r up . i. nvestiga ing di . utesc betwe en
a:I :.. ali in an..c ULnri t. -tates f i hermen resoonse to
dist-es s ca13. s , and enforcement f arcotics laws
E . zeei-e. i .1975! 53. G:iven the history of the Coast
Gi .ar . d i .uo i. terdic ti. on effort just pri or to thic;
per iod , t-e 1.atter woulcld seem a recent addition basec on
t.!-ie pFi.at.ro. e operie- ce- of the day.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRUG INTERDICTION DOMAIN:
Prior- to the in:e ase i. s eizutres, druL'g i nterdi. ction was
coiidered w.,'t.h:irn the cmair of ,tler a..encie;. '1he
Coast Guard'.s role was to assist those agencies. Given
Coast Guardl participation in prior drug smuggling
campaigns. - it is difficu.L.tlt to nderstand why the shift in
the drug t rade was not viewed in the same light as the
oppor-tunity to fight in Vietnam. A review of the
h:ist -or- of Coast G..ard boarding authorit tv and drug-
Ii ter di c t ion camp .i pro vides t le answer.
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BASIC LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY: Legislation pass;ed
in June 19:36 authorized the Coast Guard to "enforc:e r
assist in the enforcement of all appl.icable Federal laws
upon the high seas and waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States." [49 Stat 1820] The
latter authorized the Coast Guard to make "inquiries,
examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and
arrests . .for the prevention, detection, and
suppression of violations of the laws of the United
States, lunder certain imitations." [49 Stat 1820] The
basic law enforcement authority of the Coast Guard is
now codified in 14 LUSC 2 and! .4 USC 89.
These statutes were enacted in 1936, after the
Supreme Curt upheld the validity of Coast Guard
two Prohibition era boardings in Maul v.. U.S. C274
J.S. 50I (192, 7) and i. S. v. Lee [274 U.S. 559 (19727 ].
The Court ruled in favor of the Coast Guard but
indicated the need for a specific statute absent a l].ear
violation of law or probable cause Johnson, 1987: 158]..
Coast Guard boarding officers were advised in the Coast
Guard Handbook "Law E nforcement at Sea Relative to
Smuggling" 1932: 1-2] that probable cause was required
to board United States vessels outside territorial
waters. The 1936 legislation empowered the Coast Guard
to board nited States flag vessels without probable
cause or warrant to conduct routine administrative
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inspections, authority that has been repeatedly
challenged in court in the last two decades. Admi ral
Stephen Evans [1949: 218) has called this legislation
"one of the most sweeping grants of police authority
ever written into law."
MAJOR DRUG INTERDICTION CAMPAIGNS: Prior to the
passage o f this legislat ion, the Coast Guard and earlier
Revenue Cutters appear to have engaged in two major dru-.g
smuggling campaigns (in addition to the ongoing, routine
enforcement of customs laws). The f irst operation took::
place prior to the Civil War. The dates are unclear but
operations are implied in Evan's 1949: 25) "repor-t of a
shipbuilding prooramn that was intended to increase the
sspeed of the cutter's in the 1840's to win "races with
opium smugglers" emphasis added].
The second campaign took place in the late
Nineteenth Century. "When Congress revised the revenue
law in 1890, it levied import ta:xes of varying kinds and
amounts on morphine and its salts, smoking opium, and
medicinal op:ium, and preparations of opium, and an
internal revenue tax at $10 per pound on opium
marnufactured in the United States for smoking purposes"
[Millspatih, 1937: 80. Smuggling of opium to avoid
tariffs was combined with the smuggling of Chinese
aliens for cool.ie ].abor [Evans, 1949: 1823. Enforcement
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operations in th:is campaign took place largely in the in
the Pacific: ! Jorthw est (as discussedd i n Chapter 3) 
It appears that due to World War I and the
following massive anti-liquor smuggling effort during
PrFohibition, the Coast Gard did not pursue immediate
enforcemert of the Harrison Act. After the repeal of
P'ro-hibitio::: n in 1933 and the strengthing of the Coast
GLUard's boarding au1.th--or i t in 1.936. the Coast Guarcl,
Customsi,, and FN eniaged in an anti -narcotics smuggling
roperati on . t i t e Lou.Itbreal:k of World War I I
Wia:l ter C-a tit- 1 r -965 1. 12:! icommented
"Whi.le li. iqiuor smuggli. ng was dyi ng out
.-. t.he 1 !: :i ri,:! , of smuggling was ircreasring.
Tf-is. was th e s muggling of narcoti cs, mostly
morh:ine anc its derivati es There never- tRad
been any dcou bt that some of the rumrunner s had
engaged in other ill eal enterpi-ises suc:- as
this -and even the smugg:!ing of aliens -- but
it was always a sideline. Now, in 1935 , a new
wrirn !:kle :i.n smuggling dope appear ed . Niarcoti cs
rin.-t., placed men in the crews of various large
steamtnships, passenger vessels, and freighters,
particularly those sail. ing from the Orient and
M e! d:i. terra nean. As these vies;sels approa-chetid
'United Stat es prts . . . packages of
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narcot:ics would be thrown overboard .
Coast Guard vessels would meet the suspected
vessel offshore and attempt to trail it to
port."
In the three months following the passage of the
1936 act, 20,000 vessels were boarded, 2,000 cited for
violations of law, and six were seized Millspaugh,
1937: 153L]
DRIFTING AWAY FROM DRUG INTERDICTION: After World
War II, the Coast Guard gained a number of maritime
regulatory duties and drifted away from direct
enforcement of narc::otics laws. 1962 Roles and Mission
study of the Coast GL.lard by the Treasury Department
concluded 
"Th!-e Department of Justice has primary
authoiritV to investigate Federal crimes.
Coast Guard policy is to refer all criminal
investigations to that department after
preliminary investigation reveals possible
criminal activity . . . Enforcement and
investigation of violations of criminal laws
is not a large area of Coast Guard activity."
[Department of 'Treasury, 1962: B-133
In regard to customs laws the study concluded:
"The Coast Guard provides assistance to
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the B ur ean.u of Customs in the en f orcemernt of
ct::itt'.ms :l aws .. by f urnishi n7g water a nd
air transortation and, less frequently,
manpower needed in emergencies to carry out
investigations and to seize merchandise and
cL ntlrabad .a enforcement assistance
prov''ided Customs by Coast Guard is on a
c:eoo::iperabt:. ve basi s. No for-mal agreement
_.i.-' ts, nor appears: to be necessary. F i m r
e-nT:or-cem ent-tresponsibility is vested in
Cust oms, which reports that the Coast Guard
re.-e. rs inva..ab e ass s tan e. it i s
r-ecommenided that the working rel ati onshi p
beteen h .ea. Of Cust.oms and the Coat
Guar,-d be cor-tinr.ed"
[De.,par,tment of the TreasurIy, 1i62: E--24.. :,2
Thos:e l aw en .forc emen o perations which remai ~ned
ac--t. e we riente toward ... p rt s afe ty and 
enviuronmental orograms. The War had left the Coast
Guard with a "Captain- of the Port" function concerned
with -iarl:i-r and port s--afety, anti-sabotage activity, and
dangerous cargo regulatioin [Bennett, 1981: 77. While
wartime activity included mounted and canine beach
patrols. peacetim-e activity centered around anchorage
and harbor patrols during the Cold War and, later,
renvile, t: ' -activ i t.y In 1969, the law enfcor.-cement
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program str.icture reflected the devolution of drug
enforcement and the evolution of regulatory and
environmental progr-ams-, (see Chapter 10)
In short, drug interdiction and general criminal
law enforcement had been de-emphasized following the
war. The acqu.tisition f regulatory functions and the
rel ocati on to DOT reinforced this notion. The f ormer
tieis btetwjeen Cuist:oms and the FBI' no lJonger e,-isted.
After a 3:-year !hi atus little e..- pertise or competenc:e
in thi area eisted in the Coast uard. What board. . in
ard enforcement sk.ills remained had been gained in
normal operations, , Operat ion Mar ket. Time, and
enf: rcement f i nternat ior ia. fisher ies agreements.
"WE DID IT BEFORE, WE CAN DO IT AGAIN!" C::aptain
Larzelere recalls that. he was "not uncom fortable" with
law en forcet-men7t b.ar di.g operations and the drug
,inter: iction.- m:i.ssi..on, al thouogh we had "not perfected our-
procedLres. " He made several. points which illustrate
that minimumir level, baseline sills needed in drug
interdiction were retained through a variety of sour-Ces.
Fir-st, he had commanded a patrol boat in Vietnam and had
personial.y spervised hundreds of armed boardings nder
comba.t cnditions. Second, he had also commaned a
patrol b-oat iri the Fl].orida area earlier in his career'
andci gainec! epe:e! .:e in unusual operation-: in the same
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geographical area, including the Bay of Pigs operation.
Third, there some Vietnam veterans in the cutter crew
who also h!-iad eperience. Fourth., firearms qualification
and deck weapon proficiency was a routine training
requirement for cutters and their personnel. Finally,
lack of specific knowledge concerning evidence
procedures, drug identification, and prisoner handling
was learned with the help of local DEA and Customs
ag en t s.
For eothers interviewed by this researcher, there
were some protbllems.. Some cutters lac ked firearms
training for al l personnel and faced difficul.ties in
handling large number-s of prisoners. One commanding
off icer solved the problem by issuing guards baseball.
bats. One boadcling officer made his first solo boarding
after onl one traniiing boarding and was told by his
commanridin g officer not to load his weapon.
Those involved in early interdiction operations
reacted re-Plexively with existing hardware and
expertise, while the rest of the Coast Guard was in a
transition period or waiting for the new fisheries
mandate. In 1974, the Operations Officer on a Florida-
baised cutter published an article in the Coast Guard
Academy A].umri. Atssociation Blletin entitled, "Drug War
Erupts in the Seve-7-nth District" Cashdollar', 1974.. In
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1989, the Coast Guard is still at war, but the campaign
has turned into a seige. It is the largest operating
program in the Coast Guard surpassing search and rescue.
The legal mandate under which the war has been played
out has been 14 USC 89, codified in 1936. The
geographical domain has been the Coast Guard's since the
Quasi-War with France in 1799. The legal and customary
practice of interdiction of contraband dates to 1790.
The oroanizational reaction to the interdiction mission
is detailed in Chapters 10 and 11.
232
CHAPTER TEN
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN THE COAST GUARD& ADAPTING TO
THE DRUG INTERDICTION MISSION
( 1969-1979)
The Coast Guard organization as a whole did not
take great notice of drug interdiction operations until
the late 1970's. Law enforcement gained visibility
because of the impending 200-mile limit but drug
interdiction tended to be viewed as a regional problem
in Southeast and Southern California. In the 1980's it
became apparent that enforcing drug laws was a high
visibility mission with equa lly high benefits in terms
of fnding, procur-ement of hardware, and elevating the
organizaticn s; pr-est:ige. This; chapter- examines the
first interdic:tion decade, 1969-1979.
LOCATION OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AS A SURROGATE
MEASURE OF CHANGE: Few major organizational changes
have occurred at the operating level of the Coast Guard
over the years. Equipment and sk:ills change over time,
but the basic field structure has been relatively stable
or, at least, slow to change until the late 1980's.
Organizat:i.onal ch nges are more frequent at levels which
deal witl-h the e.ternal environment in government. As
e,tei-.l-al m ndates chan-ge, the Coast Guard plans and
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implements those chanoes through its headquarters staf
in Waih:ington. . That. staff routinely reorganizes t o
accommodate new programs.
The location of the program management function,
the acquisition and management of resources and policy
development for a particular service can provide
insioht into the or-ganizati.ona. status of that r-ogoram.
For e. ampe _.-. a , coi- :i ;, c:zi:, onal 1 y man-tdatted progr-am to
cai- l. e tife j-t or f: 1 . jacket s tc blue wth ch :is
.; _::i;i ,J tr o a . , .- : evel i-, te organi zat ion h iera rc y:
wil.1 3 I. d iffi 44C .ul.tL,; competing.r fl- res- t ces to cai ry
cu t t -hat mar'-idate,,, On the other hand, if the roora'im,
we. ass, n.ngied t an imp.ementation tas k force headed bti
.. a -s:,",ior ffC:: a tached t. t he C ie o S af f's
of f i. c: c, th e o.come.... wc:,i.ld be sure and swift t
:i.L.h'r,, t , o:Lani n , . SI an p,,i- st-e -mmin J -tem :i.-n t-e t
Coast G:.- ard druI i -tErdi ction has aways been one pry!-t
oDf th- En-f o-r ement of Laws and Treaties Operatin
FProgram shown in Fig..tre e8-5. Other functions within the
EL'1i progra m i rclude. marine mamimall prot ection, ille gal
alien smuUg.ing, enforcement of weapons laws, and so
f or th., . Wh ile the writer and the Coast Guard its el f may
u.se the ter-m "pr-cj'".-=-, i.n dif:ferentwai7 y w i.t. tas, meai-nw Si -l: h t ri-i-; E C t g -Pi . f.-. . . i r: - l t h ; ea ino r I 4 
w:i 'thi th .:- : sercie a.:= a fu_.nctional category for
.: Ld g 't i. in ' 2 ... r oes ,
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In t i ch apt er an d the +foll owing one the t1 C:ati ron
of the ELT program and the included drug interdict:ion
function or mission is traced over the last two dec:-tades.
This organizational tracking is one measure of how the
Coast Guard viewed the ELT program and the drui
interdiction mission during its early phcases.
A NOTE ON COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION:
As described in Chapter 8, Coast Guard Headquarters 1i
broke,.n down into "ofices" which are assigned operati
and sut.pport program management resposiliti. t TIey
assigned acr nyms with si gle letters; i .e. C M E)
These offices are led b a ].ag otf icer or admiral.
ili
Th e
d i vi *s:, i on . ,- et, sI b d i t i s i: o ., ' T
subdividd!e,: J intc "br
a b ranc. h depends oni-
Branches and some d
personnel as chi.efs_
the or an ' izat i on is the "cdiis: C)ion .
3.y l ed by a Captain (a Colonel
They are assr igned -aco ' iym t
cE .. . : J t. ' *-. ', i hie n i den t i fy th
i.OLE) D:iv:i. sions are fu t l- t herF-
anches. " The 1 eve]. of sipervi s
the size and na tutre of the pr
i.Vs, ion;s h av e seni or ci vili an
The Off ice of Civil Ri hts,
created in the 19'70's, is headed by a senior-
Branches are ass .Qned 1. . al pha-numeric- designat
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FIGURE 10-1
GENERIC ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE AT COAST GUARD
HEADQUARTERS
SOURCE: U. S. COAST GUARD, 1989.
236
i.nc:lutde the divisi.c:.n acronym pl us a number (i.e. OLE- .,
OI-5) F':i j;ure :0-l. is a generic orgariizational strui.ctLLre
at Coast Guard Headqutarters.
In 1969 the drug interdiction program was
administered by a Commander at the branch level. For a
whil e ( !97i 4) it was downgraded to a staff functi on
within t he Search and ResctLe Divisi. on. By 139, the
0f -f: i: eL c. 0 ,F- ert ;i , !.- h a d b F. een r e n amed t h e 0 f i c o L. a w
Enf orceent and Def -se O-. erations and wa manarl ged by a
two-star admiral wr:i t.h a one-star admiral a a r
assistant. That of:ice incl des a L aw Enfor cement 
Dli svsion w:ith searate branches for sur-face anri air
dru L. i r t. di t r, The 4: .l owi ng sections show tha t
dr- :_' Jnter:-ct' . , d :it - tse into the o r gniz ati n
fr om the ,- t tc n ul p.
EARLY TRANSPORTATION ISSUES
At th e start of: the first interdictijon decade.
Coast GuardL organization was changed to accommodate the
new sett of t-arsportati on and environmental missci.ons
added to the ervice ' s.- portf.olio. However, eternal
factor-s forced both l- is.heries:h and drugs onto the agenfda
and in to the or-anizat:ina l structure by the end of the
d(A e dc: a 2 e ,,
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FIGURE 10-2
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ORGANIZATION CIRCA 1969-1971
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
U.S. COAST GUARD ORGANIZATION
I s l;I SAFETY (IJ
'
llrlIC If Iffllr
COnPTIOIII l F CNIFF Cill
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 1971.
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BEFORE THE ENVIRONMENTAL SURGE (1969-71): Pr i or to
1971, the Coast Guard was organized as shown in Figure
10-2. The majority of the service's operating programs
(service product lines) resided in the Office of
Operations (), they included the divisions shown in
Figure 10-3. The Law Enforcement Division (OLE)
consisted of three branches which managed the law
enforcement proograms in port safety (OLE-1). maritime
law enforcement (OL.E-2) and maritime pollution contr ol
(OLE--.3) shown in Figure 0-.
The Maritime Law Enforcement Branch managed the
Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT) operating
program which would have included any drug interdiction
fu-ction. The thrust of this operating program in 1969
wa.s enforcement of:i nternat ional fi:sheries agreements
and the rec:ent l i mposed 12-mil. e fisheries zone
(1966) . The renmain:i.n branches managed the environmental
and port safety programs that emerged after World War
II.
During this period the FBN was reorganized into the
BNDD in 1968; and the Comprehensive Drug buse
Prevention and Control Act was enacted in 1970. The
legislation consolidated a badly fragmented drug control
regime and repealed previous legislation regarding
"narcotic 'drugqs." Among the acts that were repealed was
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FIGURE 10-3
COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
CIRCA 1969
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 1971.
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a 1941. act, which prohibited possession of any narcotic
drug on board a Un-ited States v;essel while engaged on a
foreign voyage [Harvard Law RFeview., 1980: 725J. The
Coast Guard was not actively involved in drug
interdiction missior management at the headquarters
level. and the omiss-ion went unnoticed.
Thte effect. of this repeal and the failure to create
a new statute wasi to I.egal ize possession of controlle-d
<sub-stances -u.tside. the territorial waters of the Uni ted
Sta..te. While Ee tie Coast Guar d could stop and bo ard a
ULni t ed Sta tes rt - e s ta . .e s s vessel with m ar j i an.-a ba les
loaded on decl .:. rsectti o wias di f i c Ut becaus ric
i pos es ,i L 'on law had been vio lated. Pro se t cuti on t p i b i 
violator cold take pl.ae Lner statutes prohbiat';ni
tconspira y to im|port r d i s tr .bi-t act i .vits c overi .-
in the 17r0 sLatiut:e b: ut difficult to rove r-2l J .C: 952 
atn, .t1 Ui.. 96. hi loophole crea-ted enforcement
partoblems -for the Cas Guard in the 970'7 and is
d isc-ussed i -t Chapter ' 12.
ADAPTATION TO THE MARITIME SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION MANDATE (1971-73): The Office of Marine
Environment and Systems was created in late 1971 to
consolidate all marine trancoorta.ti.on systems. The i ds
Aids to Navi gat-  i i D iision (O N) and the Port Safety
(OLE-!) ad Manritifme Pllutti.on Control (fL.E-3) branches-
241
of the Law Enforcement Division (OLE) were removed from
the Office of Operations. The Maritime Law Enforcement
Branch was left without a division assignment. ELT
program management was downgraded to a staff function
and assigned to the Search and Rescue Division as OSR-5.
This organization remained until 1974.
In 1973 all Coast Guard offices were given prefixes
to their offi.ce identifiers to signify within DOT that
thlny were part of the Coast Guard (i.e. G-OSR). The
Office of Operations was reorganized to provide greater
emphasis to the marine science programs. The new
divisions in the Office of Operations were as shown in
Figure 10--4.
These changes were in reaction to new missions and
did not particularly take account of the ELT program
other than providirng it an organizational address. In a
subttl e way, however, the broad concept of ocean
operations allowed the eventual assimilation of the
expanding law enforcement program.
The Marine Sciences Division was renamed the Ocean
Operations Division, a more general term and amenable to
wider program dliversity. The branches of the Ocean
Operatiorns Division were (1) Oceanography, (2) Pol.ar
Operations, and (3) the Ocean 2Zati on Branch. The Ocean
FIGURE 10-4
OPERATIONS DIVISIONS CIRCA 1974
1974
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
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Station Program was nearing the end of its life and the
branch was aboli.shed by mid-1974. The law enforcement
program remained in the Search and Rescue Division, but
a few months later it was renamed the Maritime Laws and
Treaty Branch and was relocated from the Search and
Rescue Division to the Ocean Operations Division as a
full branch, G-000-4.
During this period seizures began to increase
in the Southeast. The Nixon administration created
ODALE and ONNI, then merged both with BNDD to form the
DEA in 1973. A public affairs publication of the Coast
Guard,. the Commandant's Bulletin, noted the creaticon of
DEA stating:
"All CLoast Guard personnel are urgec to
assist this new law enforcement body to the
extent possible. This is a good time to
reaffirm the Commandant's policy to assist
Federal, state, and local law enforcement
bodies in all matters of mutual concern. The
Commandant is strengthening liaison with
various agencies at a national level. All law
enforcement components in the Coast Guard on
the working level are encouraged to reassess
and improve their liaison with all law
enforcement bodies."
[Coast Guard, 1973a: 8, emphasis by author]
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IAt the annual A-rea and District Commanders
Cornfe rence in .1,7:75 the Chi-f of Operations of the Coast
Guard, Rear Admiral William Jenkins, stated
"The potential for increased HEC [high
endurance cutter employment for ELT could
we].l arise from increased fisheries law
enforcement. e m   We see this almost every monrth
with add:iticnal bills that are introduced. . .
thE. y co. lti nuti .! voi c:e concern on our lack:
of pF-atro:l c:apal -ilty. New requirements miay
stem also from increased Coast Guard law
er-' -forc' i .e nt ..i,- We have seen this in a numbe r of-
area a -- -- Co operatio i w:i.th the new DEA, for
e xamp:e Cuito s the Bureau of DangeroL
Drug:-t.s (before t e : DE) and the border patrol!
i:tparti cu lafrly iin th e 7th District, h. a, ve
pec'...:. a-i- ems , nd Cstoms i i: concer ned
with h i-,.: smuqo ing o:f narcotics and asodi  t i- L- -s r -, 3 i . r ot . .n r:. i,
i].eoa -A iens in m -any areas 
[Coast Guard, 1973b pp. 12--4 .,5J
THE ASCENDANCY OF OCEAN OPERATIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
COMPETING MISSIONS (1974-79)
Ihe ee.ected passage of 2C0-mi].e .imit legislation
anld t he orI:goiln Inlternati:onal Conrferen ce of t:he Law of
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Sea (LOS) foc:used the attention of Coast Guard ELT and
marine scienc:e program managers. An additional branch
was established in the Ocean Operations Divisi on to
coordinate National Ocean Policy activities (G-000--5).
ELT planners estimated in 1975 that enforcing a 200-mile
limit would requ:ire 6 additional cutters, ].6 aircraft,
and ,5C:0 people [Coast Guard (G-000-4), 1975. Passage
o f the Fisher.ies Conservation Management Act (FCMA) i. n
,
'7" , '+b i hFd t h e 2 r,0-m:i I e i m i t effec t ive 1 a -th
1.977 [PL.. 94 -265 . 'he legislation did not include
addit onaa f nd ng f or the Coast Giua r-d.
There were good reasons why the fisheries iss ..Le
dr ew so muc; h atte- nt. i n (bes:i des a lac k of funds)r. ani-t!
div;erted time and effor- t from the embryonic dr ug
interdic L t - ,ion mission. Fi r st, in late 1975, I c:and ha(::!
impos5ed a sim laar fisheries ].imit which led to a "Cod
Wat- " with Great r-:i. tai.n [ AIlen, 1985 15-1]. Several
incidents resulted in damage to vessels and injur i te  s 
Iceland, thom'e to strategic United States defense
instal].ations, threatened to break ties with Great
Britain and leave NATO [ilen, 1985: 161. Second,
Admiral James Holloway III, Chief of Naval Operations,
and Henry K::issiner , Secr etary of State, both opposed the
legislationr at Conr-esscional hearings stating the law
wo..cl interfere w ith r:ights of innocent passage and the
deli cate oi ingoing LOS negotiations [Allen, 1985: 183.
246
President Ford had nearly vetoed the FCMA legislation
saying the "measure purports to encroach upon the
exclusive province of the Eecutive relative to matters
under international negotiations" [Allen, 1985: 13.
Contrasted to the global implications of the FCMA
and the anticipated resource requirements to enforce it,
the regional drug interdiction operations in the Seventh
District did not seem very important to senior Coast
Guard personnel at Headquarters [Melsheimer, 1989 . EL.T
program managers worked on both the fisheries and drug
issue in the same branch office, thus the two tended to
compete for staff attention. Fisheries issues were much
more well known to senior managers [Melsheimer, 1989.
Nonetheless, internal briefing papers by ELT planners
reported on the results of coordinated Operations
Buccaneer- and Chai-nel Cat in 1974., noting "These
operations have Presidential encouragement and have been
described as 'just the tip of the iceberg"' [Melsheimer,
1989 .
The international fisheries issue was being worked
top-down (under a congressional spotlight); the drug
interdiction mission was forcing itself up in that
interdiction operations were taking place regard].ess of
the congressional position on drug enforcement. Admi ral
Wagner had establish the Law Enforcement Organization
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(LEO) in Florida, took part in regional multi-ageni:y
operations, and pressed for more resources for the
Seventh District.
Congress was concerned about drugs, but focused on
DEA's performance and early border control issues. In
fact, studies in 1974 and 1975 to consolidate or
reorganize drug and bor-der enforcement functions mention
the Coast Guard only briefly, if at all. A 1974 Justic:e
Department analysis of border issues stated, "While
there are other agencies concerned with the security of
the Southwest border, e.g . .. Coast Guard . . . the
principal3 agencies involved in law enforcement are the
Departments of Justice and Treasury" Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs, 1988: .367-8.. The
recommendations of the 1975 Domestic Council Drug Abui-ts;e
Task Force regarding enforcement and interagency
operations co not mention the Coast Guard [Senate
Committee on Govern-7mental ffairs. 1988: 414--418].
The "staffers" in the Maritime Laws and Treaties
Branch were able to obtain one position in 1975 to
expand the dr g interdiction program. The "billet"
Eterm for a Coast Guard military position] was assigned
to the El Paso Intelligence Center and then Lieutenant
Commander (LCDR) Robert F. Melsheimer moved from the G--
000-4 staff to EPIC [IMelshemiw-8 19891. This liaison
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bi.3.].et reported to the Intelligence Division (G--OI S)
which marnaed all Ctoa-t Gua-rd intel 1 igence program s.
The Coast Guard had also placed a liaison officer at the
State Department as a result of an incident in 1970-
where a Lithuanian seaman requesting asylum on board a
Coast Guard c -tter was returned to a Soviet trawler-.
This offic:er reoported to the Ocean Operations Division
and cordinated eSForcement actions taken agai. nst
{foreiJgT-n vesse . s [1 e].sh ei..mer. 989].
InrleasIed interaction with various types oif -e:sels
·f r-omI variou-:iUs countir . es i. n the course of law enforcement
patrols ( is . rie s and drrugs) had the potential to cause
inter-nat.i ona. tensi. cin at:t he wrong ti. mri One of the
earir !est 001 c dir ecti es -F the era, "Proedure-s -ot:. I -o I i tc  :. e i v si t h ,' .- c E d Lt r 3e s; cr
Handi. i. n V ai . ue .v:oes of NJi on-Mii 1 i taary Inident s" was
isisue L to al, Coast G Li uard io pe rat i u nit s in 1 97 4 and
coveredi- the f o3..l o:i. !- acLt iv:i t ies
1. H.- ijac:ki. -s or terrorist activities
2 syl/um requests
.. Seizure of: United States citizens or vessel-rs
abroad
4. Requests for assistance by a fore:ign national
5. Violation of international agreements on the
hig h s ea.su
1-'otetia] or .acual s.eizuOe of -foreignr ves-;e ls
i.. vi-ol. ati..on of L.ni.ted States law
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7. Con-l i -ts between ULnited States and fore:ign
f ishing. vessel. s [Coast Guard (G-OCFP) 1974 .
The directive contained more information reporting
requirements and guidance on press releases than on the
actual procedures to be followed in individual
situations. The purpose of the directive was to inform
senior officials, up to and including the White House,.
of potential. international incidents that might :impac:t
nat.i ora:! secu ri . The activities couldz i nclu.de some
drug interdiction actions tak:en outside territorial
waters aOgains t forejiri vessels.;
In J975 te i.ncr-ease in sei.ures and the comino
+ :i -sh:e!, 1. S, limit:. p rompted a general direct:ive on law
enfor- cement oper-ations that off i ci t ally reversed the
concl: us ion-I C-f the 1.962 :Ro les and Mission s S tudy. T he..
stated p ol. i c was t h at
"inc reased emphasi s will be .a ced on E L..T
olper---ti. on s as a primary duty and
responsibility of the Coast Guard. With
regard to cooperation with other Federal law
enforcement agencies . . . that role may vary
from providing transportation or
communications services to acting as lead
agency in a multi-agency operation .
whien Coast Gard Cutters and/or Coast Guard
btcarding parties are involved, seizures and
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arrests as appropriate will normally be made
by Coast Guard personnel."
[Coast Guard (G-000-4), 19751
Area and District Commanders were also directed to
establish "appropriate liaison and coordinating
mechanisms at the local level" [Coast Guard (G-000-4),
97. J A pended to the directive was the organization
manuall Cfor the L.EO etablished in the Seventh District.
AN ORGANIZATION IN TRANSITION: After ten years in
thle DOT, the Coast Gu ard was bing pressed to become
involved in two major- mission areas that seemed to
diverge from the m aritime transportation agency
envisione d t;i F'resi.dent Johnnson fisheries and druo
interdiction Nei.ther had appeared as pressing national
i ssiueis in t.he Fost-War per :iocl, but were now emergi g.
Within the Co.t. Guard regul at.or-y specialists tended to
co nf lic : t wit tradii i I .al i:operators. In a special Coast.
G L.ard f :: Lus issue of the J . S.. Naval Instit te F ::i:   t i L..C i- -: i-.
in M arch 197 C om -andant Owen Si ler [1976: -35 rem ar ked
that
"ThIie populLtar ity of the regul atory ve..rsus
operational theory tends to overshadow other
views of the Coast Guard that can also
cc ntribu.te to a better understanding of our
nat L-.re .. ! i ee the Coast Gu ar d' I -nat..lre
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as that of a law enforcement agency; in this
context we are all operational with a central
fundamental purpose."
The late 1970's could be characterized as an
institution building period in Selznick's sense.
External requirements and threats were being processed
and accommodated. Within the drug enforcement
struc ture the Coas;t Guard was emerging as a major
organization in the "drug wars" by virtue of the
maritime domain it held, the assets which were in place,
and the growing competence to operate those assets.
Outside the Coast Guard, the eternal environment had
already sensed this. Tthe major border management
studies noted in Chapter 7 began to include the question
of what the Coast Guard role should be, but provided few
answers.
ORGANIZING THE OCEAN OPERAT IONS DIVISION FOR FISHERIES
AND DRUGS -- MAJOR POLICY ISSUES
By 1977, drug seizures and fisheries boardings were
increasing rapidly. The Coast Guard was beginning to
focus more closely on the management of these programs
and their place in the organization. Resource
management and policy guidance for the field also
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i ncr eaed .s w t ee n 1.5 and .97 7 si maj r pi icy
direct:ives had been issued:
:I . determi: nati on o jurisdictions
2. (re) emphasis of law enforcement
mi ssi on
·.% procedures for contact b at
4,, veciel .L ockout procedures
5 'i. nternational agreement procedures
6.. stolen vessels
[Coast Guard Directives and F'ubli cation ndices
1975- 1 77I I I 
The pci l ici es had been required to standard i ze field
practice across districts (stolen vessel cases, suspect
vessel lookouts-) or to respootnd to enforcement problems.
identifi ed by f:iel.d ciommanders (mother-shiips offloa-dini
to c-:ntact b:oat. s. uni:orm .-sser tion of jurisdtiction
With thie etC-ept gi.dane isued to enf:orce high
seas violattions., th-iese pcrocedu(res resulted from early
interdiction eperiences. Legal research and policy
developmen,-It. requlire more time and highier level review.
The division was reorganized into the branches
shown in F:i-iure 10-5. For the first time in the mdern
inter7 di ction era tere - as- a pro , gram management br anch 
f,,,,cused d,. :le:t y t o', mar 'l t i m ei-forceimen... issues
......... ........ j' ~:IM" l L
FIGURE 10-5
OCEAN OPERATIONS DIVISION
CIRCA 1977
MAI
SCIE
BRA
(G-O
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 1977.
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independent of fisheries laws and treaties. The
remaining years of the 1970"s produced a number of
changes and contentious internal issues which occupied
the "staffers."
INCREASED INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT: The role of EPIC
increased dramatically and a system of centrally issued
suspect vessel lookouts was established in 1976. A
suffic:ient number of personnel were assigned so that
Coast Guard peronnel were available on a 24-hour basis.
These officers were specifically directed to provide
intelligence information and not to direct operational
un :i. t s.
The -growth of the law enforcement program and drug
interdiction in particular created some new
organizational relationships. The role of intelligence
was one such change. Before the re-emphasis of law
enforcement as a primary mission, relations with other
agencies and criminal enforcement activities, when
required, were carried out by Coast Guard agents
assigned to the intelligence organization Chapeau,
1984: 341. These agents were trained at the same
facilities as DEA, FBI, and other federal agents and
tended to see themselves as the true law enforcement
officers of the service D. Thompson, 1.989]. These
agents are:. also the internal 'efairs investigative force
for the Coast Guard. Coast Guard personnel conducting
boardings, makin.g arrests, and seizing vessels were
considered as a patrol force which lacked "professional"
law enforcement expertise ED. Thompson, 19893. This
same dichotomy existed between the investigative and
patrol agencies within the overall structure. The Coast
Guard was eperiencin g the specialization of functions
within the ELT program.
STANDARD USE OF FORCE POLICY: In 1978 the first
service-wide "use of force" policy was issued. This
policy standardized terms, defined situations requiring
deadly and non-deadly force, prescribe training and
quali.fications standards. and directed that all Coast
Guard personnel engaged in boardings be armed [Coast
Guard (G-000), 1978). The policy also contained
standard procedures for hailing and stopping vessels and
the situations underwhich force could be used to compel
compliance [Coast Guard (G--000), 1978. This was a
significant policy decision on the part of the Coast
Guard.
Prior to 1978 use of force issues had been dealt
with at the district level. However, several incidents
involving accidental discharges of weapons and one
invo].ving the death of a suspect raised the issue to a
service-wicle level.. In the la ter, a Coast Guard159
helicopter had been attempting to stop a boat fleeing
into Mexico south of San Diego, California. A DEA agent
had been embarked on the aircraft and was armed. When
the boat entered Mexican waters the DEA agent attempted
to use disabling fire without advising the aircraft
commander. As a result a passenger on the boat was shot
and .kll.ed [:D. Thompson, 1989].
District and units commanders who had retained a
cgreat deal of discretion ri-egarding the arming of
boarding parties and the use of force lost some of this
discretion. The previous discretion of commanding
officers not to arm boarding parties was gone.
An angry offic:er wrote an article entitled
"Torpedoinoi the Coast Gluard's Good-Guy Image" in a
pro fessiona l ournal 
"Canr it be that this outfit which wanted
noth-ing more than to ensure "the safety
of life and property at sea" now sl:.:ulkss
about the ocean in unlighted ships and
sends armed boarding parties to lool: at
children's life jackets?"
[Adams, 1980: 137
This policy and the growing law enforcement
activity o-F the Coast Guard prompted a division within
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the service commonly referred to as the "white hat"
versus "black hat" role. An opposing view was offered
later in the Coast Guard Academy's Alumni Association
Bul 1 etin,
"Our candidates should know right from
the start that among the many "hats"
which a Coast Guard officer is expected
to wear is that of the modern-day
"Smokie of the Sea." As such, he/she
will be called upon to carry a weapon,
engage in extensive boarding and other
enforcement operations, and make . .
seizur:es, and arrests."
[Abel, 1932: 33
TRAINING FOR PATROL PERSONNEL: The 1975 policy
reversal regarding law enforcement activities raised an
issue noted early on by commanding officers and
underscored in events leading to the use of force policy
-training.
"It soon became apparent that maintaining
a professionally competent boarding force
would require more training in basic federal
law enforcement than was available solely from
a school-of-the-ship approach" [Coast Guard
G-00), 1979].
In 1978 the Coast Guard established a Maritime Law
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Enforcement (MLE) School at its Training Center in
Yor-k:town, irginia. The five week resident course
trains personnel assigned to boarding teams and patrol
units. Semi-annual seminars for senior officers are
also conducted. The MLE school graduates approximately
30 people in each class. The number of classes held per
year is established by annual funding level for Coa st
Guard training and varies. The training provided
is "fuindamental 3.aw enforcement training needed to
perf orm e ff ect iv ely and professionally as federal law
enforcement. - T i cer" [ Coa st Guard ( G-000 , 1 979.
However, the capaci.t of the school was not sufficient
ear-.ly on to train all3. personnel needing the s ills and
"alternat.e sources of training" were encouraged [Coast
Guard (-000)l 1979]. These al.ternate sour.3ces were
local_ enfiorcem-ient training facilities and in--house
mobile traininr teams.
FORMALIZING INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS: Inr the
short period between 1975 and 1977, the growing
activities of the Coast Guard in drug interdiction
prompted its inclusion in the interagency coordination
discussions in Conoress and elsewhere (i.e OMB). The
Coast Guard negotiated "Inter-agency Agreemrents" with
both Customs and DEA in 1978. These agreements
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i denti f i ed i r sdi c:t i ons and establi shed coordi nati ng
procedures on a ij.lat:eral. basis Coast Guard, 978b and
197 8c 1
IMPACT OF THE 1976 MANSFIELD AMENDMENT: In the
late 197'C!s, proposed oint interdiction operations with
the Col ombian Navy were derailed when legal
interpretat. ions f t the Marisfield Amendment (1976)
indicatc:td the Coast Guard was prohi bited from assistir,
the Colomb:i ans in thei - territorial waters [Coast Guard
(LMI), I 19 3. Th e j.ssue was debated in legal. circles.
and had a dampening effect on international initiatives..
1979 case law broadened Cowers. to assert Jturisdi.ctlic
over Stnted ates -f lag vesels in the territor ial
waters - ar;-rer nation with that nritions consent
rLLS. S v. I nr, , 89 F. 2df 1258 (1979 ] I t was not
unti. ithe mi.d-98''s t hat a leg:i. slative remedy was
p -,5..4; e ,i .
ASSESSING THE CHANGES
From the time of the first seizure of Southern
California in i.969 ntil the establishment of a separate
headquarters branch devoted entirelyv to mar time law
enf orcment in 1977, eighot years had el.ased Over 7
mi liion poundl-s marij Lana and 339 : vesselis had been
seized by C- ast Guard units [Coast Gu ard (G-. L.E-1),
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19t81. No documented seizures in the current era were
found prior to the 1.969 case noted in this research. As
the Coast Guard wa; reacting to and coming to grips with
the "new" environment represented by drug smuggling, the
overall enforcement structure was seeking to replace the
FBN. The concept of coordinating all ocean operations
in one division emerged as a form of consolidated
program management at Coast Guard Headquarters. This
structure prl-ovided the latitude to incorporate fast
growing fisheries and drug interdiction activities in
the ELT program. Forced on to the policy and program
management agenda from the field level, Coast Guard
managers began to provide policy guidance on law
enforcement and drutg interdiction issues and to interact
with the eternal. drug enforcement structure through
interatgency agreements and other means (EPIC
advisory c:mmri. ttee, the National Narcotics Intelligence
Co.sumer Committee (NNICC)S.
The end of the 1970's also raised several policy
issues which carried over onto the agenda of the 1980's.
The foremost question was, how many resources should or
could the Coast Guard put into the lengthening drug war.
External economic conditions were forcing operating
costs in the form o:f fuel price increases and the
federal budget defi:it problem was forming. The decade
ended with budget problems looming and a GAO evaluation
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of the Coast Guard's interdiction efforts to date.
".The Coast Guard has had some success in
detecting and capturing drug smugglers on
the high seas. For the most part, this
is attributed to its cutters, aircraft,
and electronics gear being superior to
the equipment used by smugglers and its
strategy of concentrating surveill aice in
areas which smugglers must pass.
The Coast Guard needs to establish a druit.o
enforcement goal to use in measuring its
effectiveness and in determining its
resource needs. ." GAO, .979a:cover
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN THE COAST GUARD- ADAPTING TO
THE DRUG INTERDICTION MISSION
(1980-1989)
Inter-diction operations were taking place in every
distic:t. in the Co.st. Guard by 198r: , Joint ooera.t.ions
at Car ibbe ...-i : F -hoke intis" forced vessel smug:L in. into
the Gl. f Mex :i..co and nor-th i.nto ther mid-At.antic
states and New England. On the West Coast seizur..t'e.s were
not as r,'equen'i tbu.it occurred in every state, i r :: 1 uc n r
ask: a - [Coast Gua.,:d ( G-- L.E - " 983 -.
There were an increasing number of incidents where
veijsels refused to stop and required warnirn shr7ts t o
"co me a t. ." In 198. the Cutter Point Francis, ecaie
the first cutteir in the era to use disablin f re to
stoi. a ve s ;el [ Coas t Guar d, -iLE-1, 1 988. In 198'. the
Naval. guicided missle ci-ru..iser Mississippi with a Coast
Guard Law Enf orcement Detachment (LEDET) embarked,
seized 25 tons of iimarijuana and arrested 11 in capturing
a drug smuiggler- under wider authority granted by the
Posse Comitatus amendments [Trainor, 1987, p. El8]. In
1983, the USS Kidd a Navy destroyer with a LEDET
embar-l:ed, was; the first Naval s;hip to use disablinc 3 fire
to stop a smuggler [Coast Guard (G.--OLE- 1) 19883]
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Mar :i i uai- a, b ul ky and space con sumiIrig , was be:i nig
repl.aced by 1ow vol ilume, higher alue cocaine. Drutgs
once visible in bales on deck were now being hidden in
secret compartments Coast Guard (G-OLE), 1983 .]
Mari-juana seizures peaked in 1981 and 1982 to be
replaced by growing cocaine seizures [Trainor, 1.987: 8.1;
Coas t Guard ( -OLE-I ! 9 , 88. 1 * f3 . ircraft wh:ich we re
runconstrained by choke poi nt-s were becomi ng the
smulggers: preerredi mode o¥- transp.c;if ortati orn [Coast
Guard, ( -Of) .987]. Chani-ges in the dru- trade and
counter-chanes in t e enfor c:ement s=tr ucture
ac l. c arated. The C ast Gu ard s-cr-ambled to keeo u with
thni i n resour e s i n an austere - f:iscal envi ronment.
Law enrcemet pro rami manati-i ement, i lega. alien
i ntper : i. c t iot pera i onis as we . a !s drug i. nterdict t i on
con rJ t i . - h , i.r--- Co s L 
contin -  d th c] .i up the prio rit str cture at C ast
Gurd Hadquarters.
RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
(1980-1982)
]he combined growth o the f isheries and drug
interdiction missions oIutgrew the Ocean Operatior-ns
Divis. i. ; b :. The O-t fi. ce of iperationrs was
re:irzgar:i zed as shown.- irn F..iure 1.--.. The O.ea,
Oerat i. t i n. ivi sn was broken ini-to two sep arate
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FIGURE 11-1
OFFICE OPERATIONS CIRCA 1980
OFFICE OF OPERATIONS I STAFF
MILITARY
READINESS
DIVISION
G-OMR
SEARCH AND
RESCUE DIVISION
G-OSR
OPERATIONALOPERATIONAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT
G-OLE
PLANS AND
PROGRAM
BRANCH
G-OLE- 1
ELT
TRAINING
BRANCH
G-OLE-2
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 1980.
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divisionsr: t.fhe Marine Science and Ice Fpeiration
Division (G'-OMI) and the Operatioinal Law Enforcementr
Di:vision (G-OLE); the latter reest-blished after a nine
year absence.
The :omp:leity of the ELT program was reflected in
the establishment of separate branches for planning,
trainin, geeral law enfor.ceient including. 
in terdi ction), and -fisher-j.es as show-in in Fi gure 11-i.
T- 1981. the L..--:I ,-ranch explan ded its plann:ng funcrr:::lt.i on
to include the f-aci.lity management of a ll cutters ex cept
buoy tenders and icebreakers.
Ir, 1982 te tel ec;--rommuni cation manaemnent spp)r-t
function was rem-oved from the Office of Oerat:i.ons and
relc'cated in the newv Office of Command, Contrcl and
Commnii, i ns. Thje Off ice of Oper atiiors was let:. wi t 
five maj ·or dii\.isions c-Fmpared to the seven it manaoed in
1969. D uri ngt i . o ei' i d act itv ity cF t fe,' o n g a:i.or n,n
operating funds and new hardware for the e,.panding
enforcement missions in tough budget times. In
additior.. the staff w-as inrivolved in a new Rol.es and
Mi. issiri Study [Hart, 1. 989 .
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THE BUDGET PROBLEM
The combination of rising fuel prices and increases
in Coast Guard missions since the late 1960's prompted
the service to seek: budgetary relief in the late 1970's
[Alumni Association Bulletin, May/June 1980: 26). A 1980
GAO review of the service and its funding concluded: "In
recent years the Congress has given the Coast Guard new
duties., for example oilspill prevention and cleanup, and
enforcement of fisheries and drug laws. However, the
Coast Guard's budget has not grown to meet its needs for
additional staff and vessels. Moreover, some Coast
Guiard shore facilii t i es are i nadequate" LGAO, 198..'
Digest .
In 19781., the House Committee on Merchant Marilne and
Fisheries published an oversight report on the Coast
Guard entitled, Semi--Paratus: The United States Coast
_Guard .9_?1." 1. "Its general thrust was that the Coast
Guard [did] not have the resources to cope with the
variety of responsibilities placed on it and that whi.le
priority must be given to the Coast Guard'is at-sea
missions and to improvements in training and plant
maintenance, the service should be relieved of
responsibilities 'whi.ch can be fulfill.ed by other
federal. agencies, by state or local government, or by
the private sector' c [Moore, 1980: 195). When relief
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did not appear in the 1982 appropriation, the Commandant
of the Coast Guard, Admiral Jack Hayes, announced a 10
percent reduction in force and the closing of three air
stations, the decommissioning of 11 cutters, and the
closure of 20 coastal stations Moore, 1980: 196]. Most
of the reductions were restored after a confrontation
with the Congress, but the battle for funds has
continued to rage through the 1980"s Yost, 19893. ]The
situatio was repeated in 1988 when the Commandant
ordered a 5 percent reduction in enforcement patrol.s
and c:losed stations [Yost, 1989 . Supplemental funds
followed then too.
As a result of growing concern over the state of
the Coast Guard, the House Appropriations Committee
directed in 1980 that a study group be established to
review Coast Guard missions and that it "be something
more than a simple reaffirmation of all Coast Guardc
existing tasks" [Transportatiorn Department, 1982: 11.
The result was a new Roles and Missions Study to update
the 1962 effort. That study was completed in 1982 and
had several important impacts on the Coast Guard. The
study concluded that the drug interdiction mission was
mandated in law, but did not carry a specific goal or
standard comparable to other programs [Department of
Tra-rsportation., 19-'2: 41--42 The Coast Guard, in the
absenc:e of central federal pol2i6cy on desired268'
performance., was described in the study as creating
their own standards. The study did not recommend the
Coast Guard reduce its effort, but it did call for a
unified federal policy on what was expected.
This recommendation tended to agree with the 1979
GAO evaluation cited in Chapter 10, "The Coast Guard"s
Role in Drug Interception -- How Much is Enough?"
However, ino central enforcement policy struLcture eisted
until the National DrugJ Enf .orcement Policy oard was
created in 1984. Prior to that time, national.
strategies were developed by working groups under the
loose coordination of the White House Office of Dru.g
Abuse F'olic y [Of fice of Drug Abuse Policy, 1978. Thi. s
researcher as found no clear cut, exact performance
goals or the Coast Guard provided by any external
entity.
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EARLY 1980' S
CLOSING THE HIGH SEAS POSSESSION LOOPHOLE: A
signifcant policy goal was achieved in the passage of
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act of 1980 (PL 96-
350) which closed the high seas possession loophole
created in 1970. The new act made it illegal for "any
person on btioard a ve-ssel of the United States, or on
board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the Unite..l
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States, on the high seas, to knowingly or irntentionally
manufacture ordistribute, or possess with the intent to
manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance" CF'.
96-350 ].
THE MARIEL EXODUS: The largest "no-notice"
peacetime surge operation in the Coast Guard's history
occurred in 1980 and virtually brought all other
enforcement programs to a momentary standstill. Between
April and November in 1980, nearly 125,000 Cubans
entered the lnite:l States in a massive exodus from the
port of Mariel, Cuba. The combined rescue and blockade
operations invol ved 22 major cutters, 37 patrol boats..
19 Navy ships and patrol boats, numerous aircraft and
small craft. and thctousands of Coast Guard personnel
[Larzel .-e, !e 988s. The operation required a Coast Guard
reserve force call-up for only the second time in the
service s peacetime istor'y [Larzel.ere, 1988: 189].
This operation is noted here for two reasons.
First, the enormity of the task and the time pressure to
respond presented a huge challenge which the Coast Guard
met by mustering all the potential capability and
reserve capacity the service had. It worked, and
provided the most elegant example to date of the
ex<t.ension f the srategic triad through the multiplier
ef-fec t noted in Chapter 9. 270
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Secncd . the operation removed cutter patrols from
the choke points in the Caribbean providing nearly free
access to the United States by smugglers for a number of
months. The operation was directed by the President and
left no mission discretion on the part of the Coast
Guard. At the close of the operation it was possible to
see "almost a :inear relationship between the number of
patrol units r-eturned to drug interdiction and seizures
i .t also showed how resource poor the Coast Guard
was in stopping Clrugs from entering the country" ED.
Thompson, 1989). Units retained in the area against the
contingency that a second threatened exodus would occur
":led to a massive increase in drug seziures late in the
year-" Coast G ard (G--OLE-3), 198 3 .
The inference by Admiral Thompson from this
"natural experiment" is that the Coast Guard can
demonstrate a relaticinship between choke point patrols
and seizures that is linear (more ships, more seizures)
when there is no prior warning to the smugglers. Th:is
can infer an overall lack of resources in that when
smugglers have no k:nowledge of interdiction unit
location, seizures are proportional to patrol units.
The notion is., then, that we are constrained in
enforcement effectiveness only by the number of patrol
unJi t s.. W- are "re sourc:e p oor." However this albeit
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fragile notion soon collapses because the element 4of:
suprise is ephemeral and smugglers soon learn of patrol
units and reroute. The overarching question becomes how
to attack the flex.ible transportation system of
smugglers. It is a question unanswered today.
HAITIAN MIGRATION: The following year, 1981, the
Coast Guard intiated the Haitian Migration Interdiction
Operation (HMiO) in cooperation with the Haitian
government to stern the flow of aliens attempting to
leave Haiti Coast Guard (G-OLE-3), 198.3]. That program
continues today ith a cutter on patrol or capable of
response at al3.1 ti mes. Between 1981 and 1988 nearl.y
17, 000 aliens have been stopped. During the same peri od
those cutters also sei. zed an estimated 700, 000 pounds of
miariluanra and 3 ,0t pounds of cocaine in 5 9 cases Coa;st
GuLard (G-OLE-1 ), 1C988 . These amounts are included in
the ver;-all statistics provided elsewhere.
POSSE COMITATUS AMENDMENTS: The passage of the
Posse Comitatus amendments in 1981 provided an inter-
agency coordination requirement. Policy issues were
addressed within the OLE division until the
establishment of NNBIS in 1983. Day-to-day coordination
of DOD involvement was carried out by district and area
commanders. The major use of DOD assets was for
survei 1 la:-ce (aircaft) and through the use of Tactical
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Law Enforcement Teams (TACLETS) of 15 persons and
smaller detachments, LEDETS, of 5 to 8 persons Coast
Guard (G-OLE), 1983].
Without increases in funding, the Coast Guard found
the emerging multi-agency operations a cost-effective
way to stay involved in interdiction at a reduced cost.
The TACLET/LEDET concept is a good example. Placing a
team on boarcl a Navy ship transiting the Caribbean in
the course of normal. operations adds little cost to the
Navy and provides a dr-ug enforcement platform to the
Coast Guard. A 1984. briefing paper on this support
noted, ". if we had to replace this effort with
equivalernt level of Coast Guard resources the cost/
vaiuLe wouldt: be very subL st tantial" [Coast Guard (G-OLE-.),
1984 ].
REACTING TO TOP-DOWN MANAGEMENT, THE MULTI-AGENCY
COORDINATION ERA BEGINS (1982-1983)
Chapter 7 detailed the evolution of multi-agency
coordinating structures as a natural response to agency
specialization and the growing complexity of the drug
trade. From the agency view it tended to cloud existing
organizational relationships and circumvent eisting
chains of command. Fi.ure 11-2 is extracted from a 1983
Law Enforc-.ement D:iv:is:ion briefing bo.:ok:. It is the Coa-.st
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FIGURE 11-2
COAST GUARD COORDINATION CHAIN
WITH MULTI-AGENCY STRUCTURES
CIRCA 1983
COAST GUARD
COORDINATION CHAIN
SOULRCE: U.S. COAST GUARD, 1983.
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Guard-s Sview of the inter- ction between the agency an-d
the e.'.ternal enforcee-' st ruc:tuLre op rior to the cr-eationr
of7 the Nati.' nal. Druc1g FP'J1 icy Bcvoard. Fi gue 1.-3. frm
the same brief:i.ng book, is a conceptual framework whicth
shows the various supLtly and demand reductio agencies
placed lp.Ion the fur ma or components of the tra.ffick.:ing
svstem. The reader m ay want to compare thi. agency view
w:i t h t he -, f r ,am. ew or I :: ,f; p r vi dedi in Fig ures -. , o 7- ,,
1Th-e Co.:-.- uard summar i. ed the interagen-cy
c::dinat:i. -oni S IE iu i a Cono ressi onal hearing- tbr sf::int
book as fo.. os
. .. i 1t i ion etween ag, ie,  s is
n essay due to overlapping j ur isdti on and 
, nU g ., -, Of the. il thre ].ead feder-a:! dr!g..
i.nt+erdic;cti:na? g,=:.nes, aDE is the pr:imary
oer fy o'' r urt..no L..aw enforcement biu.'t its
intli.'"-','5.~ ..e dmestic atd i i foreign
) ::ii ii: t .. , n anci . a' d - s:i. d i nt.er ' i cl t i c n.
Cu;stcms h-as ju- isdiction t o int s of entrvy
:i nto te -, U.S,, wh:ich includes customs wate.rs;
c-.ou.t to 2 miles of he U. coasCt The C.o.ast
Guard has overlapping jurisdiction t wi h DEA
and Custo.m-s at maritime points of entry and
w:i t.h Custo. ms w:ithin the customs waters, h  and
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FIGURE 11-3
ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACTIVITY
FRAMEWORK
CIRCA 1983
SOURCE: U.S. COAST GUARD, 198.
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has primary jurisdiction on the high seas
beyond the customs waters" [Coast Guard
(G-OL.E-.3) . 1. 98. 3.
The Coast Guard, starting with assignments of
personnel to EPIC and the State Department in the
1970's, assigned a number of personnel to the various
task forces and coordinating structures. These liaison
or staff officers assigned to eternal or-ganizations
have represented Coast Guard interests, worked on joint
projects or- operations, and, most importantly, gained in
depth knowledge of the other organizations involved in
similar missions. Figure 11--4 is a listing of
liaison/staff functions carried out in the Coast Guarcl
in the interdiction era.
The service's jargon for an individual assigned to
such duty is a "purple suiter." This is a play on the
term "blu.-e sl:iteF-" which refers to the Coast. it Guard
uniform and is an expression for someone in the Coast
Guard. In this case, purple suit means there is no
identifiable agency affiliation. In other words, these
individuals serve for the good of the organization, not
necessarily their own service. While no person is free
from their organizational culture and its goals during
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FIGURE 11-4
L IAISON FUNCTIONS RELATED TO DRUG INTERDICTION
AGENCY/LOCATION AND
ACTIVITY
State Department:
Cooirdination of law enforcement activity involving
foreign vessel or nation. Expanded in 19O0's to liaison
officers for both fisheries and general law enforcement.
Coast Guard military attaches assigned to source country
embassi. es.
El PasF'o .Irntell..igence C nter: Early liaison activity
with drug intelligence community, followed by staffing
of 24-hour watch.
National Drug Poeli cy Board: Staff representative
of the Coast Guard.
The Inter-di.ction Cmmittee: (TIC) Executive Director and
staff officer. Coordinated development of interdiction
portion of national strategy. Located with Customs..
Department of Def.ense: Liaison officer for issues
invol.ving DO) role in interdiction.
National Nharcotics Border Interdiction Svstem.: t(NNB.IS)
Staff director and staff officers provided. Half of
reoional centers under Coast Guard coordination.
Or-cga. -z.e.d jCrime Dut-g Enforcement Task Forces: (OCDETF s)
Coast Guard personnel assigned as staff at regional
c enter s..
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such an assignment,, the notion is that Coast Guard
people do this well [Hart, 1'99 Crriey, 989:
Melshei mer-, 1.989 K Thomps;on.. 1.989.
The following sections provide supplements to the
material proviided in Chapter 7 on the multi-agency
coordinating tructures, based on Coast Guard
experienes i.n tthe So..th Florida Task Force.. the
C!.ETF, s! !:. , .1rI a tte D-u F'ol..icy E ard
THE SOUTH FLORIDA TASK FORCE EXPERIENCE: Resoo-pndino
to th.., mrandate to "i mei. atel andcl iign:i :ii cantl 
inF-crease Coast Guard .forces and manpwer- in the SoUt.h
Florida area to help i n c-Amiing m*t:onths it h the
in terdi t' ion of i .].ea. e . ru -s and ali ens," the Coast
Guard ., I :ioed cUtterS to the area fom.E 1ts-A ) i c-h:' .'-, d,' :, f. :'L- .'y -ei ai n :t e t : h t . e a F C' o
other part': -f: te-. country [Bland, -9 : 71
Etb:,,.L.: i shed::, at the same time was a new suL.rface effect:
sh Li .p (SE' ) s qadro ' vessels) at Key West These 13. -("
f .oot v e s s e i: s ha -eu .ap a ili y t V Li p to 4 ::nots ar
wer e capabIle of short-notice interceptions which othert-
cutters could not co. Teamed with a large cutter with
better sensors and a deployed helicopter, the SES
concept was intended to close choke points such as the
Yt,.cat Chan G  nel C EB and .. 9 17 The ES squ adron
remains in o erat io:n ad the n mber and sophi stic:ati ior
of interdic t ion assets has continued to inc-ease.
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The combina. tion of the Posse Comitatus amendments
and Admiral Dan Mur-phy's "consumate management by
intimidation," produced DOD assets for the Task Force
ED. Thompson, 19893. TACLETS and LEDETS were deployed
on vessels with increasing success Coast Guard (G-OLE-
3), 1983] The impact of the overall SFTF operation was
enough to reroute mugglers to other parts of the
country. Between 1981 and 1988 Navy assistance to the
Coast Guard in the form of LEDET/TACLET embarkation
or sightings leading to seizures resulted in 106 cases
where an estimated 1 ,800.,C(00 pounds of marijuana and
2, 300 pounds of cocaine were seized [Coast Guard (G-OLE-
i) 1988)
In the day-to -day operation of the SFTF both
Admir als Thompson and Cueroni (coordinators between 1982
and 1986) noted the unusual reporting chains; they were
responsible t the Atlantic: Area commander and the
Commandant within the Coast Guard, but reported to the
Vice President via Admiral Murphy in coordinating SFTF
operations. The Coast Guard coordinator had three
offices: one at the Coast Guard District Office, another
at the U.S. Attorney's Office, and a third in an office
complex ou.tside of town where the DEA was located. The
Whi.te House was kept informed of activities through a
weekly status report and a dai.ly telephone call to the
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Vice Pr-es:idcent's press office, in addition to the many
informal contacts with Admiral Murphy ED. Thompson,
1989. ExSternally, there were a number of agencies
whose action were to be coordinated. Internally the
District Commander frequently used temporary personnel
from throughout the Coast Guard to support the SFTF and,
later, NNBIS. It was difficult to manage the operation
without creating friction within Coast Guard senior
management, in particular those officers losing
resources and senior- officers in the traditional chain
of command ED. Thompson and Cueroni, 1989 .
Admiral Thompson agrees with Elaine Shannon' s
contention the DEA would have rather been involved in
other long term investigative activity, but noted that
the local Sec ia. l Agent in Charge of the DEA "wori:ed
around" the problem and was very supportive of the local
operations. The span of activity coordinated by a
senior Coast Guard fficer was considerable and ranged
from finding enough jail space for prisoners, to
coordinating money laundering investigations involving
the DEA, FBI, and IRS, to assigning Coast Guard lawyers
as Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys to facilitate
prosecutions CD. Thompson, 1989]. At the same time,
Coast Guard personnel were gaining valuable training and
e>per:ience from the other agencies. Admiral Thompson
character ized the i nteracti on of the agencies as
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"harmonious- as it could be . . . looking back: on it.
people were too busy to get too petty. . the
frustrations came from not being able to respond in two
directions at the same time" [Thompson, 19893.
TRANSITION TO NNBIS AND THE OCDETFs: Admiral
Thompson suggests that NNBIS was born from the "need for
a visible display of tactical operations. The South
Florida Task Force did not have that. The South Floridda
Task Force let each agency run their own interdicticns.
their own arrests, their own apprehensions, their own
effor-ts . . we coordinated them. . . but we didn't
have a 24-hour operations center as we in the military
could understand it, a command and control center"
ED. Thompson, 1989:!. The thrust of the SFTF was to "et
to the :kiingpi.s" in post-interdiction investigations.
At the same time other areas of the country began
to complain of displ.aced smuggling activity and the idea
of a national interdiction system was proposed by
Admiral Murphy. Thompson recalls that dmiral Murphy
directed that an operations center be established in
Miami for interdiction and he felt the center should be
located in the Coast Guard District Operations Center.
That command center, the busiest in the Coast Guard, was
already overloaded with ong.oing Coast Guard operations
such as the Haitian operations and other Coast Guard law
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enforcement patrols. Thompson recalls, "It was a crisis
management center and Murphy wanted to throw everything
in there." Using the clout of the Vice President's
office, a separate operations center was created on
short notice by GSA D. Thompson, 19893. "We just added
another hat and made it work" ED. Thompson, 1989). A
Coast Guard NNBIS staff officer in Washington observed
that the different recional command centers functioned
differently based on the type of activity and the lead
agency for the region: "Miami was the best because of
the strong leadership and the oversight of the citizen 's
group" [Hart, 1989].
There were other considerations too. Thompson
[19893 obsserves that "The creation of the OCDETF was a
recognition on the part of [the Department of] Justice
that were was not enough post-seizure investigative work
being done. . and it was clear that we were missing
a lot of feedback. that would have been useful in placing
assets. . . we didn't get one in Miami and, qu.ite
frankly, we could have used one."
NNBIS AND THE "HAT TRICK" OPERATIONS: When Admiral
Richard Cueroni relieved Admiral Deece Thompson in the
Seventh District he wanted to come up with tactics
beyond choke point patrols. Intelligence at the time
indicated that a major operation during the arvest
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oer-iod (late fall) would be effective [Cueron i 1891.
Admiral Cueroni points out that they later learned there
is no particul.ar harvest time and marijuana is
stockpiled during periods of intense enforcement
ECueroni, 1989, The Seventh District staff developed a
plan for a Coast Guard "pulsating operation down off the
Colombian coast" where cutters would, in effect,
block::ade the outibcund shipment areas of Colombia: the
retsul..t was' Operati on WaonwhFee]. [Cueroni. 1 99Q]-
iWhen te head arters s-,taff di rector of NNBIS ,
Coast Guiard Captain Hc:wiar Gehring, was briefed on the_.
cpera=-'j. the pro ject quickly e.'panded. In addit:i.on to
the Coast Giuar .. o peat . . i ion in what were cal .ed
C art r . :?_a'--e oiS oi . cor- i ate t L .ti-a renc
oper at-i. on in the "t ransit" and "arrival. " zones
Cr Cu .... , i 1 Q --e t hr e i n t e i c: t o n p 1. n ,! , ' ,a -..
the rati'- onale for t he name "Hat Trick.:" Unde r the
fc i:: n::rd'~at:i n If jBCi' the State Department enliss, the
aid of Car ibtbea sn n t i ations an d i ncreased us e of DOD
assets were obtained [NDEPB,, 1986: 136]1 A special
agreement was negotiated with Colombi a to a]. low
boarding s of their- vessels on the high seas- and to allow
cutters to board United States vessels within Colombian
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tel-rritoriat wat.ers [DEFB, 1986: 136-137].
"During the early phases of WAGONWHEEL..,
the maritime forces realized a seizure rate
that was much higher than usual. When the
smugglers became aware of the presence of the
interdiction force, however, they stopped
mo.,ving their illegal cargoes, planning to wait
until the operation ended. Ma rijuana
a.ccumL ... Lte in the staging an-d gro wi. ng area i
c;jf L' .ombia . w he re in-ouLntry frce s wer-e r-il 
ti :: confis cate and des troy ma ijor quanOt:irti es o
the d rug OLerat ion WAGONWHEEl_. r-esu 1 ted i. 
tt he s eizi .te -F 7 v ,etls car rt-iy:i ng 1 69 tns oF
ma. i-iana. Anrther th-ree iessels carrvin 28
toins were r.sed into IMex i can waters, whe-re
they w !ere seized by iex ican aLuthor i t i es
i[NDEPB 1986: 1. 7] 
Ir cmpaii- is n, the ear .ier and simil ar mu].ti -agency
Operation Stopgap (1977-7 3 noted in Chapter 6 resulted
in the sei zuLre ro.f 23. vessels, the sinking of 4 others,,
and the seizure of nearly 450 tons of mari-juana and 55
pounds of cocaine CGLO EIC. 19783.
Other-s ere not so sure of the success. Admiral
Cerni ca r- ].. ed the op erat ion a "mi. ed success ." noting
there :e-e "t-ooj mary , ..layelr.-s" [Cueronei-s:i. 1.:.89] H o wever-,
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in NNBIS, Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Atlantic
Area command there was great enthusiasm for the
operation and plans began immediately for Hat Tick II
[Cueroni, 1989). Cueroni [19893 had doubts about the
"sustainability" of the operation and the continual
"knowledge gap" encountered with the temporary personnel
sent from elsewhere in the Coast Guard to provide the
needed staffing levels.
As operations became more visible, political stakes
were raised. Florida Governor Bob Graham embarked on a
local patrol out of Miami as a "seaman for a day"
ECueroni, 1989 When a drug bust resulted in a photo
opportunity at the Coast Guard base, his opponent in the
ongoing Senatorial. campaign, Paula Hawk:ins, comp lained
that the drug wars had become politicized [Cueroni.
1989).
TASK FORCE OPERATIONS MULTIPLY: A series of
special interdiction operations and mini-task forces
followed Hat Trick. Operation Blue Lightning (1985) was
coordinated by Customs and targeted smuggling through
the Bahamas. Prepositioned forces in cooperation with
the Bahamanian government operated in the Bahamas.
Strike teams moved by helicopters operating with cutters
sealed off islands and made contraband sweeps. This
operation evolved into a local permanent strike force
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operating 24-hours a day on the southeast coast of
Florida. Operation Bahamas and Turks (OPBAT) focused on
smuggling in the lower island chains of the Bahamas and
the Turks and Caicos Islands. This was a periodic,
surge-type operation that was supported by Coast Guard,
Customs, Army, Air Force, and the local governments.
These local operations were supported by new technology
with DOD WACs aircraft, mobile aerostat radar balloons,
and high-performance he!:i copters and fast boats..
THE MARITIME DEFENSE ZONE, A NEW GROWTH MISSION
in 1,84 the Secretaries of Defense and
Transportation signed an agreement to establish Maritime
Defense Zones (DZ) under the command of the Pacific and
Atlantic Area Commanders. Within these zones the Area
Comanders became responsible to the respective Atlantic
and Pacific Navy Fleet Commanders for "integrated
defense of the area, including coastal defense, mine
countermeasures/port breakout, harbor defense, port
security/safetv, protection of coastal shipping, and
harbor defoense" [Moritz, 1985: 44]. This action
followed a defense missions related study by the Navy
Coast Guard Board (NavGard Board). With the current
naval strategy of forward projection of seapower to the
area of conflict and the importance of the maritime
transportation s-ystaem to sustain the forward projection
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strategy. the solution recommended by the NavGard Board
pleased everyone and came at a time when defense
programs were faring better than others. Between 1984
and 1986, the Military Readiness Division (G-OMR) of the
Office of Operations was renamed twice (Military
Operations then Defense Operations) expanded the program
management function significantly.
By 19836, law enforcement and defense issues
dominated the agenda in the Office of Operations.
Separate divisions were created to manage the facilities
used by both the defense and law enforcement programs.
an Aviation Division (G--OAV) and a Cutter Division (--
OCU). The 1986 organization of the Office of Operations
is shown in Figure 1-6.
The grow-ing requirements for intelligence in both
the EL.T and defense operations programs resulted in the
establishment of a Intelligence Coordination Center
(ICC), a separate intelligence command located in
Washington. The ICC coordinated the intelligence
activities of the Coast Guard in two areas Hager,
1989]. It interfaced with the law enforcement community
through EPIC and NNICC. It also interfaced with the
National Security Intelligence Community (IC) for
defense related matters. The Coast Guard is nique in
that it is the on:ly federal agency with an ongoing role
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in both intelligence communities simultaneously Hart,
1989).
THE MULTI-AGENCY STRUCTURE IN ACTION, THE AIR
INTERDICTION MISSION
THE COAST GUARD AND THE NATIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT
POLICY BOARD: The NDEPB was created in the 1984
legislation noted in Chapter 7. Early organizational
meetings were held in pril 1985 and by fall the board
was soliciting staff from the participating departments.
Captain FKenneth Thompson, a previous branch chief in the
OLE division at Coast Guard Headquarters, was assigned
to the staff of the Policy Board and reported in
November of 1985. The Chief of the Office of Operations
and other senior managers felt the Coast Guard should be
"the firsi:. in" when such organizations were created CK.
Thompson, 1989]. It was felt that there was "real
potential that this would be important to the Coast
Guard" [K. Thompson, 1989).
AIR INTERDICTION, A BRIEF HISTORY: Interdiction
success on the water, coupled with increased use of
cocaine in the United States produced new targets.
Particularly important was cocaine smuggling by small
aircraft: 48 percent of cocai rY90entering the country in
19136 entered in eneral aviation a:ircraft Coast Guardl,
(G-OAI), 1987.
Without ctoke points and shoreline barriers air
interdiction becomes a complex. problem of sorting
targets, detecting small panes, identifying smugglers,
monitoring the aircraft'"s movement, and intercepting the
smuggler at a landing site not known in advance [Coast
Guard, (G-Ol) ," 1987]. No single agency in the federal
d-'ug enforcementf structure holds all of these
capabiliti. es. The current national strategy calls for
detection, trac::i ng, and apprehensi. on in the "arrival
zcne" [Coast Guard (G-OAI) 1 987 . The detection and
tiac:l.::ing phases require use of fixed radar sites (I-AA
facilities) , .and based aerostate radars, mobile
aerostat radars, and air search platforms (vessels and
aircraft) [Coast Guard (G-OA! ), 19873.
In the early 198's. thl-e Navy made ava:ilable
several P-3 Anti -Submarine Warfar-e (ASW) tracking planes
for air' interdiction. The Commandant of the Coast Guard
at that time , dmi ral James. Gracey, r efused the missJ. on
exp Fansion unei7r the premise that the air cra+ft were
maintenance intensive and in need of sensor replacement
to be seful [ Yost, 1989.] In short, he believed they
w-ere not the r ight pl atforim .and the Coast Guard should
rnl-l get i i n te ui !:-ine.. T-he 9rrent C mmandant ..,
Admiral Paul Yost 19891, agrees that the aircraft would
have been an "intercept platform but would not be a good
search platform." Customs took the aircraft and
attempted to expand their own air interdiction mission.
Evaluating that strategy, Yost 19893 remarked,
"The airplanes never flew very well.
They never got program hours out of them that
we would have expected. What they did get out
of them, they got at very high costs under
contract maintenance and very high cost with
contract pilots."
When Admiral Yost became Commandant of the Coast
Guard in the summer of 1986 he felt strongly that P-3s
were not the answer. He also felt that if the Coast
Guard did not provide some similar platform in the
maritime environmernt, Customs would obtained their own.
"Arnytime Customs wanted a pl.atform to go board something
or to patrol something we gave it to them if could spare
it . . . if somebody is supposed to be serving you and
they don't serve you, you build your own in-house
capability" [Yost, 19893. When it became clear that
superior E2C Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (AWACs)
would be made available by Congress for air
interdiction, Admiral Yost felt that the time was now
right and that the Coast Guard was the proper agency to
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receive them; William Von Raab, the Comissi oner of
Custotms, did not. agree Yost 1989.
ENTER THE POLICY BOARD: One of the first major
policy issues referred to the NDEFB was the air
interdiction issues and who should receive the E2Cs. A
pr(oject team was assembled in August 1986 to report by
November 1986 [GO,, 988: 16-17. While Captain
Thompson was not assigned to the project team (nor was
Customs) , he pro iii deed the team with etensive ba ckground
on the Coast Guard's long aviation history arid tried to
impact i an "opei- and positive manner" on behalf of the
Coast Guard [K.:: T hompsonii 1989 . The Customs
r-epresentai tive did riot have the same background in
:interd::-lic::tio and did:l not foc-us on the team's actiivitiees
[K.:: Tho-impson, 1989]. Capltain T-ihompson provided
logistics suppoFirt and an opportunity for the pro:iect
team to vis it Coa:H.st Guard units during the evaluation
trip to Florida so they "couldi see the Coast Guard at
its best" [K. Thormpson, 1989 .
POLITICAL OUTCOME: The prelimi.nary finding of the
team was to assign all four available E2Cs to the Coast
Guard and upgrade other sensor systems for Coast Guard
aircraft and vessels. It was anticipated that the
team's report would be inc:orprrated into the 1986 Anti-
Drug Abuse ct (tsee Chapter -7). Just prior- to the fall
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electionrs, Capt:.ain Tholimps on was "beeped" to cal 1. the
offic:e late at night and was in-formed that the Congress
had deciced to assign two of: the E2Cs to the Coast Gard
andJ the other- two to Customs [K. Thompson, 19893. In
Solomon-l i ke wisdom the Congress had split the air
interdicti on mi ssi on between the two agencies.
Onr, . May 1.987, t he Coast Guard and Customs signed
a Memorandm ii Understandi ng (MOU) regarding the oint
'resprjcns. i. i.i .- fr" air i nterdi cti on. Under the
agree-ment -e Cas-t. Guard is the "lead" air interdiction
agency in the ma-r:itime reg:ion, while Customs has tie
lead in the ].anrd reci-on. The MOU states, however-, that
the lead agency desigati on "does not connote erclusive
responsi r . b i . it: c rl c:mmand and control of the resources
by any olther agenI:y" r:cited i 'Young, et al, 1 987 70.
Both agenc:i es currently operate E2C aircraft
:i ndependent i -I t. o d t a , neither agency has
"b . i n . ed" TheI is sue; may be moot as t98 J 138 3eg i s at i on
assigned "letect ion and moni toring" responsibi lities t o
the DOD (See Chapter- 13)
RECENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES
The combined e-ffects of the fluurry o legislation
between !93L. and 1988 arind the program management
requirement--s e ner a ted b y te i. r- inter-ldiction arid M1DZ
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mission expansions, produced sweeping organizational
changes as the second interdiction decade drew to a
close. While the drug mission was expanding the budget
problems remained.
THE BUDGET REVISITED: Small increases in the Coast
Guard's operating bugdet in 1983 and 1984 had allowed
modest expansion of the drug mission. However the
effect of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act to reduce the
deficit in 1984 had a chilling effect on the Coast Guard
budget. Unlike the Department of Defense which had
benifited from the Defense build-up of the Reagan
administrationc the Coast Guard was funded through the
Department of Transportation appropriation which meant
the Coast Guard had to compete with the likes of the FAA
and Urban Mass Transit Administration for funds [Yost,
19891. S:ince the drug interdiction and new Maritime
Def:ense Zone were missions that had support in Congress,
the Coast Guard began to get third--party funding via DOD
appropriations and anti-drug legislation [Yost, 1989 .
Figures 11-6 and 11-7 show the Operating Expenses
(OE) Appropriations and the Acquisition Construction,
and Improvement (ACI) Appropriations for the fiscal
years 198:3 to 1990 (requested). OE is the everyday
expense of operating the Coast Guard. ACI is the
capital budget for the service. In OE the Coast Guard
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FIGURE 11-6
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FIGURE 11-7
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has been literally kept alive by DOD and Anti-Drug funds
since 1986. Likewise, capital. acquisitions have come
largely from those sources. Many of the acquisitions
have been multi-mission hardware such as new patrol
boats which have been purchased with DOD funds and are
used for a number missions, most notably drug
interdiction. In many cases the capital expenditure is
provided for, but the follow-on OE is not. Since OE
includes personnel cost, the Coast Guard has to staff
new facilities from other sources. As the figures show,
since 1986 the Coast Guard has struggled to staff new
equipment and missions and still maintain current
operationing level s. FLurther Figure 11--8 provides an
overview of how E funding (including overhead) has been
slowly shifted to the ELT program since 1979.
GILBERT I ND II: In 1986 a newly promoted
Admiral., Marshal E. Gilbert, was asl<ed by the Commandant
to (1) recommend ways to reduce personnel overhead for-
reprogramming to new facilities; and (2) recommend
changes to the headquarters organization and staff
structure to achieve greater efficiencies. The studies
are referred to as "Gilbert I" and "II" within the Coast
Guard.
The first study was completecl in December 1986 and
implemented in the summer of 1987. It is the subject of
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FIGURE 11-8
OPERATING PROGRAM COST WITH SUPPORT COSTS ALLOCATED
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FIGURE 11-9
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Sloan School of Management thesis, The RealigQnment of
SLgeort and Management Functions in the United States
Coast Guard: An Interim Look [Belz, 19883. When
implemented, the changes recommended in the study
produced a real savings of 500 personnel to be applied
to areas such as E2C and patrol boat staffing [Coast
Guard (G-CPA), 1987]. To accomplish this, traditional
support functions carried out in districts (engineering,
contracting, health care administration, etc. ) were
centralized in two regional Maintenance and Logistics
Commands (MLCs)in New York: and San Francisco [Coast
Guard (G-CPA), 1987. In addition, a major change in
the concept of Coast Guard operations was made when
operational. control of all large cutters and long range
aircraft was centralized at the rea Commands Coast
Guard (G -CF'A), 1987).
The second study was completed in 1988. As
implemented, this study significantly changed the staff
organizationr at Coast Guard Headquarters. Pertinent to
the study was the relocation of the Search and Rescue
(G-OSR) and Ice Operations (G-OIO) Divisions from the
Office of Operations to the expanded Office of
Navigation Safety and Waterways Services (G-N). This
action left the new Office of Law Enforcement and
Defense Operations with the structure shown in Figu.re
11-9. The Operational Law Enforcement Division was also
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reorganized to accommodate the new air interdiction
mission. In a reversal of the organizational pattern of
the 1970's and early 1980's, fisheries enforcement is
managed within the general law enforcement branch, while
drug interdiction has achieved branch status in both the
air and surface programs.
SHOOTING AT A MOVING TARGET
The last twelve months have brought about great
changes in the drug enforcement structure and the Coast
Guard. This research began as the new Headquarters
reorganization was starting. The National Drug Policy
Board and NNBIS have been replaced by a drug czar. The
air interdcliction mission has been largely assigned to
the DOD in legislation passed late in 1988. The Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (which contained the drug czar
bill) assigned the role of "detection and monitoring" to
DOD and, as a resuilt, .joint operation centers are being
built at this moment in Key West, Florida and San Diego,
California. Two Coast Guard admirals have been assigned
to the Navy as to assistant Fleet Commanders. This, in
turn, has drawn fire from Customs.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
WORKING LEVEL ISSUES IN DRUG INTERDICTION
A recurring theme throughout this study has been
the increasing complexity of the drug trade and
specializatio of agencies involved in drug enforcement.
One of the reasons why the Coast Guard is a specialized
agency lies in its sole authority to board vessels and
enforce law beyond the customs waters. This authority
is the cfe facto legal mandate for drug interdiction -- no
one else is authorized to do such work on the high seas.
This is part of the domain dimension of the strategic
tri. ad. Other- !reasons for the Coast Guard drug L
interdiction role lie in its asset inventory and
cojmpetenr ce, the remaining dimensions of the triad.. This
chapter focuses on the competence dimension of the triad
and, in parti cu:lar, the police activity of Coast Guar-d
perslonnel. .
The police work of the Coast Guard is different
from any other force in the United States and has not
been the subject of detailed analysis as have other
police agencies. However, the nature of Coast Guard
police work is important because the service's
involvement with drug :interdiction results in a large
number of .boardings and interaction with the public.
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Boardings like many other enforcement activit t i es
represent the ilntreest of the state in maintaining order
iju:'taposed against the rights of individu als. This
tension has always been present in traditional police
work:. However, the Coast Gutard has not encountered it
to a great etent since Prohibition.
Fol lowin- the devel opment of a framework for the
disc ussion i this chapter focuses onr three issUes
involvi ng Coast Guard p .o lice work at the wcorkking level:
(1) comipete cy. in conducting boardings; (2) discretion
in Coast Guard police worl:: i.e. stopping vessels,
dispatching boardinq teams); and (3) the specialization
of police w irl: in the Cast Guard since 969.
FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION
Jc.ames . W jiljscn, Michael EBanton, Egene Wenninger,
John Clar, and others have made a general distinction
in police work between what is called "enforcing law"
and "maintaining order" [Wilson, 1968: 16. Wilson
implies 1968: 161 that police agencies help atta:in
certain basic goals of any society through "goal
attainment" (law enforcement) and "pattern maintenance"
(maintainin order). It is the maintenance of order
that is the primary goal of the everyday patrol officer,
as opposed to the enforcement of law which is a pri.mary
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goal of :Lnvest i gat :i on. The difference in the view of
Wilson is that patrol officers have the added dimension
of peacekeeping in their activity. This role
necessarily implies discretion as to what response is
tal:en by the patrolman. A warning not to speed to a
speeder may be all that is necessary to keep the peace.
A warning not to murder to a murderer is unacceptable.
So the definition of what a patrolman does is fuzzy and
based largely on the order maintenance needs of the
environment.
Peter Manning 1980: 423 has described the
interaction between the environment and the
organizational mandate (interdict durgs etc.) to be a
"dialectical process." He discusses 1968: 43] the
"environment of policing" in depth and settles on
Weick's term of the "enacted environment" to describe
what is useallv called the external environment. The
notion here is that police enact in the environment and
therefore shape it to an extent.
. . . the environment cannot usefully be
seen as a single object but as an entity that
variably and phenomenologically links the
organization and external events. . . [it] is
a reflexive concept: it refers not only to
what is "seen" in the external world but also
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to the structure by which such seeing is made
possible" Manning, 1980: 441.
While this is a strong concept in thinking about
police work, it is an intuitive notion that is raised to
nearly a spiritual concept when applied to work on the
sea. The literary works of Melville, London, Conrad,
Wouk, and others abound with the notion. The Coast
Guard is cdistinguished from other police agencies in
that it is a patrol agency which creates its enact.ed
environment throuh the cultural lens of the Coast Guard
as a traditional naval organization.
The distinct natture of Coast Guard police work does
not end there. Whi. le most models of police wor: focus
on indivi cdual off i. cer behavi or, Coast Guard police work
is marked by a collectivism not seen elsewhere. Th is
col3ec tiiis Sm is due in part to the need to survive in
the envi'ronment first, before policing in it. It is
also a manifestation of the organizational essence
(discussed.in Chapter 9) which combines the law
enforcement and military characters. Police work in the
Coast Guard is necessarily a military operation. This,
in turn, introduces another dialetic, to borrow
Manning's term, in that individual action is in tension
with the larger authority strct..cure of the military:
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autonomy and discreti on versus militarVy accountabiity
and collective action.
COAST GUARD POLICE WORK: The majority of current
Coast Guard law enforcement (police) work, and nearly
all drug interdiction activity, is carried out by Coast
Guard boarding teams which are patrol entities in the
marine environment. A boarding team might be deployed
fromn a large c:ut er wi. th rea dy fire power and seniLor
personnel on scene to provide gui dance and oversight. A
bo.arding team can also be a group of two or- three junicir'
enl.isted personnel deployed from a coastal rescue boat
d:ispatche, fr-0om a f:i.ed station. After the Fosse
Comitatus Amendments a boarding team could be deployed
from a Navy ship. In most Niavy ships no other Coast.
Guard personne woul.. d be on boar-d. Boardi ng teams are
the action taking subunits of a .larger facility-ba-sed
group or organization with a .aw enfo rcement mis si on ,
-he comfbined act ivity contntutes the Coast Guard patrol
function , This notion, not pursued here, can be
extended to a larger unit of analysis; the interdiction
system where cctters, aircraft detection facilities,
and command centers operate collectiv ely.
The boarding team itself is led by a "boarding
officer.." Tie term hais leqal and organizational
meaninos, Or-ganizationall y, the boar-ding officer is the
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team leader, sim..ilar to the platoon or squad leader in a
military ground force,  Mili.tarily, the boarding of ficer
is usually senior to others in the boarding party.
Within ii.itary protocol the boarding officer is
responsible to a superior on the larger facility, be it
a coxswain on a small boat, the commanding officer of a
shore station, or the commanding officer of a cutter on
scene. Legall.y., the boarding officer- is the individual
who! takes te enforemen ct a ion; the one who exercises
j lurisdi.c:. iin-, author-it, and the powers of search,
arrest.., and iez r 'e e or she is the locus of act:ivity.
In courti :it is the boarding officer and boarding team
wh ot normay l te.sti.y. I t is the boar-ding officer who
makes , n--scene deci si ons as to probable cause and t.he
app licatioi of law t a sittuation. While the jtiudoements
and act:i.-ons of the boardino officer arid boardi.ng team
carn be o.,-;bserved (wi.th ou:icdance and acldvice oprovided by
seni .ors nreary):i the actu al enforcement acti on is the
board i of i c: s ,,
This form of a law enforcement activity is n:i. que
to the Coast Guard for a number of reasons. First,
while similarities eist between marine police units,
SWAT teams, and other law enforcement action subunits,
the Coast Gardc is the only organization (:in the United
States) wh!-ich carries out peaceti me tac:i ca:l unit .aw
enforcemen't iperat .:i. or-s W:ithin a mi i tar-y tructure of
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command and control. Second, boarding teams operate
totally in a marine environment that may vary from an
inland river to the high seas hundreds of miles from
land. There are many situations where the environmetnt
may be a greater danger to the officer than the
offender.
Third, while the enforcement power is vested in a
boarding officer, the final enforcement action tal:en is
the result of a system of actions which are brouglht to
bear in a situation. Many of these actions are
necessary to establish the basis for the enforcement of
l1aw but are not carried out by the boarding officer.
For eample, the determination that jurisdiction eists
over the location of the offense is often a navigational
activity carried out on the bridge of a cutter and then
relayed to the offi.cer. In such cases, logs and charts
bec:ome vidence required to establish jurisdiction.
This system of actions makes the boar-ding activity a
collective enforcement system in which information is
fed to the boarding officer. Moreover, a portion of
that information is not related to the enforcement
action itself but is designed to insure the safety of
the boarding team (i.e. the close presence of a large
deck gun or periodic communication).
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BOARDING COMPETENCE AND DRUG INTERDICTION
The boarding team is one part of the interdiction
system. After twernty years of interdiction eperience
boarding teams have progressed from seizing vessels with
bales of mariijuana in plain view to conducting space
accountability audits and using fiber-optic scopes to
detect cocaine in concealed compartments EDuca,
1989: 1.80 .
The early interdiction boardings were conducted L 
teams of per-sonnel. from-n the ship' s compliment. In
keepinrig with the mlti-mi-ssi on her itage of the ser-vice,
boarding 'team rrmemfibe!rs hrad car-eer specialties and
shi iboard ortani zati , al assi niments (see Chapter 8) 
Tho!-e same individl, a.s e used in boarding teams today.
The bi o difference wacs_ competence. In 1969 true law
en-f c-e.-trL. competence resided with special agents.
While su;S.i fiient si::ills may have recsi.ded in the boardiing
tea memb ers b y chance . ther e was no service-wide
training program or performance standcards. As several
officers have noted, early success in boarding was
related to the e:istirng skill portfolio on the cutter,
many of which were carryovers from other missions
[Larzelere, 1989].
On-the--j cii trairning was replaced in 1.978 with the
opFerij.ng of the MLE school. i3 r1 e this school could iot
produce a sufficient number of graduates, many graduates
returned and became trainers at units. In addition the
increasing number of multi-agency and surge operations
(SFTF, Mariel Eodus, Haitian Migration, etc.) gave
boarding teams increased experience.
Until 198t0, boarding teams had to deal with the
high seas possession loophole. ttempting to assemble a
conspiracy or possession with intent to distribute case
was difficult. Often seizures did not produce enough
evidence to support prosecution. Successful
prosecutions involved a cast of players including
intelligence officers, special agents, and other people
from other agencies. One novel approach used prior to
the 1980 amendments to the Controlled Substances ct was
the use of the 1935 Hovering Vessel Act, a Prohibition
era law which was use! to take action against foreign
liquor smuggler;s who hovered outside customs waters
[Ficklen, 1975: 7003. Nonetheless, the prosecution of
violators was difficult. One Coast Guard attorney
estimated that prosecutions were only possible in about
half of the interdiction of the era and of those
prosecutions "only about 50% yielded convictions"
[Conroy, et al, 1988: 5. After 1980 legislation
closed the possession loophole the percentage of
prosecution following arrests rose from 41 percent to 90
percent and the percentage of arrest that yielded
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c:onvicti ons rose from 32 percent to 5 percnt t betwe.en
198 C and 982 [Conr oy, et al, 1988: 1 4. .
In 19g: ., the Coast Guard published the first
Mar i time Law Eforcem-ent Manual wh:i ch incorporated
previous guidance on training, procedures and use of
force [Coast Guatr-d COMDTTINST 1.6243, 1983]. Recently the
ML E School. begai to issue bi--monthly MLE Bulletins to
th{e: field. E-' the 1- 't .., 1980's. the Coast. Guard had
gained enough exp ernti se i boardi rig operati on that
t!.ai3i.n Lno teams have been .cr eated to deploy to third
world countries. The Internat i onal Training Team (I TTs)
i s a permanent trainin g u n :i.t s t -atione d at the Coas t
Guard' s t rain in g cente t at. Yorktown, Vi ri. ni a.
Eoar l:i n g teams:, and b oar di g o- ffic er s are one h al 
of the in terdi c:ti system. The basi.c diecisi.ons on
target selection" and as:sertinq jurisdiction are made at
the command .evel.
COMMAND DISCRET I ON
COMMAND ROLE: In the collective system of
enforcement that makes up Coast Guard patrol activity,
the decisions of the cutter commanding officer are
cr i t i c:al F:rior t any actiori by a boarding team, a
target must be seectE. slcdPeter Manning has noted the
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high degree of discretion in target selection in
narcotics ei-nforcemrent [Manning, 1980: 47]. In a i. ke
manner, the commanding officer exercises discretion in
selecting boarding targets. In addition, since the
commanding officer is nearby and can be informed of some
or all of what is transpiring on the vessel being
boarded, the boarding team' s discretion can be limited
by the commanding officer. Very often there is good
reason to clo this, such as the receipt of intelligence
indicat:i.ng a threat on the vessel which is unk.nown to
the boarding tea-m . Often this imposition of auth ority
is command perogative, the exer-cise of e perience fro-m a
di s;tance. Above all, the commanding officer is
responsible for the safety of the vessel. and its crew
and is ultimtelv ac:ountable for the actions of a:l. L
crewmembers . including the boarding team.
MaYny : the decisions made b individual patrol
Joffi.ce.rs in a typical-1 p olice situ.ation are split between
the boarding officer and commanding officer at sea,. The
target selection, method of stopping a suspected vessel,
the decision to use force on the vessel, and the ability
to recall the boarding team reside with the commanding
officer.
EARLY DISCRETION: Early in the interdiction era,
commanding officers e,ercised discretion that was
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constrained only by local operating orders and the
statutes themselves. For example, Captain Larzelere who
commanded the cutter Courageous in 1973 was concerned
that a crewmember might be taken hostage. In the
absence of formal guidance, his contingency plan was to
pass a code word to the boarding team which would alert
them to the fact that the cutter would ram the vessel.
The boarding team was then to leap into the water where
they could be recovered Larzelere, 1989]. Another
commanding officer, as noted earlier, issued baseball
bats in lieu of firearms for prisoner guards.
The tension created between command responsibility
and autonomy and the military chain of command was
significant early in the era Melsheimer, 1989]. Many
seni:or officers recalled the punitive letters of
reprimand and the forced retirement of the First
District Commander and Chief-of-Staff in Boston after
a 1970 incident where a Lithuanian seaman who requested
asylum aboard the cutter Vigilant was returned to a
Soviet trawler [Johnson, 1987: 3643. One law
enforcement staffer at Headquarters in the early 1970's
felt senior managers prolonged the official decision to
re-entry the law enforcement arena because of the
unpredictability of boardings, the discretion of
commanding officers, and the "Vigilant affair"
[Melsheimer, 1989). 314314
CONSTRAINING DISCRETION: The majority of policy
directives concerning law enforcement that have been
issued in the last twenty years focus on procedures to
be followed in similar incidents. The outcome of this
process have been procedures that require commanding
officer to notify uperiors' in certain situations before
taking action. While this process has e:ceptions (i.e.
firing irn self defense), command decision making is
reviewed by higher authority in much the same manner as
the boarding officer's actions are reviewed by the
commanding officer.
In the area of target selection the commanding
officer must assess a number of factors including
available intelligence, the location of the vessel
(jurisdiction over- location), the offense or activity
observed (jurisdiction over the offense or activity),
and, finally, the nationality of the vessel (soveriegn
jurisdiction). Many smuggling vessels are stateless or
claim more than one nationality. In those cases, when
verified, international law allows enforcement action
under a 1958 Geneva Convention Conroy, et al, 19883.
For certain countries the United States has negotiated
individual agreements that allow enforcement action by
the United States against a foreign vessel Coast Guard
(G.-OLE-3), 1983). final consideration is the current
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case law regarding the particular situation. There have
been a number of challenges to the Coast Guard boarding
authority under 14I USC 89 [Carmichael, 1977; Buonaiuto
and Josephson, 1980 3 .
The combination of these factors has served to
lessen the discretion held by commanding officers at the
start of the interdiction era. This limit on discretion
was recently raised significantly in the "Zero
Tolerance" policy. This policy "was recommended by the
White House Conference for a Drug Free America and was
in:itiated by the N'ational Drug Policy Board" [Coast
Guar-d Commandant's.. BEil3.etin, May 31, 19838: 1. This
policy required commanding officers and boarding
officers to seize vessels for even small amounts of
drugs found on vessels within 12 miles of the United
States coast. After boaters and fishermen complained to
their Congressmen, the 198 Anti-Drug Abuse Act amended
the policy by allowing fishermen to continue their work
pending an investigation CC Current American
Government, Spring 1988: 783.
SPECIALIZATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COAST GUARD
WHO DOES POLICE WORK IN THE COAST GUARD: The
majority of Coast Guard police work was not always
carried out by boarding parties as described above. In
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fact, as Wilson and others note, there are a variety of
types of police .work in organizations and the Coast
Guard is no exception. The Coast Guard currently has
personnel conducting patrol work (boarding parties),
carrying out criminal investigations (internal and
external ), and working in the intelligence field as
intelligence officers or analysts. These are
specialized areas of law enforcement, just as the
various agencies are specialized. E xcluded for the
purposes of this study are the personnel who enforce
environmental and marine safety regullations. These
activities are regul.atory in nature and do n-ot i.involve
the-i mai.ntenance of o-rder oi- the enforcement of crim-int:Lr'
l aw. Much- of this w-ork is done without armi.ng
peri- sonne i:
Th et Coast fGuai-d had de-efmphasized mar itim me law
enforcement as an operational mission after World War
II. Little plice work was carrie ol..lt by boardin
tea.ms from cutters, with the eception of the
enforcement of international fisheries treaties. Most
police fwork: in 1969 was carried out by a smal]. cadre of
special agents who were trained with other federal
agents (civil service series 181.1) at national
enforcement academies [Chapeaul 1984: 34], These aents
were attached to the Intelligence Branch of te
Oop-rations Division at d:istrict o-Ffices and were utnder
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the control of the district commander. "Coast Guard
Intelligence until the late '60"s had, as a primary
mission, the conduct of internal investigations related
to misconduct of military personnel. A second major
function was conducting background investigations for
security clearances. Another major duty involved being
the foca3. point for Coast Guard contact with other
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
There were miscellaneous other tasks, including the
management of the Port Security program. A few of those
other takl:s involved intel i. gence collection and
dissem in at :i c-, " ChapFea..l, 1984: .34..
As Chap-eau has noted, "since the 1970's radical
changes have taken place" in the law enforcement
function. The most noteworthy has been the spillover
effects from the boarding operations in the field and
the program management at Headquarters. The only
intermediate level staff element which was suited to act
as a district ].evel program manager was the traditional
Intelligence Branch described earlier. As a result
general law enforcement and fisheries programs developed
at the district level to provide an interface between
field operations and headquarters. These offices
prepared resource requirements for law enforcement units
and also prepared operational plans and strategy for
loc.al regi ons. It was, in a similar manner that the
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Seventh Distr-ict had become involved in multi-unit
operations early on in the era.
At the same time a dichotomy emerged between the
intelligence and criminal investigation function.
Interaction with the national intelligence communities
through EPIC and ONNI, as well as the national seci.Ltt y
agencies (i.e. CIA), createdc the need -For an
inte l gen ce o f i cer s ec:i ala. ty separat:e from t he
tr-ad i t i. orna . inte.! iene o f:ic: As i.ntel crience began
to f : W: ri e ..:1. -f i- i rm s; eiz.ure th ere was no
eL-?-.:tab ' i..l. systemn- to: pr:ces: it' It was r etai ned .t
t, e C . i. 'L t :i. or: : t .) a l  f (-r:, war ded to EP C. In the -, i r .
idecaide -::f tie ei-a., s ai]. I pci- ::et:s _- i i n tel i ,ten-e
ai- al . -: a p r, ..up t E F . ICa ..- b l-i r a C o m mar - di
,r, 4: · T .g f .1.. i r' . -. 1 r5- *. :l ts L i-i i i-i n cte L i. t. . : *i£-, c-r , 9-, T hisa-F :raFment: io  e d d wi th the
Et a . i 1 i. a iim-n :..t f a c:e nt -al i ntel 1 i ence C: un :i t 'r, t e
C: as t Gular in 1j 8-1- r : - , , .989Q . Th He'Ie ia n aitW , n
iL 1 '~1 e . i: g e, .i --- fie r cai e oat. ! - i t he Coa,. t a I . r a- i" dl !(,
i ncl udi r- g a post.- gradat educ:at i i- proram [THager t,
In r egards L to _cri mi .a invest :i. gati ions, ther-e h--as
been an attempt to s-ep ar ate out internal affairs.
ba::: k r o u r"l. d i nvest i t .at .iin s, a n d cr :i m i nal i nv e s ti -g at i. on s
-o-im_ thE manra;ement :f o pera tional law enforcement
ca. r :i. ei:: t t. by .. L u .i - Th i has been ac: p-r: in ... Th .ed 
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to a degree by the creation of civilian special aent
positi..j.ons in slec-'.ted Cast Guard districts. As noted
by Wilson and others, t-iere is a substantial difference
in the roles of the patrol force of the Coast Guard and
the investigators. The drug interdiction mission has
served to defirne the boundaries and create the need for
a separate intelligence organization.
SUMMARY
T!-ie nat.:i-ure of Coast Guard police work is unique
becau- e o2f the env,:i. ronment in which it takes place and
the collectiv e nature of the interdiction system. With
1ittle f:p:ior :-knowledge in general law enforcement.
boardinq teams have increased in competence over the
Vyea-rs. t th e same tiie commarn-, dino4 officers have .. seen-
standar-dization o f proced ur es and somrre limits on
di .creti -,rI not. present ear-lier F:inal ly a i th the
l].arger- enf orcement str uclt'ure, internal law enfor cem Dent
duties- in the Coast Guard have become more specialized
as a result of the increased tempo of operations and the
i ncreasi ng compl e :ity of the tas::.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE, DRUG INTERDICTION,
AND THE COAST GUARD
The drug enforcement structure has grown from a
small regulatory enforcement branch in the Bureau of
Internal Revenue in 1915 to the Office of National Drug
Control PFolicy headed by a "czar." The Coast Guard
which has participated in periodic anti-drug campaigns
since the early Nineteenth Century has been engaged in
the present one for near-].y twenty years with the ET
program now larger in operating epense than any other
program. During that period each President has pledged
to end the scourge o;f drugs.
What is to made of al.l this? This final chapter
attempts to derive some organizational implications- from
the study just related :Ln terms of the overall federal
drug enforcement structure and in terms of the strategic
position of the Coast Guard. However, these discussions
are preceded by an update on the new Office of National
Drug Control Policy at the time this effort ends.
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THE LATE STATUS OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
POLICY
As stated in Chapter 7, the creation of the Drug
Czar marked the organizational end of the National Drug
Po:licy Board. the National Narcotics Border Interdiction
System, and the White House Office on Drug buse Policy.
After Presidenrt Bu-h was iL naugurated and before William
Bernnet-t was named Drut Czar, the NNJB;S or-anizat:ion was
moved from the Office of the ice Pt-esident to the
E.-;eciutive Office of the President (EOP). Thus it was
assured life ater the nam:iig of a drug czaT-. The
F'olicy Board staff was not moved into the EOP.
After his. confirmati orn, William Bennett has mrade
s.,,me, staff chanes but reta-rined the basic NNBIS
struct:u-e iunder the supply reduction deputy Addis,,
i989]. TI-is ac-tion insured that the regional.
coordi:ination! c:nt.ers around the coluntry wld cont:inue
to operate. The Policy Board staff remained at the
Department of Justice and was eventuallyv dissolved 3C
days after Bennett's confirmation Some of that staff,
bui.t not all, was relocated into the drug czar office.
The new staff is cu.rrently under a legislative
deadil:ine to produce a new national drug stratey wi.thin
1.83:' days. Wor-:ing under the deadline. te new staff has
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involved the National Security Cuncil (NSC) staff in
the policy frmutlation [Addis., 1899. This is an
interesting trn of events;. The NSC is the president's
national security policymaking boudy which is intended to
provide a supra-departmental view of issues. The
involvement of the NSC raises the level of discussion
and review above that previously carried out in the
Policy Board. Under the 1988 legislation, the Pres;ident
has the otption to allow the drug czar0 to sit on the NS-.. 
Wh:ile the new staff has worked on the new stratey,
the new Drug Czar William Bennett has tested the new
off ice. First,-t he has used the positioin to advocate
reform of giun contro laws [Wall. Street Journal, 2. March
1.989:: -) . Second.. he has focused attention on the druQC
abuse and related crime problem in Washington, D.C. [RNew.
York Times,, 11 Aril 1.989: 1.
The estab. ishment of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) has centralized control over
three prior strutctureS and focuLsed acc:ontability in a
single office. These actions, in and of themselves,
will not achieve a centralized and accountable
structure. The reasons are set forth in the section
bel ow.
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THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE CIRCA 1989
The basic problem in organizing drug enforcement
today has riot been solved by the creation of the drug
czar organization. Three central problems remain in the
current enforcement structure
First, the new organization has not "captured" all
of the po:ii y a-ind enforcement str-LLu:ture s which e xi st
The NNBIS or-gnization was assimilated into the ONDCP,
the OCDETFs remain undier the coordinatiorn of the
A tt-or ne- er , T-e NS-. staff, - under the 1.986
Nat:i i]. S iSecu lr i t y D:i r ec ti ve, are engaged in p olicymaking 
ab o v the CJ N F . .
Second, the basic issue o or gani z ati onal conf ict
over' si mul. taneo ..s , ccupati on of po.licy space continues 
to ei st lhis sitl-tationr creates organizati onal
conf: . ic t wi . i- i. . take uc p OINDCF' sita:ff tim e and d iiver t
energies from drug abu-se isues. "The policy space issue
has two key components. One is the conflicting legal
mandate.s of thie ernforcement agencies. Both the Coast
Gu..ard and Customs share legal jurisdiction within twelve
miles of the Uinited States shore. Similar si tLuatio lns
exist between DEA and Customs, and between Customs and
-t-e Border F-t:rol. Past reoroanizat o ns have
consolidated oarti cular aspects o-f: drug enfor-cem ent but
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have not remrived conflicting legal mandates andcl agency
enforcement capability. As a result bureaucratic
organizat:ions grow back. The other is less subtle but
more important than legal pronouncements. Agencies
retain control over their own resources in the budgetary
process. Latitude necessary for the operation of an
organization creates the discretion described by
Halpe-ri in choosing or emphasizing missions.
Third the pace of comple,ity and growth of the
enforcement structure s-hows no, sign of slowing. A good
example is Title XI o-F the National Deense
Authorization Act for 1989. This legislation did not
receive the media attentiron which was accorded the driug
czarv- bill but it added another major layer to the
enforce men iitstruc-ture. This, law designates the
Department f Defense as the lead agency for "detection
and,! mon:i to:iri.ng" i- the drug war CF.t'._ 100-456.. The law
allowed the FPresideint o assign another agency as lead
agency within 15 da.ys; of the bill's enactment but this
did not occur [Coast Guard (G-L), 1988: D-83. Since the
Anti-Drug AGbuse ct of 1988 allows Presidential
designation of lead agencies in principal drug trategy
areas, the option is not forclosed [Coast Guard (G--L),
1988: D-83. The act also requires that existing
command, contoltr, ommun:iati i ons, and intellience (C3I )
assets dedicated to drug.i initerdiction be integrated into
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an effective network. The President was required to
submit a plan within 90 days assigning responsibility
for operating the network. [Coast Guard (G--L), 1988, D-
81. There is no indication in the bill of how this
structure relates to the drug czar organization or how
the dual role of the former NNBIS centers is to be
integrated.
These three problems are indicative of the patternr
of drug control organizing seen since the 1930's: a
cyclical pattern of consolidation, fragmentation, and
reconsolidation in a more complex form. The flaw in
each cycle has been the failure to address the entire
spectrum of activity within the new structure. This has
been due to the problems noted above as well as the
shifting nature of the drug threat. It seems at each
jurncture the new organization did not perceive a new
threat just over the horizon. In the 19)30"s it was
abuse of dangerous drugs and synthetic opiates. In the
1970's it was the shift in smuggling to the maritime
environment. With the number of civilian submersible
vehicles which exist it is not beyond the realm of
possibility that submarine smuggling could emerge by the
year 2000, if it is not already in progress.
The activity of government appears to be in
competition with the drug trade and both continue to
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grow. Th:is appears to the author to be a pathologfic:9-al1
prob].em in the enforcement struc ture and g overn men t i 
general.. The answer in the mind of all interviewed in
the course of this research is demand reduction, the
creation of a "drug repulsed generation."
THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD AND DRUG INTERDICTION
The purpose of this study has been in part to
determine the extent to wiich the Coacst Guard has
undergone change in its organizational structure i.3.. M:.
result of the drug interdiction mission. The issue of
cultural change and drug irterdiction is an equal 1 ripe
area for- study, one that woul.d ave been included mor-e
fulilv in this study cinder broader time constraints.
Since L ecoming involved in drug interdiction. the Coast
Guard has elevated EL.T proQgram management to the highest
organi.zational level at Headquarters, an office now
bears a law enforcement title. That tile is shared
with an equa].l.y fast rising mission, defense operations.
Resource allocation is now greater for law enforcement
than for any other operating program.
THE EXTERNAL THREAT RATIONALE: These actions are
things that the organization has done to accommodate
external threats in the meaning of Selznick and Schein.
The threat has been twofold. Fir-st, the drug trade
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entered the maritime environment and created a threat to
the maintenance of order in the enacted environment of
Coast Guard operations.. This prompted a ref 1 e i ve
response at the field level which then committed the
service to the mission; especially when it became clear
that the Coast Guard was sole owner of the drug
interdiction policy space on the high seas. Second,
failure to fill a mission vacuum in the bureaucracy will].
result in a loss of that mission and the attendant
mandate and resources Maintenance of roles and mission
is a process necessary to agen-cy survival. The threat
is not unl.ike defending market share and cistributi on
ne tworks: e with new r-oduct lines. When the visibi ity
of the drutg prob-lem became i. h enough, the Coast Guard
benefitted in terms of hardIw;are acquisi. tion and
operating funds. For an aency that has labored for
many yearsl in the baci:water of media attentionr in
Washinrgton, the Coast Gard also finds the new attention
f at t ering.
THE RETURN TO TRADITIONAL MISSIONS: Beyond the
notion of eternal threat, this author has developed
an al.ter-native concept of why the Coast Guard has
pursued both the drug interdiction and defense
operations missions. Each is alike in one basic
respect. Neither m:i.ssi.on resulted from a modern
congressional mandate., Each is based in the central
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founding concepts of the service, its dual-character
nature. Neither is r-elated to the maritime safety
portfolio envisioned when the service was relocated to
the DOT. Most importantly, since neither mission
carries a modern mandate and specific program goa:ls, the
Coast Guard has the flexibility to determine how much of
that service it wishes to produce, subject to resource
constraints. No congressional or presidential decision
wasr made to spend less on search and rescue and more on
drug interdiction-i, the Coast Guard did that. Latel y.,
additional resources-- have been legislated with more
specific goals (i.e. air interdiction) but the basic
entry deci si on was the Coast Guard';.
Assessin g the f irst ten years in the DT, a formier
instruct*tfr at. the Coast Guard cade-my noted the
mi 1 i tarv-ci.vilian tension which eisted in the service
as a result f the relocation to DOT [Russell, 1976::39:1
The military conicept "-ias remained ingrained in the
officer corps in spite of an increasing civilian role in
the Transportation Department" [Russell, 1976:39] Eight
years later in 1984, a young officer wrote in a
professional journal stated, "We spend entirely too much
time apologizing for the fact that the Coast Guard
enforces law" [Abel, 1.984: 28] Over twenty years after
the creation of D -the real act is that the Coa stt
Guaird now.purs;ues, as i.ts primary iTii.s orns, fiLncti ons
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not considered in the original DOT concept. This
situation gives rise to the question of whether the
service really accepted its new role in the DOT,
regardless of rhetoric to the contrary. The service has
not, as Admiral Whalen suggested at the time, expanded
within DOT to capture its functions. Could it be that
the organization has sought, in a largely unconscious
manner, to return to its traditional roles? The
question is posed without a sense for the answer. The
recent rash of beach pollution with medical waste and
the Alaskan oil spill appear to signal a new
environmental wave in the country. This could radical].ly
change the current mission portfolio should
congressional and public pressure continue.
STRATEGIC MPLICATIONS: The role of the strategic
triad and the expandable mission universe described in
Chapter 9 are also important in understanding what the
Coast Guard did. The ability to react on short notice
is linked to reserve capacity and capability which are
created by the organizational multipliers, the dual-
character of the service and its multi-mission people
and assets. If the ability to react on short notice,
even in a reflexive mode, contributes to agency
survival, these multipliers are the true organizational
essence of the Coast Guard. The implication or meaning
of the drug interdic:tion experience lies, then, in its
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role as an implicit, incremental. and possibly
unconscious strategy carried out to position the
organization for future survival. The organizational
essence was the primary force which allowed the mission
universe to pulse and incorporate the new role.
HOW LONG AND HOW FAR SHOULD THE DRUG WAR BE
EXTENDED IN THE COAST GUARD? Excluding the social
problem of drug abuse and viewing the drug
interdiction mission in a strategic context, the
question arises of how far the Coast Guard should extend
its participation and how long should it stay engaged in
the drug war. A look around the Coast Guard right now
might raise the same question as a recent article notes,
"Without much notice, the United States is
developing two separate Coast Guards.
One is the high-tech, well-armed force that
uses the newest in radar, planes and boats to
battle clrug runners around Florida.
A close cousin to the Drug Enforcement
Administration and the FBI, this Coast Guard is a
glamorous outfit whose high-speed boats slam the
waves in pursuit of cocaine and marijuana
smugglers.
The other Coast Guard is the old Coast Guard:
the low-keyed naval service that sets the buoys in
channels, rescues the occassional stray boater,
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teaches marine safety and maintains order along
America's coastline . . .
Congress loves the new Coast Guard and
annually gives it money for new boats or planes.
At the same time, the old service suffered a $100
million cut under a budget agreeemnt last year, and
had to close 0 stations.
The two forces are real 1 y the same Coast
GLard, of course. But the difference between what
is happen:ing around Florida and what is happening
elsewhere in the country is so dramatic that the
agency sometimes appears to have become a rich
F].orida belle and her3 poor Northern stepsister."
C arai m , 19:38 ,
This issue bears serious consideration, not so much
because of the have and have-not missions, but because
the service may be drifting away from its traditional
strategy as postuated in this chapter. That strategy
calls for the maintenance of a strong strategic triad
upon which the orga-nizational multipliers may act when
needed to provide surge capability and capacity. The
trend noted above, if true, tends to defeat that
strategic pattern. Some eamples can illuminate the
i ssuLie.
332
The basic: organizational rationale for many Coast
Guard facilities lies in the multi-mission application
of that resource. It is difficult to imagine aircraft
and cutters operating deep in the Caribbean as also
being standby resources for search and rescue or
pollution response. When the organization moves multi-
mission assets out of the existing domain of service
provision they become single mission units. The value
of the asset and its potential capability is diminished.
Defense assets on the other hand are single mission and
depl -yment away from United States territory is common.
For many years the Coast Gard has justified greater
designed performan:e in facilities than would be
appro-ived for a single mission asset under the multi-
mission rationale. Opera-tinrlg out of the strategic
domain c:an result in duplicate assets and higher costs
to the Coasc:t G.tard a nd government. E2C airc:raft and
aerocstat balloons could fall. into this category. I:n-
anclth er Mar:iel Exod,!us these assets would add itt e to
the surge capability required. Finally, diversion of
operating funds has the potential to slowly deteriorate
the infrastructure on which the entire organization
rests.
The question arises of how far the service should
extend itself into the drug war. This questi on is
rel.ated, :in a purely organizational sense, to the Cast
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Guard's overall strategic plan. Despite the moral
argument to show a strong public stand against drug
abuse through enforcement, the Coast Guard strategy in
regard to the future is very fuzzy. Part of this has to
do with the political tide and the will of congress
which is pro-enforcement at this time. Federal agencies
have great difficulty planning beyond the next session
of congress. However-, as part of the larger question of
future missions and strategic placement of the agency,
the drug war raises serious issues.
Lacking a clear long-term organizational strategy,
which the author hopes has been proved not to exzist in
the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard is best served by
maintaining flexible capability to respond to short term
threats and new oppor-tunities within its environment.
The maintenance of this capability can be seen as a
generic strategy in itself.
The Coast Guard should maintain and enhance its
strategic triad whenever possible and maintain the
organizational essence (or multipliers) which allow the
best choice of mission for the organization. If this is
accepted as the organizational strategy, the emergence
of the drug interdiction and defense operations missions
become explainable and almost logical. In contrast, the
single-mission assets defeat the purpose of the
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strategic orientation and place the organization at ris::
unless those assets are used in a policy space which is. 
solely owned by the Coast Guard (polar icebreak:ers come
to mind). Mission (domain expansion), asset
acquisition, and the development of competence should be
consistent with the maintenance of the triad. The
agency should not acquire assets for which operating
competence cannot be shared. The agency should not
acqire missions that include assets not useable in
other missions unless the mandate is exclusive.
If this; rather abstract notion of strategy is
applied to current events, the decision of the congress
to designate DOD as the lead agency in detection and
monitoring is logical and in the interest of the Coast
Guard. DOD cant- deplloy assets away from the United
States and remain consistent with their strategic: triad.
On the other hand, Coast Guard deployment c f training
teams to Thi.rd World countries is a ex,,portation ofr
competence retained solely in the organization. A ll of
this indicates that the Coast Guard is pushing the
strategic "envelope" at this point. The risk exists
that the strateoic base will deteriorate while the
agency acquires single mis sion resources. This would
lead to the conclusion that the agency should rethink
the air iiterdictionr mi.ssionl n light of the new DOD
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The long term strategy, in the author's view,
should be to clean up domain issues with other
enforcement agencies, not just by agreement or
coordination of higher authority, but through
legislative housecleaning of the statutes. Beyond that
new systems acquisitions should reflect multi-mission
use. Finally, competency should be expanded in generic
forms to enhance futuire capability. A small example
will end this thesis. The Coast Guard with its own
university should produce officers with dual-language
qualifications given the international interfaces that
take place regularly on the high seas in fisheries,
search and rescue, and law enforcement all of which are
traditional missions and part of the strategic triad.
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